Pain and social context : social, contextual and environmental factors in the perception of acute pain by Williams, David
 
 
 
 
 
WestminsterResearch 
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch 
 
 
 
Pain and social context: social, contextual and environmental 
factors in the perception of acute pain 
 
David Williams 
 
School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages 
 
 
 
 
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of 
Westminster.  © The Author, 2003. 
 
This is a scanned reproduction of the paper copy held by the University of 
Westminster library.  Additional appendices are attached in separate files. 
 
 
 
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
 
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail 
repository@westminster.ac.uk 
)f5`/ * PHD 
Pain and Social Context: The Role of 
Social, Contextual and Environmental 
Factors in the Perception of Acute Pain 
David Williams 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of 
Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
May 2003 
ABSTRACT 
A number of factors have been identified as generally reliable predictors of individual 
differences in responses to acute pain (e. g. sex, personality traits and cultural affiliation). 
These factors constitute relatively stable, long-term characteristics of an individual. 
However, there is also significant within-individual variation in response to acute pain, 
suggesting that factors other than individual characteristics also influence pain response. 
It is known that affective-motivational state is a significant component of pain, and it has 
been argued also that the process of automatic evaluation effects changes in affective- 
motivational state through the activity of limbic structures associated with the detection and 
processing of emotionally valenced environmental information. This thesis proposes that 
through this mechanism, qualities of the immediate environment can act as modifiers of 
pain response. 
A series of experiments were conducted to test for the effects of manipulation of social, 
contextual and environmental features on responses to a mechanical pain stimulus. The 
results show that manipulation of preparatory information and locus of perceived control 
within the experimental dyad resulted in significant changes in response to the second of 
two pain stimuli of identical intensity. Also, both the sex of the assessor and the presence 
of a negatively valenced feature in the test environment were shown to influence pain 
response significantly. These results are in line with evidence from research into 
automaticity and automatic evaluation, and recent evidence concerning the roles of limbic 
areas in emotional processing and pain. 
The results provide further insight into the nature of acute pain, and suggest that individual 
variation in pain response may be explained in terms of an integrated biopsychosocial 
model, which includes what is known of the neural bases underlying the sensory and 
affective-motivational components of pain (the pain matrix), but also acknowledges the 
roles of socially acquired, long-term cognitive structures relating to individual traits, and 
the influence of automatic evaluation. The results have significant implications for clinical 
and research practices as they indicate that qualities of the environment may impact upon 
clinical and experimental pain measurement. Moreover, they indicate that individuals can 
be `primed' for pain by qualities of their environment and as a result, may suffer 
unnecessarily during acutely painful clinical procedures. However, awareness of these 
principles may be useful in developing methods of reducing suffering in those situations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Investigations concerning individual differences in the perception ofpain have concentrated 
largely on factors differentiating pain response between individuals. Factors such as sex, 
ethnicity, cultural affiliation and personality factors have been shown to be determinants 
of traits in the perception and reporting of pain. However, individuals respond differently 
to pain at different times. The same stimulus applied to the same individual at a different 
time often provokes a different response. This thesis investigates factors which influence 
within-individual variation in pain perception. 
Work pertinent to the study of pain perception has been done in the area of experimental 
social psychology. Research investigating automaticity, particularly the preattentive 
evaluation of features in the environment and the subsequent effects on basic emotional- 
motivational states (the automatic evaluation effect) may provide an insight into how the 
perception of pain can be influenced by factors other than individual characteristics, or the 
qualities or intensity of the pain stimulus. There are a number of limbic structures that are 
associated with the detection and processing of emotionally salient environmental 
information (including information relating to pain). These structures are responsible for 
the classification of incoming information and the initiation of appropriate (adaptive) 
affective-motivational responses to that information. These responses result in either a 
positive or negative emotional state, and a greater behavioural propensity to approach or 
avoid a given stimulus or situation, consonant with that state. A number of the structures 
involved in processing incoming information constitute a significant part of the medial 
division of the pain matrix, which is involved in processing nociceptive information, and 
is responsible for the emotional-motivational responses to it. 
In light of the relationship between emotion, motivation and pain (and the fact that they are 
mediated by several of the same limbic structures), individual variation in pain perception 
over time may be attributable to the automatic evaluation process. It is known that affective- 
motivational response is a significant component of the pain experience, therefore it seems 
likely that emotional-motivational state prior to a painful event will influence the perception 
of, and response to a pain stimulus. In practical tern-is, the perception of pain at any given 
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time will be (at least partly) dependent upon factors other than characteristics of an 
individual or the intensity or qualities of a pain stimulus. it is proposed that the social 
context in which a pain stimulus is applied; beliefs concerning the situation, who applies 
the stimulus and salient features of the immediate environment which are not related to the 
stimulus per se, all will be significant modifiers of pain perception. In short, it is proposed 
that social, contextual and environmental factors, through processes of automatic 
evaluation, influence the emotional significance of a situation in which a painful procedure 
occurs, and thus influence the ultimate pain experience. 
The following Chapters begin by examining the phenomenon of pain in order to provide a 
working definition for these investigations. Following this, literature on factors influencing 
individual differences in pain perception is reviewed, examining similarities in mechanisms 
of ftinction, and their relationship to emotional and autonomic responses to painftil stimuli. 
The neurological bases of emotion, motivation and pain are reviewed, particularly with 
respect to the relationship between automatic limbic processes, affective-motivational state 
and pain, leading to a review of the literature from experimental social psychology 
investigating automaticity and the automatic evaluation effect; its influence on affective- 
motivational state and the implications for the perception of pain. 
Defining pain 
The paradoxical nature of pain 
Pain is a complex phenomenon, and one of the first problems encountered in pain research 
is defining the phenomenon under investigation. Most people will have experienced pain 
at some point in their lives; anything from a stubbed toe to major trauma or illness. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that everybody will to some degree have an implicit 
understanding of the nature of pain and an experiential insight into the qualities of the 
experience. However, if one were to select people at random and ask for a definition of pain 
(as the author has done), the most frequent responses would probably be a description, 
rather than a definition. People tend to define pain either in terms of its qualities (for 
example, sharp, shooting, dull, aching and so-on), or in terms of their emotional response 
to it (for example, distressing, annoying or depressing). 
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Due to the abstract and personal nature of the pain experience, creating an all encompassing 
definition of pain is problematic, and such definitions usually will be flawed. The 
experience of pain does not appear to conform to any laws, rather it tends to follow certain 
rules, to which there are often exceptions. A principal confound is that pain is not directly 
observable. It is a personal experience, entirely unique to the sufferer. In this, it shares 
qualities in common with hallucinations. The pain a person feels cannot be known to an 
observer, only their behavioural responses to it (e. g. groaning, grimacing or antalgic gait). 
Even verbal report (heavily relied upon as a method of pain measurement and a means of 
providing access to the subjective experience), is only a behaviour from which the observer 
draws inferences concerning the internal state of the sufferer (e. g. Liebeskind & Paul, 
1977). The observer then relates these behaviours to his or her own experience. This has 
obvious limitations. For example, consider a person suffering the pain of appendicitis, 
being observed by a person who has never suffered appendicitis; the observer can make no 
valid inferences concerning the qualitative nature of the sufferers' pain, and can only make 
assumptions concerning the intensity and location of the pain based upon the behaviours 
of the sufferer. Furthermore, such assumptions depend upon whether the sufferer is stoic, 
or vociferous. The knowledge of pain in another is therefore an assumption on the part of 
the observer, though it is not an assumption to be made lightly. In hospitals for instance, the 
working philosophy is that a patients' pain is what the patient says it is. 
Another confounding principle is that often there is no correspondence between degree of 
physical trauma, and the subsequent expression ofpain. Traditional sensory models ofpain, 
held in the early and middle parts of the twentieth century, argued a direct correspondence 
between the intensity of noxious stimulus and the experience of pain. That is, that pain was 
purely a sensory experience with an unpleasant quality (e. g Chapman, 1984). However, 
those models fail to account for the experience of pain in the absence of any discernable 
cause. For example, psychogenic pain, such as that which can be experienced in 
hallucinations (e. g. those occurring in schizophrenia), pain experienced during conversion 
hysteria (Weisenberg, 1977), or psychologically induced pain (e. g. Bayer, Baer, & Early, 
1991). 
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Nor do they account for differences in pain experience in the presence of physical damage, 
e. g., the phenomenon of people undergoing what would by western cultural standards be 
considered painful mutilating rituals, with no apparent suffering. An example of this is the 
Indian hook-swinging ceremony, which involves a chosen man (the celebrant) having steel 
hooks inserted under the skin and muscle on each side of his spine and then being 
suspended from these hooks by ropes attached to a cart. He is then wheeled from village 
to village, blessing crops and children. During the 'ordeal' the celebrant shows no sign of 
suffering, rather he seems to be in a state of exultation (Melzack & Wall, 1982). 
Chapman (1984) relates the story of a9 year-old boy he observed in hospital, just after the 
boy had undergone a nephrectomy. 
"As soon as he recovered from the anaesthetic, the boy was transferred to his 
room. He was given no drugs for postoperative pain in accordance with his 
surgeon's normal practice. 
A colleague and I had involved the boy in a transcutaneous electrical stimulation 
experiment in which electrodes were attached under the bandage and stimulation 
was initiated before the patient regained consciousness. As the youngster lay in 
bed with his hands outside the covers, the surgeon and his associates came to 
visit. The surgeon told him that he could not drink water for the entire day and 
gave other instructions. 
Since an experimental intervention was being tried, they repeatedly asked if he 
felt any pain in his belly. He said, `No, it doesn't hurt', to repeated queries, and 
everyone was impressed with the apparent success of our intervention. 
After the surgeon and his retinue hadgone, the boy talked more casually with the 
others in the room. When asked whether there was anything hefeared, he began 
to cry and confessed his terror of the expected operation that would remove his 
kidney. His surprised nurse tried to reassure him that the surgery had already 
been done, and that there was nothing to worry about. He refused to believe her. 
'But don'tyou remember? 'she contended, 'That's why theyputyou to sleep this 
morning .. so they could 
do the operation'. The little boy looked very threatened. 
'It's not true! 'he shouted, 'It's not true! ' When asked why it couldn't be true, he 
asserted confidently, 'Because I haven't got any bandages. We asked him tojeel 
his belly, since his hands were outside of the bedclothes. When he did, an 
expression of astonishment came over his face, and he broke into tears, 
screaming, 'It hurts! It hurts! ' Thus, the boy's 'analgesia' occurred because no 
one had told him that he had been operated and not because of our stimulation 
therapy" (Chapman, 1984, p 1256). 
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Under these circumstances, it would have been tempting and understandable to assume the 
boy had no pain because nothing physical had changed in the few minutes of the 
conversation. Clearly, something significant had changed, at least as far as the boy was 
concerned. A nephrectomy is a fairly major surgical procedure and as stated, the boy was 
given no post-operative analgesia. At least as interesting as the boys' reaction to his 
discovery of the bandages, is the apparent absence of any suffering prior to that discovery. 
It may be concluded that the suffering associated with a wound (in this case the result of 
a surgical procedure), is not necessarily a direct result of it. Moreover, that the eventual 
suffering of this boy was associated more with a change in his psychological state than his 
physical state. But what had changed? It is possible that the boy felt surprise or 
consternation that the procedure had taken place without his knowing it. But certainly, with 
the boys' discovery of his bandages would have come the knowledge that his fears had been 
realized and that he had been cut. 
These examples illustrate some of the problems associated with attempts to define pain. 
They also demonstrate a dissociation between stimulus and pain experience. In other words, 
the ultimate experience of pain is dependant upon more than just the intensity or quality of 
the stimulus. 
A working definition 
Sternbach (1968) defined pain as an abstract concept that refers to: 1) A personal and 
private sensation of hurt. 2) A harmful stimulus which signals current or impending tissue 
damage. 3) A pattern of responses which operate to protect the organism from damage. 
That pain is an abstract concept and a personal and private experience is unarguable. 
However, exceptions to the second point have been shown above. Moreover, as noted by 
the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP), the stimulus is not pain per se 
(IASP, 1994). The third point refers not to the experience of pain but to escape and 
avoidance behaviours associated with it. Thus it is not so much a definition of pain, as an 
evolutionary rationale for its existence. It describes the most basic biological function of 
pain; to wam an organism of impending or actual damage and thus allow the organism to 
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avoid, or limit the damage and, in the presence of damage, to cause the organism to alter 
its behaviour in such a way that promotes healing of the injury (Chapman, 1984). 
Although there are exceptions, as a general rule physical trauma results in pain, but as noted 
above, there appears to be a lack of correspondence between degree of trauma and the 
ultimate experience of pain. As stated by May (1993), to be of any use, any definition of 
pain must account for this apparent paradox. It must include not only what is known about 
the physiological basis of neuronal transmission and the general rule that physical damage 
results in pain, but also the apparent lack of correspondence between degree of physical 
damage and the seventy of the resultant experience. The Gate Control Theory of Pain 
(Melzack & Wall, 1965; Wall, 1978) was the first to attempt to accommodate these points. 
The Gate Control Theory of Pain proposes a gating mechanism in the dorsal homs 
(substantia gelatinosa) of the spinal cord, consisting of inhibitory intemeurons. These are 
proposed to synapse with large myelinated afferent fibres (AP fibres), small thinly 
myelinated and non-myelinated primary afferent fibres (A8 and C fibres respectively), and 
large projection neurons. Ab fibres are thought to mediate sharp, pricking, immediate pain, 
whilst C fibres are thought to mediate slow, diffuse, dull or aching pain. 
The primary afferent fibres enter the dorsal horn, which consists of layers of cells or 
laminae (of which there are six, where laminae H and 1111 form the substantia gelatinosa). 
C fibres terminate in laminae I and 111. Ab fibres terminate in laminae I and V. Aa and AP 
fibres terminate in laminae Ed and V. These laminae contain cells which are especially 
responsive to activation of Ab and C fibres. 
In essence, the Gate Control Theory proposes that volleys from large diameter (AP) fibres 
excite inhibitory interneurons in the substantia gelatinosa, which in turn inhibit the activity 
of large projection neurons, thereby'closing the gate' to nociceptive volleys. Activation of 
Ab and C fibres are said to inhibit activity of the inhibitory interneurons, thus facilitating 
transmission of primary afferent volleys by the central projection transmission neurons, or 
'opening the gate'. 
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Significantly, the Gate Control Theory proposes a mechanism of central control. Melzack 
and Wall (1965) note that it is now firmly established that stimulation of the brain activates 
descending afferent fibres which can influence afferent conduction at the earliest synaptic 
levels of the somesthetic system. They suggest that is it thus possible that CNS activities 
subserving attention, emotion and memories ofpnor experience, exert control over sensory 
(nociceptive) input, and present evidence that these central influences are mediated through 
the Gate Control system. More recent research has revealed the existence ofpowerful active 
central control systems (via fibres descending from higher system to lower ones), 
implicating the nucleus raphe magnus and periaqueductal grey area (see for example 
Liebeskind & Paul, 1977). Liebeskind and Paul suggest that other central systems of pain 
modification may exist, intracerebral as well as cerebrospinal. 
The Gate Control Theory of Pain goes some way in accounting for the lack of 
correspondence between degree of tissue damage and reported pain. Although the Gate 
Control Theory is a theory of pain perception, it has important implications for any 
definition of pain. Liebeskind and Paul (1977) suggest that all the mechanisms described 
above, in combination, are sufficient to account for the experience of pain, but none in 
isolation. Therefore, the experience of pain is the result of the combined activity of many 
peripheral and central nervous system structures. Nociceptive volleys from primary afferent 
fibres are evaluated in terms ofpnor experience, current attentional states and meaning, and 
current emotional state. 
More recent definitions ofpain take into account these different mechanisms and the impact 
of psychological state and define pain as an entirely subjective, multidimensional 
experience involving sensory-discriminative, cognitive-evaluative and emotional- 
motivational components (see for example Chapman, 1984; Weisenberg, 1977). Axons 
from primary afferent (A6 and C fibres) project via the spinothalamic tract to the higher 
central nervous system (CNS). Ascending nociceptive volleys passing up the spinothalamic 
tract terminate project to a number of different CNS areas. Those projecting to the 
ventrobasal (lateral) thalamus and somatosensory cortex are involved in the sensory- 
discriminative component of pain. Projections to the reticular formation, the intralamina 
(medial) thalamus and the limbic system are associated with aversive, cognitive and 
emotional-motivational components of pain. 
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The sensory-discriminatory component refers to the neurophysiological mechanisms which 
facilitate detection of noxious stimuli, and allow the sensation to be localized in space, time 
and intensity. However, as noted, pain is more complex than an elementary sensory 
experience. It also involves the attribution of meaning to the circumstances surrounding the 
painful event through cognitive processes such as memory, belief, expectancy and intention 
(Chapman, 1986). 
The cognitive-evaluative component refers to the cognitive appraisal and interpretation of 
the situation, and the subsequent meaning of the pain to the individual, within their 
cognitive framework. For example, consider two middle aged men attending a business 
dinner. One has been warned by his doctor that he is at serious risk of heart disease, whilst 
the other has been told he is in perfect health. After the dinner, both suffer an attack of 
severe indigestion. The man warned by his doctor is aware of his risk of heart disease, and 
in light of that knowledge is likely to interpret the chest pain as a signal of a potentially life- 
threatening event. Thus, whilst the cause of pain may be the same for each man, the 
significance of the pain will be different, due to differences in pre-existing knowledge 
between them. 
The emotional-motivational component refers to the emotional response to the sensation 
and the situation in which it occurs, and the resultant motivation towards escape and 
avoidance behaviours. Examples such as the one above also are commonly used to describe 
the relationship between emotion and pain. Under the circumstances described, the 
emotional response of the two men in the example will be very different. The man who 
received the warning from his doctor, and who will have forined a more negative cognitive 
interpretation of the pain, may become extremely anxious and fearful. This anxiety and fear 
will certainly compound the experience and result overall in more severe suffering. 
Chapman (1986) provides a similar example. 
"In some instances, recurrent bouts ofpain may trigger emotional arousal even 
though the experience is all toofamiliar to the patient. This occurs when the 
pain may signal an acute life-threatening event. Many heart disease patients 
with anginapectoris repeatedly experience high anxiety with each successive 
onset of retrosternal pain, because such pain may herald a fatal heart attack. 
In this case, the uncertainty about survival associated with the pain generates 
anxiety. " (Chapman, 1986, p. 164). 
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Whilst examples such as these are generally sound in respect of emotional responses to pain 
being influenced by existing knowledge and beliefs, the relationship between emotion and 
pain is a complex one. Negative affect is strongly associated with pain, but states of arousal 
such as fear and anxiety may be both a result of, and a compounding factor in the 
experience of pain (Craig, 1978; Robinson & Riley IH, 1999). Thus there has been much 
confusion as to whether emotional processes should be considered as causes or 
consequences of pain (Craig, 1978). 
The use of dichotomous tenns such as "sensory-discriminatory" and "emotional- 
motivational" are useful in distinguishing between aspects ofthe pain experience. However, 
Liebeskind and Paul (1977) suggest that other dichotomous terms sometimes used in 
attempts to specify the origin of pain, such as "physiological" versus "psychological", or 
"organic" versus "functional" promotes a division between pain patients into those seen as 
having 'real' pain, and those suffering 'imagined' pain. This may result in insufficient or 
inappropriate treatment being provided to patients perceived as not having 'real' pain and 
who are therefore considered to be engaging in attention seeking behaviours. 
As stated previously, this kind of judgement is discouraged in clinical practice, under the 
general philosophy that a patients' pain is what the patient says it is. Nonetheless, it must 
be tempting, when confronted with a patient complaining of pain that has no discernable 
origin and a large affective component, to label the patient a 'moaner' or an 'attention 
seeker', and unfortunately, this temptation is reinforced by those occasions when it is 
known to be true (there are circulated between accident and emergency departments, lists 
of individuals who are known to present regularly showing signs of extreme pain, solely 
with the aim of receiving prescriptions for controlled drugs). Liebeskind and Paul suggest 
that when considering the source of pain, it is more reasonable to distinguish only between 
pains of peripheral, central or unknown origin. 
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All the above has been taken into account in the IASP definition of pain, presented below. 
Pain: 
An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage, or described in terms of such damage. 
Note: The inability to communicate in no way negates the possibility that an individual is 
experiencing pain and is in need of appropriate pain relieving treatment. 
Notes: Pam is always subjective. Each individual learns the application of the word through 
experiences related to injury in early life. Biologists recogni 111 that those stimuliwhich cause 
pain are liable to damage tissue. Accordingly, pain is that experience we associate with actual 
or potential tissue damage. It is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the body, but 
it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional experience. Experiences which 
resemble pain but are not unpleasant, e. g., pricking, should not be called pain. Unpleasant 
abnormal experiences (dysesthesias) may also be pain but are not necessarily so because, 
subjectively, they may not have the usual sensory qualities of pain. 
Many people report pain in the absence of tissue damage or any likely pathophysiological 
cause; usually this happens for psychological reasons. There is usually no way to distinguish 
their experience from that due to tissue damage if we take the subjective report. If they regard 
their experience as pain and if they report it in the same ways as pain caused by tissue damage, 
it should be accepted as pain. This definition avoids tying pain to the stimulus. Activity induced 
in the nociceptor and nociceptive pathways by a noxious stimulus is not pain, which is always 
a psychological state, even though we may well appreciate that pain most often has a proximate 
physical cause (1ASP, 1994)1. 
This definition of pain acknowledges the purely subjective nature of the experience, that 
it is always a psychological state and also an emotional experience. Also, it acknowledges 
the fact that whilst pain is usually the result of actual or potential tissue damage, this is not 
always the case; that activity in nociceptive pathways induced by a noxious stimulus is not 
in itself pain, but that the reported experience of pain in the absence on any 
pathophysiological cause, should be considered pain. Thus, for the purposes of this 
investigation the working definition of pain shall be that provided by the IASP, whilst 
accepting as a given the multi-dimensional nature of the experience. 
Implicit within this definition of pain is that because of the lack of direct correspondence 
between tissue damage and pain experience due to differences in interpretation, affective 
and attentional states, the same person subjected to the same stimulus at different points in 
time may suffer entirely different pain experiences. Similarly, different people subjected 
to the same pain stimulus may also suffer entirely different pain experiences. 
I The IASP Pain Terminology list may also be viewed at http: //www. iasp-pain. org/tenns-p. htmi 
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Indeed, there is a significant body of research investigating individual differences in the 
perception of experimental pain. Many factors have been shown to influence the experience 
of pain, and most of these factors have been shown to do so reliably. Chapter Two reviews 
briefly some of the principal factors which are acknowledged as having an influence on the 
perception of pain between individuals. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE PERCEPTION OF PAIN 
Individual differences in pain perception have long been investigated and have been 
approached in at least three main ways: from the standpoints of personality variables, sex 
differences, and ethnic and cultural detenninants. The following sections review some of 
the salient literature, highlighting particularly the role of emotional arousal in the mediation 
of these factors. 
Sex 
Although there is a general consensus that there are sex differences in the perception of 
pain, there is some debate surrounding the source of these differences. Some differences 
seem to depend upon stimulus type, for example some researchers have found that females 
rated supra threshold thermal pain stimuli significantly higher (more painful) than males 
(e. g. Feine, Bushnell, Miron, & Duncan, 1991; Fillingim, Maixner, Kincaid, & Silva, 
1998), whilst others have found no such difference (e. g. Bush, Harkins, Harrington, & 
Price, 1993; Lautenbacher & Rollman, 1993). However, a fairly robust result has been 
obtained using pressure (mechanical) pain stimuli (Fillingim & Maixner, 1995; Riley Elf, 
Robinson, Wise, Myers, & Fillingim, 1998). 
In studies using pressure algometry, males generally report higher pressure pain thresholds 
(e. g. Brennum, Kjeldsen, Jensen, & Jensen, 1989; Fischer, 1986,1987; Mersky & Spear, 
1964). However, the interpretation of such results requires caution. There may be 
physiological sex differences in response to pain stimuli (Feine et al., 1991; Fillingim & 
Maixner,, 1995), or alternatively, there may be gender related differences in response to 
non-related qualities of the stimuli, such as the degree of anxiety evoked by stimulus onset- 
time and duration, which reflect an increased capacity for males to modulate pain through 
psychological means (Feine et al., 1991; Lautenbacher & Rollman, 1993). 
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Fillingim. and Maixner (1995) note that pain response between the sexes may vary along 
any of the different dimensions of pain; sensory, affective or cognitive. Thus, the qualities 
of the stimulus, as well as intensity will have an influence, for example tonic pain (e. g. cold 
pressor and ischemic pain) has a significant unpleasant quality, as well as being intense. 
Fillingim and Maixner point out also that a relatively neglected area of research is that of 
physiological and cortical responses. There are sex associated differences in respect of 
other, non-painful stimuli. For example, females exhibit greater facial electromyographic 
responses to emotional imagery compared to males, and males and females show different 
cardiovascular responses to laboratory stressors, (Fillingim & Maixner, 1995). They suggest 
that both gender associated developmental differences and phasic fluctuations of gonadal 
hormones influence pain perception by modulating the activity of mechanisms associated 
with central modulation of pain (anterior, ventromedial and arcuate nuclei of the 
hypothalamus, medial preoptic area, periaqueductal grey area, amygdala, nucleus raphe 
magnus and the locus coeruleus). This is supported by evidence showing that pain 
perception in females vanes depending on the phase of the ovulatory cycle (Riley III, 
Robinson, Wiseb, & Price, 1999), and through the use of oral contraceptives or with the 
presence or absence of dysmeorrhea (Feine et al., 1991). 
That being said, sex differences in pain response have also been shown in neonates 
(Guinsburg et al., 2000), but by age 8, males and females have been shown to begin to 
differentiate between intensity and unpleasantness. Goodenough (1999) reports that 
subjected to vempuncture, there was a significant effect for age (but not sex) on pain 
intensity scores (older children reporting less intense pain), and a significant effect for sex 
(but not age) on unpleasantness ratings, with females reporting greater unpleasantness. 
Whilst Sternberg (1995) generally endorses the model proposed by Fillingim and Maixner, 
particularly the aspect proposing that differences in pain response between the sexes may 
stem from differences at the level of intrinsic pain modulatory systems, 
Rollman (1995) 
expressed some reservation towards the more physiological aspects ofthe model. 
He argues 
that many of the studies reviewed by Fillingim and Maixner may have confounded anxiety 
with pain and that differences in anxiety between the sexes may in 
fact be responsible for 
reported differences in pain response in many cases. 
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However , in a rebuttal, Fillingim. and Maixner (1995) reaffirin their acknowledgement of 
psychological factors and moreover that pain responses between males and females may 
reflect differences in patterns of emotional arousal (Le. that pain responses may include 
gender differentiated evaluations of the unpleasant quality of the pain, as well as the 
intensity). 
Indeed, there are autonomic correlates to pain response between sexes. Differences have 
been shown in a number of different autonomic indexes such as cardiovascular response 
(Al Absi, Buchanan, Marrerob, & Lovallo, 1999) and adrenocortical response (Al Absi, 
Petersen, & Wittmers, 2002) suggesting that emotional arousal plays a significant role in 
the perception of pain between the sexes. 
It is important to note that the central regions listed by Fillingim and Maixner as important 
areas in differential pain response form part of the limbic brain and reticular activating 
systems which are also associated with emotional arousal and the processing of affect (see 
Chapter Three). Moreover, given that emotion (including anxiety) is a significant 
component of the experience of pain, it is possible that Fillingim and Maixner and Rollman 
are in fact arguing the same case from different perspectives (physiological and 
psychological respectively), as two people arguing that the grass is greener on their side of 
the fence, where it is in fact the fence that is the artificial construct. 
In any event, as emotion is an intrinsic component of the pain experience, any increase in 
negative emotion would serve only to make the experience more unpleasant, which would 
be reflected in subsequent verbal reports through such terms as 'worse pain'. The role of 
emotional arousal, whether viewed from a physiological perspective or a psychological one, 
is generally acknowledged as being an important determinant in different pain response 
between the sexes (Al Absi et al., 1999; Al Absi et al., 2002; Fillingham & Maixner, 1995; 
Fillingim, Edwards, & Powell, 1999; Goodenough et al., 1999; Rollman, 1995). 
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The origin of sex related differences in the perception of pain is most likely a combination 
of inherent biological differences in central (limbic) structures associated with the 
processing of emotion, and developmental differences in gender related traits acquired 
through social learning. There is evidence to suggest that the acquisition of gender identity 
through social learning may also have some influence on the development of central 
structures associated with emotional processing through neural plasticity. In any event, it 
is apparent that sex associated differences in the perception of pain stem to a significant 
degree from differences in patterns of emotional response to qualities of the stimulus other 
than simply intensity. 
Ethnicity and cultural background 
As well as sex associated differences, small but important social and cultural differences 
in pain response have also been shown. Again, social learning and differences in patterns 
of emotional arousal have been strongly implicated in ethnic and cultural differences in 
response to pain. 
Bates et al. (1993) investigated 372 individuals, from six ethnic groups, undergoing 
treatment for chronic pain at a multi disciplinary pain-pain management centre. The ethnic 
gToups were Hispanic, Polish, Italian, Irish French Canadian and Old American. Bates et 
al. found that the best predictors of reported pain intensity were ethnic group affiliation and 
locus of control. They discovered clear and consistent patterns of behavioural, attitudinal 
and emotional responses. Members of the Hispanic group reported their pain more 
frequently and more emotionally than members of any other group, and reported higher 
degrees of associated anxiety anger and tension. Second highest were members of the 
Italian group. Consistently lowest on these response categories were members of the Polish 
group. Many members of the Hispanic and Italian groups reported that emotional 
expression of pain was an appropriate response to that pain, whilst members of the Polish 
and Old American groups indicated that non-expression was the ideal response. 
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Weisenberg (1977) reports a study in which significant differences in trait anxiety between 
black, white and Puerto Rican dental patients were found. Attitude differences were also 
obtained, revealing differences in willingness to deny, avoid or get rid of the pain. it is a 
significant point that both generation and degree of heritage consistency appear to modify 
the influence of ethnic affiliation on the pain experience (Bates et al., 1993). Bates and 
Rankin-Hill (1994) found later that ethnic identity was a significant predictor of locus of 
control style, and suggest that the psycho-social experiences as a member of an ethnic group 
is probably the source of differences in locus of control style. 
The examples above implicate strongly the role of social learning in pain response within 
cultural groups. It is not likely that there is any significant neurophysio logical differences 
between different races, and probably fewer differences of significance between same-sex 
members of different races than between different-sex members of the same race. Indeed, 
sex differences within cultures may also be partly a function of cultural and behavioural 
influences such as cultural expectations concerning appropriate gender-roles and behaviours 
(Fillingirn & Maixner, 1995; Otto & Dougher, 1985; Riley III et al., 1998). 
Bates et al. (1993) proposed a biocultural model to provide an heuristic basis for 
conceptualising the relationship between culture and pain. This model assumes no inherent 
neurophysiological differences between members of different ethnic groups. Rather, it 
suggests a mechanism by which social learning and socially acquired patterns of pain 
response "... may influence the neurophysiological processing ofnociceptive information, 
as well as psychological, behavioural and verbal responses to pain" (Bates et al., 1993, 
p109). This is strongly supported by evidence of neural plasticity in central regions 
associated with emotion. Data from animal studies have shown that environmental events 
have a profound impact on the development of the neural circuitry of emotion. Further, 
recent research has shown neurogenesis in areas of the limbic brain, indicating that neural 
plasticity continues throughout adulthood (see Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000). 
It is a truism to say that at some stage early in life, the experience of pam must be novel. 
At that time, reactions to it are likely to be the most basic and not subject to social mores 
or gender-role expectations. However, parents devote a considerable amount of time and 
effort in helping their children cope with the inevitable periods of sickness and injury that 
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occur. During this time, it has been observed that the pain reactions of children changes 
from a spontaneous reflexive and global activity, to reactions which indicate sensitivity to 
the immediate context and demonstrate anticipation and goal directed action (Craig, 1978; 
1986). 
The transition between spontaneous patterns ofbehaviour in response to pain to a sequence 
of behaviours suggesting fear of impending pain, the reaction to the painful event itself and 
anger following the event has been recorded as early as 7-8 months (Craig, 1978). In 
helping their children through painful events, and particularly through their own reactions 
to the responses of their children (e. g. "hush now! Be brave ... 
big boys don't cry"), parents 
also begin to establish boundaries for what is considered appropriate behaviour for each 
gender within the society. 
Parents also pass on their own fears and anxieties (or lack thereof) concerning pain. 
According to Craig (1986), the influence of social learning becomes most apparent when 
children acquire maladaptive or over anxious behaviour patterns within their families. A 
good example of this can be seen in phlebotomy out-patients clinics (blood test rooms). It 
is a fairly common sight in blood-rooms that parents bringing in their children for a blood 
test, will provide a running commentary to the child "it's ok, there's nothing to worry 
about, it won't hurt, it'll all be over soon", whilst shielding the child's eyes from what is 
happening around them and thus denying them the opportunity to see for themselves that 
other people are accepting venipuncture with little or no signs of pain. 
Fairly soon, the child who was sitting placidly in the waiting room five minutes ago, is 
reduced to a state of extreme anxiety. This degree of attention and concern from the parent 
can only signal that something terrible is about to happen. Subsequently, such children will 
not sit for venipuncture and the procedure has to be delayed, and the child's fear and 
anxiety builds. Conversely, the children of parents who behave 'normally' and allow the 
child to explore its surroundings, ask questions and satisfy their curiosity generally tend to 
be calmer, accepting vempuncture more or less with equanimity and in some cases even 
interest. 
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Within any culture, parents, peers and societal ideals play a principal role in detennining 
the appropriate behavioural responses to pain and painful situations. Combined with 
personal experiences of pain, these provide the basis for the attitudes of the individual 
towards pain and painful situations. Further, (and in common with research into sex 
associated differences) the evidence suggests that social learning is a determinant of 
subsequent patterns of affective and autonomic arousal. Weisenberg (1977) notes that 
differences between ethnic groups appears to be related to the reaction or tolerance 
components ofpain rather than threshold discrimination, which suggests that social learning 
within a culture is a more predominant factor in ethnic differences in pain perception than 
any biological differences. Underlying attitudes and anxiety reactions appear to be a major 
source of ethnic differences. 
There is also evidence that differences in cultural attitudes influence psychophysical and 
autonomic function. For example, psychophysical and autonomic correlates between 
Yankee (the term used by Weisenberg to describe American Protestants of British descent), 
Irish, Italian and Jewish ethnic groups and pain response have been shown. Yankees, 
described as phlegmatic in attitude towards pain, showed the fastest rate of diphasic palmar 
skin potentials in response to electrical pain stimuli. Irish participants, described in similar 
ternis to the Yankees as being undemonstrative, but in a repressive rather than phlegmatic 
way (i. e. inhibiting their responses and concerns toward the pain), showed a lower palmar 
skin resistance. Italian participants, described as being oriented in the present and focussing 
on the immediacy of pain showed a significant positive correlation between heart-rate and 
upper pain threshold. And Jewish participants, described as being future oriented (i. e. 
expressing concern regarding future implications ofthe pain stimulus), showed a significant 
negative correlation between upper threshold and heart rate (Sternbach & Tursky, 1965; 
Tursky & Sternbach, 1967). 
Ethnic origin and cultural affiliation have been shown to be determinants of individual 
differences in pain response. However, the origins of these differences do not stem from 
any inherent neurophysiological differences between ethnic groups, but from social 
leaming. Parental and societal values concerning appropriate behaviours in response to pain 
influence the development of individual attitudes towards pain and painful situations. 
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Whilst there are inherent biological differences between the sexes, social leaming implicit 
in the acquisition of gender-role is implicated in the development of sex associated 
differences in patterns of emotional and autonomic arousal in response to pain. In the same 
way, and in light of recent evidence concerning neural plasticity (e. g. Davidson et al., 
2000), it is likely that social learning implicit in the acquisition of cultural identity and 
societal values results in long-term differences in the way in which nociceptive information 
is processed (as suggested by Bates, (1993)), and in the development of patterns of 
emotional and autonomic arousal in response to painful events. 
The element in common with both sex and cultural differences in response to pain and 
painful situations is the influence of social learning. Social learning directs the development 
of styles of emotional processing peculiar to gender roles within cultural groups and to 
different cultural groups. However, individuals within any group may respond differently 
to pain and painful situations, as a result of combinations of characteristics peculiar to the 
individual. Personality factors have also been shown to influence the way in which 
individuals respond to pain. 
Personality factors 
There is a large body of research investigating personality factors in relation to pain and 
coping. Factors, such as introversion/extroversion, neuroticism, Locus of Control (Rotter, 
1966), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) and the perception of control have been shown to 
influence pain response. These latter three are interrelated. 
Introversion/Extroversion 
Introversion/extroversion and neuroticism have been shown to be associated with 
differences in pain response. For example, Lynn and Eysenck (1961) took measure of 
extroversion and neuroticism using the Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI), and 
measures of pain tolerance using radiant heat stimulus. They report a strong positive 
correlation between extroversion and pain tolerance (r = 0.69), and a moderate, negative 
relationship between neuroticism and pain tolerance (r = -0-36). 
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Roome and Humphrey (1992) investigated the relationship between analgesic intake and 
personality factors in a population of thirty-two chronic back-pain sufferers. In this 
instance, measures of extroversion using the Eysenck Personalty Questionnaire (EPQ) were 
accompanied by measure of health locus of control, taken using the Multidimensional 
Health Locus of Control scale (MHLC). The results show a positive correlation between 
neuroticism and analgesic usage (r = 0.4 1), a negative correlation between extroversion and 
analgesic usage (r = -0.3 8) and a positive correlation between a'powerful others' (external) 
locus of control style and analgesic usage (r = 0.36). 
Taken together, these two examples demonstrate a relationship between 
introversion/extroversion, neuroticism and pain response. Extroverts are thought to 
condition less well than introverts, and so develop less anxiety concerning the stimulation. 
Introverts tend to have a higher level of emotional arousal than extroverts and therefore 
have lower pain thresholds, whilst neuroticism is associated with greater autonomic lability 
and higher levels of anxiety (Weisenberg, 1977). 
Locus of Control, Self-efficacy and perceived control 
Locus of Control (LOC) has been shown to be a determinant of pain coping. LOC may be 
described as a general principle that a person's attempts to control their personal 
environment are influenced by internal or external factors. More specifically, the extent to 
which an individual believes that events within their personal environment are under their 
own control, or are controlled by external circumstances (e. g. luck, fate or powerful others). 
In general, a more internal LOC is associated with higher pain tolerance and better pain 
coping (e. g. Craig & Best, 1977; Crisson & Keefe, 1988; Roome & Humphrey, 1992; 
Toomey, Mann, Abashian, & Thompson Pope, 199 1). In clinical situations a more internal 
LOC is associated with more positive clinical outcomes (Bates & Rankin Hill, 1994; 
Harkapaa, Jarvikoski, Mellin, HuM, & Luoma, 1991; Reynaert et al., 1995), and in 
common with introversion and extroversion, LOC has been found to relate to analgesic 
usage (Reynaert et al., 1995; Roome & Humphrey, 1992). More internal LOC patients 
requiring lower and less frequent doses of analgesia. 
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There is evidence that LOC is related to self-efficacy (Rokke, Al Absi, Lall, & Oswald, 
1991), those with a more internal LOC tend to have a stronger sense of self-efficacy. This 
is not surprising, as a prerequisite to the belief that one has control over events and 
circumstances within one's environment (internal LOC), must be the belief that one has the 
ability to influence those events and circumstances (high self-efficacy). Lefcourt (1980) 
notes that in general, people who have been assessed as holding more external LOC tend 
to behave in ways that are congruent with descriptions of helplessness. They are less likely 
to seek infonnation, are less likely to utilize information that is available, and are less likely 
to demonstrate positive affective states than are internal LOC individuals. As noted 
previously, there are significant relationships between locus of control style and cultural or 
ethnic identity (Bates & Rankin Hill, 1994), which suggests that the acquisition of cultural 
traits through social learning influences the developments of locus of control styles also. 
There is evidence for relationships between perceived self-efficacy, immunological function 
and endogenous opiold mediated analgesia. Wiedenfield et al. (1990) took 20 participants 
with severe snake-phobia. After taking baseline measures of (among others) self-efficacy 
and immunological indexes, exposed the participants to two 2-hour sessions involving 
activities (with snakes) designed to elevate their sense of self-efficacy in coping with 
snakes. These sessions resulted in a highly significant elevation of self-efficacy in the 
participants. The acquisition of a stronger sense of self-efficacy was associated with a 
significant elevation in immunocompetence. 
In a similar experiment investigating self-efficacy and pain control, Bandura et al. (1987) 
assigned 72 participants to one of three conditions. Cognitive coping, in which participants 
received instructions and practice in the use of different cognitive coping strategies for 30 
minutes. A placebo medication condition, in which participants were given a placebo pill 
described as a widely used medicinal analgesic and asked to wait 30 minutes for it to take 
effect, and a control condition. Participants in the control condition received only orienting 
instructions concerning the experimental procedure and were asked to wait for 30 minutes. 
After 30 minutes, all participants were administered self-efficacy assessment scales, then 
undertook a cold-pressor pain tolerance test. They were then readministered self-efficacy 
scales. 
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To test whether any changes in pain tolerance were mediated by activation of the endorphin 
system, 50% of participants in each condition were given an injection of 10mg naloxone 
(an opiate antagonist). The other 50% received an injection of nonual saline. 
The results showed that training in cognitive strategies improved self-efficacy to both 
tolerate pain and to reduce its seventy. The placebo analgesic Increased the ability to 
tolerate pain, but not to reduce its severity. In all conditions, the stronger the perceived 
sense of self-efficacy, the greater the pain tolerance. In the cognitive strategy trained group, 
those administered with naloxone were less able to tolerate pain than those administered 
with normal saline. This result also revealed that the greater the sense of self-efficacy, the 
greater the opioid activation. However, participants trained in cognitive coping strategies 
showed an increase in the ability to tolerate pain even when naloxone was administered 
compared to the placebo and control groups, indicating a non-oploid component in pain 
coping. 
The relationship between self-efficacy and pain is not a straightforward one. In a later 
experiment, Bandura, et al. (1988) tested the hypothesis that perceived self-inefficacy 
activates endogenous opioid systems. Measures of perceived self-efficacy to manage pain 
were taken from 40 paid volunteers, after which measures of cold-pressor pain tolerance 
were taken. Participants were then exposed to conditions designed either to increase or 
reduce the participant's perceived mathematical self-efficacy (irrelevant to pain). 
Mathematical problems were presented on a computer monitor for 18 minutes. In the high 
self-efficacy condition, participants were able to control the rate at which the problems were 
presented. In the low self-efficacy condition, the problems were presented at a rate which 
exceeded the participant's cognitive abilities. Participants were told that they would be 
assessed for speed and accuracy, and that their results would be compared with others who 
had completed the task. To detect endogenous opiold activity, naloxone was given 
intravenously to 50% of the participants, the other 50% received normal saline. 
As with the 1987 experiment, results showed that strength of perceived self-efficacy to 
manage pain was positively related to pain tolerance in all conditions, and the 
administration of naloxone was shown to diminish this affect. However, the results also 
provide evidence that perceived self-inefficacy in coping with cognitive stressors (irrelevant 
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to pain) also activates endogenous opioid systems. Participants high in self-inefficacy 
showed elevated levels of subjective stress in response to their apparent cognitive 
impairment. These stressed participants were able to cope with increasing pain stimulation 
in the saline condition, whilst participants in the same condition given naloxone were 
unable to tolerate much pain stimulation. 
The results of these two experiments may appear to raise a question concerning the 
relationship between self-efficacy and pain coping. Whilst there is no direct evidence to 
contradict the findings that higher levels of self efficacy are associated with better pain 
coping, how can it be that higher levels of self-inefficacy are also associated with better 
pain coping? Bandura et al. point out that perceived coping inefficacy not only activated 
higher autonomic arousal during the problem solving, but left participants in a sensitized 
inefficacious state that persisted beyond the task. Therefore, it was not perceived self- 
inefficacyper se that was responsible for oploid activation, rather it was the resultant stress 
and anxiety. 
As well as activating endogenous opioid systems, it is likely that the stress resulting from 
perceived self-inefficacy also acted as a distraction. This is supported by Al Absi and 
Rokke (199 1), who investigated the effects of relevant and irrelevant anxiety on pain rating 
and tolerance in a cold pressor test. Using a2 (high or low anxiety) x2 (relevant or 
irrelevant anxiety) design, 100 female participants were assigned to one of four groups. 
Participants were given briefings designed to evoke either high or low anxiety about either 
the cold-pressor test (relevant anxiety) or about an electric shock they were told to expect 
(irrelevant anxiety). Participants were connected to a dummy electric shock machine, and 
then exposed to the cold-pressor. Measures of cold-pressor pain rating and tolerance were 
taken. Participants in the high-relevant anxiety condition reported the most pain, whilst 
participants in the high-irrelevarit anxiety condition reported the least pain, and significantly 
less pain than participants in the relevant-anxiety condition. 
It seems then that there is a degree of specificity involved in the role of self-efficacy. A high 
general sense of one's ability to cope, or a higher sense of self-efficacy specIfic to managing 
pain are associated with greater pain tolerance and better pain coping. On the other hand, 
a low sense of self-efficacy specific to pain management results in greater anxiety towards 
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the pain stimulus and is associated with less pain tolerance and poorer pain coping. Self- 
inefficacy, and the resultant anxiety and stress not relevant to the pain stimulus acts as a 
distractor and is associated with better pain coping. Distraction, in a variety of fonns is 
known to be an effective cognitive pain-coping strategy (see for example Beers & Karoly, 
1979; Chaves & Barber, 1974; Holms, Hekmat, & Mozingo, 1983; Weisenberg, 1989, 
1998). 
Another related factor is perceived control. The belief that one is in control of events 
(Internal LOC), and that one has the ability to influence events (high self-efficacy), must 
be accompanied by the perceived means to do so. For example, when confronted with a flat 
tyre, a person may believe that responsibility for changing it lies with him or herself, and 
that they have the ability to change it. But these are of little use without the belief that they 
can obtain aj ack and a wheel brace. In terms of pain management, the perception of control 
has been defined as "... the belief that one has at one's disposal a response that can 
influence the aversiveness of an event" (Thompson, 198 1, p. 90), and has been shown to 
mediate pain coping (e. g. Litt, 1988; Miller, 1979,1980; Weisenberg, 1989). 
Control may be perceived as instrumental, where a behavioural. response is available, or 
cognitive, where a cognitive strategy is available (Litt, 1988; Thompson, 1981). It is 
important to note that control need not actually be provided, it simply needs to be perceived 
to be available (Law, Logan, & Baron, 1994; Litt, 1988; Thompson, 1981). 
Whilst LOC and self-efficacy are directly related, perceived control, though also related, 
differs from LOC and self-efficacy in that it depends upon some external component, 
particularly information. People with a more internal LOC style tend to seek information, 
whilst those with a more external LOC style are more likely to avoid it (Lefcourt, 1980). 
The efficacy of information depends upon the coping style of the individual. Those who 
seek information cope better, show less distress and lower levels of pain when it is 
provided. Those who avoid information cope better when it is withheld (Law et al., 1994; 
Miller & Mangan, 1983; Weisenberg, Wolf, Mittwoch, Mikulincer, & Aviram, 1985). In 
general, perceived control benefits most those who are most confident they can use it (Litt5 
1988). 
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Summary 
Detenninants of individual differences in pain perception include sex, ethnicity and cultural 
affiliation and personality factors, particularly introversion/extroversion, neuroticism, LOC 
and self-efficacy. These factors share certain characteristics in common. In all cases, social 
learning is strongly implicated. Ethnic and cultural attitudes towards pain and determinants 
of pain response are influenced through the acquisition of societal norms and ideals with 
respect to behaviour and appropriate response to painfid events. Whilst there is a biological 
component involved in sex-differences in pain perception, social learning is implicit also 
in the acquisition of gender-roles and appropriate gender-related behaviours. Social leaming 
processes involved in the acquisition acceptable behavioural norms within familial and 
societal contexts influence the development of central systems associated with processing 
nociceptive and emotional information (Bates et al., 1993; Davidson et al., 2000; Fillingim 
et al., 1998). Ethnicity and cultural identity have been shown to be significant predictors 
of LOC style (Bates & Rankin Hill, 1994), which implicates social learning as a 
determinant of LOC style also. 
These 'trait-like' determinants ofpain response operate through a similar mechanism. They 
determine patterns of autonomic and emotional arousal in response to painful stimuli. 
Correlations have been shown between sex and autonomic and emotional responses to pain 
(Fillingim et al., 1998), and also between ethnicity and autonomic and emotional responses 
to pain (Sternbach & Tursky, 1965; Tursky & Sternbach, 1967). LOC style is associated 
with differences in autonomic and emotional response. Those with a more internal LOC 
style have been shown to exert greater control over physiological processes, particularly 
EEG alpha rhythm (Johnson & Meyer, 1974), and the perceived availability of personal or 
external resources to control pain influence its emotional impact. Self appraisals of power 
or potency have been shown to be major determinants of emotional states (Craig, 1978). 
Due to the inherent nature of these trait determinants, they are slow to change. That these 
factors have been shown to be reliable supports this contention. However, whilst these 
factors go some way to explaining differences in pain perception between individuals, they 
do not explain differences within individuals. 
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People display different responses to pain at different points in time. Whilst trait 
determinants have been shown to be reliable predictors of differences in pain response 
between individuals, research into these factors does not take into account the dynamism 
of the relationship between individuals and their environment. 
What has yet to be acknowledged is the role of environmental elements; situational and 
contextual variables which influence the basic affective-motivational state ofthe individual. 
The importance of the emotional-motivational component of pain experience has already 
been established. However general discussion ofthe relationship between emotional arousal 
and pain tends to have three things in common. First, in most cases emotion is spoken of 
in terms of conscious experiences, such as anxiety, depression, fear and anger. Second, 
emotional arousal is spoken of in direct association with pain; that pain and emotional 
arousal are concomitant (Chapman, 1986; Robinson & Riley Ell, 1999). Third, emotional 
processes are referred to in terms of being a result of cognitive appraisal (see for example 
Craig, 1978; Craig, 1986; Weisenberg, 1977). 
Before considering the possible influences of contextual and environmental factors on the 
experience of pain, it is necessary to understand the nature of emotion in relation to pain. 
The affective-motivational component of pain is clearly a significant contributing factor in 
the ultimate experience, but why? The IASP definition of pain as "An unpleasant sensory 
and emotional experience... " implies that noxious stimulation of sufficient intensity to 
result in pain will always result in a collateral negative-affective state. However, the IASP 
definition, and the fact that strong negative-affective states can and do occur in the absence 
of pain, suggest also a degree of independence between processes underlying pain and 
emotion. 
As affective-motivational processes may be a key factor in within-individual variation in 
the perception of pain, it is important to understand the bases of those processes. Where do 
emotions come from? What are their functions and how do they relate to pain? The 
following Chapter reviews the neurological bases of affect, and reviews literature on the 
neurological bases of pain in order to clarify the ways in which they relate to one another. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE NEUROLOGICAL BASES OF EMOTION 
"To make progress in behavioural neuroscience, I think, we must abandon 
ancient and inappropriate ph ilosoph ical hypotheses andfocus our efforts on the 
attempt to discover the neural basis of behaviour, the activities that animals, 
including humans, actually perform in their daily lives. " (Vanderwolf, 1998, p 
137). 
The Limbic System 
All interactions with the environment have an emotional quality of some sort. In a review, 
Cardinal et al. (2002, p 322) suggest that "it is likely that emotions evolved from simple 
mechanisms that gave organisms the capacity to avoid harm and seek physiologically valuable 
resources". This suggestion provides an evolutionary rationale for emotion as having evolved 
from basic mechanisms driving adaptive approach and avoidance behaviours. They go on to 
suggest that "Consequently, simple and evolutionarily old brains systems may serve 
fundamental aspects of emotional processing, and provide information and motivation for 
more recently evolved neurological systems to control complex behaviour". Research 
mapping the course of neural pathways in the brain has shown that all sensory information 
from both the external and internal environments pass through the limbic system. After 
processing, the information is redistributed to the cortex for analysis, after which it is returned 
to the limbic system for determinations as to whether the highly processed, multi sensory 
inforination is salient or not (Bloom & Lazerson, 1988; Cytowic, 1993b). 
Whilst the anatomical structures of the brain and certain aspects of its function have been 
known for some time through lesion, ablation and stimulation studies, more recent methods 
such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI) have allowed researchers to investigate in-vivo, functional changes in the brain in 
response to specific, emotionally valenced stimuli. Much of this research supports earlier 
ideas concerning the function of the 'emotional brain', but more important, it gives a clearer 
view of the way the brain processes emotionally salient information. The prevailing view now 
is that (as with pain) emotion is not a function of specific brain centres, but of circuitry (e. g. 
Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991). 
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The following sections constitutes a 'Cook's tour' of the 'emotional brain', reviewing recent 
research into those structures most associated with emotion and pain. 
The Circuit of Papez 
In 1937, based upon experiments that showed the hypothalamus to be a significant 
component in emotional expression, the anatomist James Papez proposed a neural circuit that 
provides the anatomical basis for emotional processing (see for example Bloom & Lazerson, 
1988; Brodal, 1992; Kandel et al., 1991; Kolb & Whishaw, 1990). Papez argued that since 
emotions reach consciousness and conversely, higher cognitive functions affect emotions, the 
hypothalamus must communicate reciprocally with higher cortical centres. This argument has 
been supported using more modem research techniques, and the circuit of Papez still stands 
as a basic model for what is known about the neural bases of emotion. 
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Figure I The circuit of Papez. The original is shown in thick lines. More recent 
additions are shown in thin lines. 
However, whilst recent research has not contradicted the original concept of an 'emotional 
circuit', research has shown the anatomy and physiology of these structures to 
be much more 
complex than Papez's original suggestion. Research has shown extensive and 
direct 
connections between neocortical areas, the hippocampal formation, and the amygdala 
(Bloom 
& Lazerson, 1988; Kandel et al., 1991) (Figure 1. More recently deterrmned connections 
shown in thin lines). 
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The circuit of Papez includes the key structures associated with emotion and motivation. 
Collectively, these structures form what is now known as the limbic system (Figure 2). The 
term 'limbic system' was introduced by Paul Broca to describe gyri which form a border 
around the brainstem. These gyri include the parahippocampal gyrus, the cingulate gyrus, 
and the subcallosal gyrus (the anterior and inferior continuation of the cingulate gyrus). 
Also included are the fornix, the septal nuclei, the olfactory bulb, the mamilliary body, the 
amygdaloid nucleus, the hippocampus and the underlying cortex of the hippocampal 
formation (Kolb & Whishaw, 1990). Sometimes included is the anterior thalamic nucleus 
(Brodal, 1992). All these structures are thought to be phylogenetically ancient, and in 
structure and function the limbic system seems to be essentially the same in all mammals 
(Bloom & Lazerson, 1988) reflecting a common evolutionary heritage. 
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Figure 2 Sagittal section showing principal components of the limbic system (labelled left) and brainstern (labelled right). 
* The hypothalamus is not usually considered a part of the limbic system. It is included here because it forms a central part 
of the circuit of Papez. 
Although though many of the structures involved are related in function, and some of the 
effects of ablation or stimulation of several of the nuclei in the limbic system are similar, 
there are also differences (Brodal, 1992). Many of the nuclei involved serve other functions 
as well as being involved in emotion. Consequently, the term 'Limbic system' should be 
used with caution as it implies an inappropriate degree of functional unity. The term is 
used here only as a collective tenn for the structures listed above. 
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The Hypothalamus 
The hypothalamus and closely related structures are primarily associated with the 
maintenance of homeostasis through the regulation of endocrine secretion and autonomic 
function. Neurons of the hypothalamus specifically effect changes in the autonomic nervous 
system that are associated with emotion, such as heart rate, respiration, blood pressure and 
galvanic skin response (Bloom & Lazerson, 1988). The hypothalamus is also associated 
with emotional functioning and motivated behaviour (e. g. avoidance ofharmful stimuli and 
the search for food). Afferent connections of the hypothalamus show that it has reciprocal 
relationships with, and can be influenced by both the peripheral organs and tissues it 
controls, and also by higher levels of the nervous system (as argued by Papez), primarily 
the frontal lobes, cingulate gyri, hippocampal formation, septal nuclei, and the amygdalae 
(Brodal, 1992). As well as regulating these specific motivated behaviours, the 
hypothalamus is associated with arousal and the maintenance of a general state of 
awareness, as is the reticular formation of the brainstem. 
The Amygdala 
The amygdala is probably the structure most implicated in emotional processing and the 
production of affect (particularly negative affect) and arousal. The central nucleus of the 
amygdala is a controller of brain stem arousal and response systems (reticular formation) 
(Cardinal et al., 2002). Research using PET and fMR1 imaging has revealed lateralized 
amygdala activation which is correlated with changes in affect, particularly negative affect. 
The left temporal cortex appears to be of particular significance (Hagemann et al., 1999; 
Lane et al.,, 1997). PET imaging has shown an increase in cerebral blood flow (CBF) for 
the left amygdala, and a decrease in CBF for the right amygdala related to the experimental 
induction ofnegative affect (see for example Schneider, Grodd, Gur et al., 1997; Schneider, 
Grodd, Weiss et al., 1997; Schneider et al., 1995). 
The amygdala has also been shown to be a site of plasticity in the brain and has been 
implicated in certain forms of associative learning and emotional memory 
formation 
(Davidson et al., 2000). This appears to be particular to tasks which require the 
coordination of inforination from different sensory modalities, the 
formation of associations 
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between objects and their emotional meaning, or the association of a stimulus with an 
affective response (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Davidson et al., 
2000; Kandel et al., 1991). It is thought that the amygdala (particularly the basolateral 
nucleus) is involved not so much in direct memory storage, but in the modulation of 
memory storage processes in other brain regions (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998). 
Research has shown also that the amygdala plays a significant role in the evaluation of 
emotionally valenced stimuli independent of the modality of presentation. For example, it 
has been shown that the amygdala is particularly important for the recognition of cues of 
threat or danger (Davidson et al., 2000), and is involved in the evaluation of negatively 
valenced information in a range of modalities; semantic (written words) (Tabert et al., 
2001), images (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Lane, Chua, & 
Dolan, 1999; Lane et al., 1997) and emotionally valenced vocalizations (Morris, Scott, & 
Dolan, 1999). 
The Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is a part of the medial prefrontal cortex, and there is 
a large body of lesion, neuroimaging and electro physiological data which supports the view 
that the prefrontal cortex is an important part of the circuitry that implements both positive 
and negative affect (Davidson & Irwin, 1999). Experimental and clinical data show that, 
as with the amygdala, electrical stimulation of the cingulate cortex influences autonomic 
function, including alterations in respiration, heart-rate and blood pressure (Brodal, 1992). 
The ACC has also been strongly implicated the processing of emotionally salient 
information (see Cardinal et al., 2002). For example, the ACC is reliably activated by 
cocaine related stimuli in cocaine users, more than by neutral stimuli in the same 
individuals, or by cocaine related stimuli in non users. The ACC is similarly activated by 
emotionally significant non drug stimuli in normal humans (Cardinal et al., 2002; Lane et 
al., 1997). Significantly, there is also a large body of evidence that the prefrontal cortex is 
involved in approach/avoidance behaviours (see Davidson et al., 2000, for a detailed 
review). 
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According to a review by Bush et al. (2000), an important guiding principle is that 
cognitive and affective information are processed separately within different regions of the 
ACC (Figure 3). Several functions have been ascribed to the cognitive subdivision, 
including selective attention, response selection, complex motor control, motivation, 
novelty, error detection and working memory. As shown above, the affective subdivision 
is primarily involved in assessing the salience of emotional and motivational information 
and the regulation of emotional responses. 
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Figure 3 Sagittal section showing anterior cingulate cortex. Affective 
division in blue, cognitive division in red. 
It is of significance to the study of pain that areas of the ACC also receive nociceptive 
information (Cardinal et al., 2002; Chen, 200 1; Treede, Kenshalo, Gracely, & Jones, 1999). 
Surgical lesions of parts of the cingulate cortex have been performed in some patients with 
intense, chronic pain that could not be alleviated using conventional treatments. Some of 
these patients reported their pain as being less intense and disabling after the surgery 
(Brodal, 1992). It of interest that the effect of such surgery is similar to that produced by 
opiate analgesia in acute pain, in that surgical lesions to the anterior cingulate cortex do 
not abolish chronic pain, but reduce the unpleasantness (Jones, 1997). 
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Also of significance is that reciprocal suppression of the cognitive subdivision dunng 
intense emotional states has been observed. Individuals with severe depression and normal 
subjects anticipating pain and experiencing experimentally induced emotion all showed 
deactivation of the cognitive subdivision (Bush et al., 2000). This may partly explain the 
intrusive, 'nagging' nature of intense pain; the quality that demands attention and does not 
allow the sufferer to concentrate on anything else. 
The Brainstem 
The reticular fonnation in the brainstem plays an important role in emotion and particularly 
arousal through its connections with higher structures; principally the hypothalamus, 
amygdala and cingulate cortex. Unlike neurons in primary sensory pathways which respond 
to only one type of stimulus, neurons in the reticular formation respond to information from 
many stimuli, and act as a kind of filter, passing on to higher regions only novel or 
persistent information from the external (sensory) and internal (somatosensory, visceral and 
proprioceptive) environments (Bloom & Lazerson, 1988). 
The nucleus coeruleus (see Figure 2) is instrumental in the activating system of the brain 
stem (Brodal, 1992) and efferent fibres from the nucleus locus coeruleus connect with 
nearly all parts of the central nervous system. The product of cells of the locus coeruleus 
(noradrenaline), is known to trigger emotional arousal (Bloom & Lazerson, 1988). Also 
located at the locus coeruleus, is the encephalenergic system, which controls the action of 
endogenous opiates (endorphines) and is also involved both in different reaction to novelty 
and familiarity and reinforcement (see Zajonc, 1980). 
Summary 
The limbic system can be thought of as the 'emotional core' of the human nervous system 
(Cytowic, 1993b), evaluating the emotional significance of incoming information, before 
passing it on to higher structures. Although undeniably, there are large gaps in knowledge 
concerning the neurological bases of emotional processing, sufficient 
is known to outline 
(broadly and in simple terms) the associative relationships between limbic structures and 
emotional processes and subsequent motivated behaviours. 
Beginning with the 'flagging' 
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and selective relaying of novel or persistent stimuli from the external or internal 
envirom-nents and immediate arousal in response to it (reticular formation and nucleus 
coeruleus). On to the increased attention to the sti rmi I imulus and dete inations concerning its 
salience (ACC) and the recall of emotional significance associated with the stlmulusý 
determining its valence (amygdala). To the affective response to the stimulus (ACC and 
amygdala), and the selection of appropriate behavioural response (ACC) and autonomic and 
endocrine changes associated with arousal and motivated behaviour in response to the 
stimulus (ACC and hypothalamus). Finally, the formation of new, or reinforcement of 
existing associations between the stimulus and the outcome (basolateral amygdala). It 
should be noted that whilst these processes are presented in a serial fashion, many of them 
occur in parallel. 
What has this to do with pain? As suggested by Cardinal et al. (2002), it is probable that 
emotions evolved from simple mechanisms that gave organisms the capacity to avoid hann 
and seek physiologically valuable resources. In other words, mechanisms which underlie 
adaptive, motivated behaviours which evolved to help the organism survive. According to 
the IASP definition of pain (given earlier) pain is "An unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage. " One of the principal 
imperatives for survival is the avoidance or limitation of physical harm. In evolutionary 
terms, even relatively minor physical damage can compromise fitness for survival; 
impairing the ability of an organism to hunt, achieve a mate or to escape predation. 
Therefore, it is more than likely that pain, painful stimuli and environmental cues 
associated with pain or the possibility of harm constitute fundamentally salient stimuli in 
terms of arousal, affective response and motivated behaviour. 
The following section reviews some of the literature on the neurological bases of pain, 
particularly with respect to the relationship between nociceptive systems and systems 
associated with the affective-motivational component. 
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The neurological bases of pain 
The Pain Matrix 
Noxious stimuli activate nociceptors. These are the peripheral terminals ofprimary afferent 
neurons. Compared to other, more specialized receptors which convey Information from 
other sensory modalities, nociceptive primary afferent fibres are the least differentiated, 
existing as free nerve endings with no specialized peripheral structures. Thinly myelinated 
A6 fibres mediate both then-nal and mechanical infon-nation. They conduct at a rate of 
around 5-30 m s-',, and are associated with sharp, pricking (fast) pain. 
The peripheral terminals of thin, non-myelinated C fibres are polymodal receptors, which 
have a wide dynamic range and are activated by a variety of high intensity stimuli; 
mechanical, chemical and heat (>45'C) and cold stimuli. C fibres conduct at a rate of 
around 0.5 -2 in s-'. Activity in C fibres is associated with dull, aching (slow) pain. C fibres 
terminate in lamina H (substantia gelatinosa) whereas Ab fibres terminate in laminae I and 
V of the dorsal hom. 
Although nociceptive information ascends via several pathways, there are two major 
ascending systems associated with nociception: The spinoreticular tract and the 
spinothalamic tract. The spinoreticular tract ascends in the anterolateral quadrant 
(extralemniscal pathway) as does the spinothalamic tract. Some axons of the spinoreticular 
tract send branches that terminate in the reticular formation and the thalamus. Another 
ascending pathway, the spinomesencephalic tract also contains niciceptive axons which 
project to the reticular system, the periaqueductal grey (PAG) and other mid-brain sites. 
The PAG has reciprocal connections with the limbic system through the hypothalamus. 
The spinothalamic tract is the ma . or 'pain pathway', and is comprised of axons of j 
nociceptive specific and wide dynamic range neurons. Unlike the spinoreticular pathway, 
all fibres in the spinothalarnic tract cross the midline and ascend in the contralateral 
extralemniscal pathway (anterolateral white matter). Two major subdivisions of thalamic 
nuclei receive information from the spinothalamic tract: The medial nuclear group and the 
lateral nuclear group. 
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In common with emotion, pain has no unique, dedicated centre in the brain. Rather, the 
overall experience of pain appears to be a result of circuitry. An anatomical matrix has been 
relatively reliably isolated and identified (Figure 4), which can be divided into two main 
divisions. The lateral nociceptive system (named after its projections through the lateral 
thalamic nuclear group), which involves the brain stem, thalamus and the primary and 
secondary somatosensory cortices (SI and SIII), and the medial nociceptive system (named 
after its projection through the medial thalamic nuclear group), which involves areas of the 
limbic system. Structures in the identified pain matrix share many functions other than pain. 
The sensory discriminative component ofpain has been attributed to the lateral nociceptive 
system (Chen, 2001; Treede et al., 1999), particularly the SI (e. g. Bushnell, Duncan, 
Hofbauer, Chen, & Carrier, 1999). It is involved in three main aspects: Localization (where 
is the injury? ), intensity (how severe is the pain? ) and quality (e. g. is it an aching or a sharp 
pain? ). These different aspects may be processed in parallel by separate pathways (Treede 
et al., 1999). The sensory discriminative division of the pain matrix has been studied 
extensively and research has generated evidence that its cellular properties (from primary 
afferent fibres to the somatosensory cortex) can account fully for the sensory discriminative 
component of pain perception (see Treede et al., 1999, for a review). 
More pertinent to this investigation is the affective-motivational division ofthe pain matrix, 
which involves the medial nociceptive system and consists principally of the medial 
thalamus and the ACC. The affective-motivational component encompasses several 
different but closely related aspects of pain. The negative affective response to pain; the 
(unpleasant) quality of a pain stimulus, and the susbsequent emotional and psychological 
reactions to it. These include elevation of general levels of arousal and stimulus related 
selective attention, and the psychological motivation and behavioural propensity to 
terminate the painful stimulus (Treede et al., 1999). 
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Figure 4. The pain matrix: Lateral ands medial nociceptive systems. 
The central processing of the affective-motivational component of pain in the medial 
nociceptive system is not as well understood as the sensory-discriminative component, 
although it is known that limbic structures involved in affective-motivational processing 
ofpain stimuli are the insula, hypothalamus, amygdalae, hippocampus and cingulate cortex 
(Chen, 2001). 
According to Jones (1997) it has been shown clearly that it is predominantly the more 
frontal cortical structures such as prefrontal and particularly the ACC that respond to the 
suffering (affective-motivational) components ofboth acute and chronic pain. WRI studies 
provide evidence of ACC involvement in the multidimensional nature of pain perception 
(see for example Kwan, Crawley, Mikulis, & Davis, 2000), and nearly all PET studies of 
acute pain stimuli show activation of the ACC including one study in which ACC 
activation occurred in the absence of noxious stimuli using the thermal grill illusion 2 (see 
Craig, Reiman, Evans, & Bushnell, 1996). 
2 
The thermal grill illusion consists of a grid of bars. Warm and cool water flowing through alternate bars provides a grill of alternate 
warm and cool bars. The temperature of the bars never reaches noxious levels of heat or cold, but the combination of the two elicits 
the experience of pain. 
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ACC response to painful stimuli has been shown also to be open to modulation through 
hypnosis (e. g. Croft, Williams, Haenschel, & Gruzelier, 2002; Kropotov, Crawford, & 
Polyakov, 1997). Jones (1997) suggests that particular support for the involvement of the 
ACC in the affective of components of pain comes from PET studies of patients with atypical 
facial pain syndromes, in which psychogenic mechanisms are thought to contribute to the 
perseveration of the pain. These patients showed increased ACC responses and reduced 
prefrontal responses to a standardized experimental pain stimulus, compared to controls. 
The ACC is one of several opiate receptor rich sites in the limbic system and is modulated by 
(morphine) analgesia, as are the amygdalae and thalamus (Chen, 2001). As mentioned, 
surgical lesions in parts of the cingulate cortex are performed to treat otherwise intractable 
chronic pain often reduce the unpleasantness without removing the pain (Jones, 1997), a effect 
similar to that produced using opiate analgesics. Descending afferent fibres project from the 
ACC to medial thalamic nuclei and the periaqueductal grey (PAG) in the brainstem. 
According to Jones (1997), this suggests that the ACC may also be involved in the modulation 
of reflex responses to noxious stimuli and the central control of pain. The PAG is a cluster of 
neurons lying in the thalamus and the pons, surrounding the cerebral aqueduct (see Figure 2). 
Electrical stimulation of the PAG has been shown to produce analgesia in rats. PAG 
stimulation in humans has shown good results in chronic-pain patients. Although PAG 
stimulation results in analgesia, it does not reduce tactile sensitivity (Brodal, 1992), which 
suggests that the analgesic effects of PAG stimulation do not involve modulation of the 
sensory-discriminative component of pain. 
Of particular interest is a study by Hutchison et al. (1999). Whilst investigating pain related 
ACC neurons, they found neurons with nociceptive specific responses. For example, one 
neuron increased firing rate in response to a decrease in temperature (noxious cold), but not 
to noxious mechanical stimulation. They found one neuron which responded to noxious 
mechanical stimulation (pin prick), but not to noxious heat, cold or non-noxious stimuli 
(e. g. 
deep pressure, touching and rubbing). Significantly, this cell also responded when the patient 
watched pin pricks being applied to the fingers of the examiner. When pin pricks were again 
applied to the patient, the cell responded before the skin was contacted. 
In other words, the 
cell responded to the anticipation of pain. Hutchison et al. suggest 
it is possible that these 
ACC cells may also contribute to the thermal grill illusion mentioned above. 
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As mentioned earlier, the ACC has been shown to respond to emotionally significant 
stimuli (e. g. Cardinal et al., 2002; Lane et al., 1997). Hutchison et al. (1999) note that the 
observed responses of some ACC neurons to complex visual stimuli that are pain related 
resemble those of monkey ACC neurons that respond both to pain and to environmental 
queues associated with anticipated pain. According to Hutchison et al., this suggests that 
cells within the ACC are involved not only in mediating the affective components 
associated with a painful stimulus but also with selective attention and (significantly) 
recognition and anticipation of an impending pain stimulus. 
There is evidence to suggest that although the lateral and medial sub-divisions of the pain 
matrix interact in healthy individuals, they are capable of independent function. Ploner et 
al. (1999) report the case of a 57 year old male who had suffered a cardioembolic stroke. 
The stroke resulted in a lesion which was confined to the right postcentral gyrus 
(detennined using MRI), comprising the hand area of the primary and secondary 
somatosensory cortices (SI and SH). Using a thermal laser, pain thresholds of 200mJ were 
recorded for the right hand and both feet. These stimuli evoked well locallsed (2-3cm) pain 
sensations that were characterised by the patient as 'pinprick like'. For the left hand 
(affected by the stroke), stimulus intensity up to 600mJ evoked no pain sensation. However, 
at stimulus intensities of 350mJ and above, the patient spontaneously described "... 'a 
clearly unpleasant' intensity dependent feeling emerging from an ill localised and extended 
area, 'somewhere between fingertips and shoulder' that he wanted to avoid". 
The patient (described as 'fully cooperative and eloquent') was unable to describe the 
quality, location or intensity of the stimulus, beyond that which he had already given. 
Further, the patient denied all suggestions from an adjective checklist containing items such 
as 'warm, hot, cold, touch, burning, pinprick-like, slight pain, moderate pain and intense 
pain'. In effect, the patient had lost sensory discriminative ability, but had retained the 
affective-motivational component (the sense of an 'unpleasant' somatic event that the 
patient wanted to (avoid'). Ploner et al. conclude that pain affect and the ability to detect 
and respond to a pain stimulus do not require the integrity of the sensory-discriminative 
structures. 
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Similar results have been shown using hypnosis (e. g. Dah1gren, Kurtz, Strube, & Malone, 
1995; Rainville, Carrier, Hofbauer, Bushnell, & Duncan, 1999). Rainville et al. (1999) used 
hypnosis to selectively modulate the emotional-motivational and sensory components of pain 
in a series of three experiments. Their first experiment evaluated the effect of hypnotic 
suggestion for reducing pain affect. Their second experiment compared the effects of 
suggestions for increased pain affect to suggestions for decreased pain affect and their third 
experiment evaluated the effects of hypnotic suggestions for increased and decreased pain 
sensation. 
The results of the first two experiments showed significant changes in pain unpleasantness 
that were significantly greater (and independent of) concomitant changes in pain sensation 
(intensity). The results of their third experiment showed significant changes in reported pain 
intensity, but no significant changes in unpleasantness (after accounting for the effects of 
intensity ratings). Of note is the finding that pain-evoked heart rate (measured in their second 
experiment) was significantly correlated with pain unpleasantness, but not with pain intensity, 
suggesting that autonomic response to pain was associated with activity in the affective but 
not the sensory division of the pain matrix. 
Summary 
In Chapter Two, it was shown that trait determinants of pain perception (sex, 
ethnicity/cultural affiliation, and personality factors) influence the experience ofpain through 
a common mechanism. Specifically, that it is not so much the factors in themselves that 
influence the experience of pain, rather, these factors are determinants of patterns of 
affective-motivational arousal in response to a pain stimulus. It was shown that ethnicity, 
cultural affiliation, personality factors and sex (which also has a biological component) are 
associated with different patterns of emotional response to painful events, and that in the 
absence of any significant physiological differences, these were most likely to have been 
acquired through social learning (including gender-role differences). 
Social learning leads to the formation of regulatory strategies by shaping what are considered 
appropriate behavioural responses to painful events within the culture or society, and through 
observation of the reactions of others within that culture (particularly parents), 
learning the 
degree of importance to attach to painful events. 
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When 'trait-like' regulatory strategies occur over a long period of time, plastic changes in the 
central circuitry of emotion are likely to be produced (Davidson et al., 2000), particularly in 
the amygdala, hippocampus and areas of the prefrontal cortex and ACC. Thus, the acquisition 
of societal and familial norms in response to painful events shapes long-term 'trait-like' 
patterns of emotional motivational response to them. It is the differences in patterns of 
affective-motivational response to a painful event that is associated with individual 
differences in pain experience, as the pattern of emotional arousal in response to pain 
constitutes the affective-motivational component of the pal I in experience, determining the 
degree of unpleasantness and resultant 'suffering' associated with it. 
In Chapter Three, the neurological bases of emotion, motivation and the affective- 
motivational component of pain were reviewed. This latter section raises some important 
points. First, emotional processing and the production of emotion, motivated behaviours and 
autonomic changes associated with emotion are driven by phylogenetically ancient, 
subcortical areas; the brainstem, hypothalamus and limbic brain. All sensory information 
passes through the brainstem and limbic brain where decisions are made concerning novelty 
and familiarity, valence (positive or negative) and salience of the information, before the 
information proceeds to higher cortical areas (Bloom & Lazerson, 1988; Cytowic, 1993b). The 
amygdala and ACC have been shown to be involved in the evaluation of a range of 
emotionally valenced information presented across different modalities, not just those 
pertinent to pain. The decisions concerning valence (positive or negative) and salience of the 
information result in changes in basic motivational state (approach or avoidance) that are 
associated with emotion, and appropriate preparatory changes in autonomic function. 
Therefore information reaching higher cortical areas already contains a degree of emotional 
4colour'. 
Second, there is evidence that detection of noxious stimuli, the generation of an affective 
response (interpretation of the stimulus as 'unpleasant') and the motivation to remove it (or 
remove one's self from it) can be served by the older limbic structures associated with the 
medial (limbic) subdivision of the pain matrix, independently of the higher neocortical 
structures associated with the lateral subdivision of the pain matrix (e. g. Ploner et al., 1999; 
Rainville et al., 1999). So the neurological mechanisms for emotion and motivation which 
preceded higher systems, although normally operating conjointly with these higher systems, 
have retained a degree of functional independence. 
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Third, in terms of evolutionary fitness, the ability to detect potent'ally damaging 
stimulation, though fundamental to the survival of an organism, must be secondary to the 
drive to avoid contact with the stimuli to begin with. The ability to discriminate accurately 
the precise location, intensity and quality of a damaging stimulus (though clearly useful), 
would quickly become academic were it not preceded by a basic motivation to avoid it. For 
example, the difference between discriminating precisely where one has been bitten by a 
snake, and avoiding being bitten in the first place. This requires recognition (not necessarily 
on a semantic level) of the association between an object and its emotional-motivational 
significance, and more important, that the motivational state associated with avoidance 
behaviour precede any pain stimulus. 
The ACC and amygdala in particular have been implicated in recognition of negatively 
valenced (avoidance oriented) information and the formation of stimulus-threat 
associations, and bilateral asymmetric activation of areas ofthe medial prefrontal cortex has 
been shown to be associated with approach/avoidance responses (e. g. Davidson et al., 
2000). This, and the discovery of ACC nociceptive cells that respond not only to noxious 
mechanical stimuli, but also to the visual cues of a pain stimulus being applied to another 
and to the anticipation of pain prior to contact with a pain stimulus, shows a neural basis 
for such an avoidance function. 
These points have implications in terms of the relationship between pain and affect. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, in general discussion of the relationship between emotion and 
pain, emotional arousal is usually spoken of in direct association with pain; that pain and 
emotional arousal are concomitant or emotional arousal as a result ofpain. However, whilst 
not incorrect, in light of the infon-nation presented above, this must be only half the story. 
If all information reaching higher areas of the brain have already undergone some level of 
processing in the limbic regions and therefore carries with it information pertaining to the 
emotional significance of the incoming information, then human interaction with the 
environment cannot be without emotional quality. In other words people must, on an 
emotional level, be responding constantly to their environment and given the evidence 
presented above, these affective responses are likely to occur outside of the volition of the 
individual and even below the level of conscious awareness. 
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This being the case, affective changes induced by incoming information must in turn 
influence interpretation of subsequent information in an ongoing, non-volitional process 
of evaluation and preparatory changes in affective-motivational state. Therefore, in terms 
of the perception of pain, it cannot be simply individual trait determinants or qualities of 
the pain stimulus itself that influence the experience of pain. Situational and contextual 
factors; events leading up to the advent of pain and environmental cues as to the affective- 
motivational significance of the situation (particularly the potential for harm) must also 
exert some influence. In other words, factors that are not an inherent characteristic of the 
individual and are unrelated to the pain stimulus are also likely to influence the way in 
which a painful event is experienced. 
Is there any evidence for such a process; that evaluation of the environment for emotional 
meaning is a constant, non-volitional process that operates outside of conscious awareness 
and thus independently of cognition? If there is, then is there evidence that such a process 
can affect directly emotional-motivational state and propensity towards subsequent 
approach/avoidance behaviours? Chapter Four reviews the research into automaticity and 
preattentive processes, and the influence of environmental features on affective- 
motivational state and behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AUTOMATICITY 
"... affect is always present as a companion to thought, whereas the converse 
is not truefor cognition. Injact, it is entirely possible that the veryfirst stage 
ofthe organism's reaction to stimuli and the veryfirst elements in retrieval are 
affective. It is further possible that we can like something or be afraid of it 
before we knowprecisely what it is andperhaps even without knowing what it 
is. " (Zajonc, 1980, pp 154). 
Predominance of Affect 
The argument by Zajonc (1980; 1984) was principally that affect and cognition were 
capable of independent function and therefore that it was possible that there were 
circumstances under which affect could precede cognition. As an adaptive characteristic this 
makes sense. On the most basic level , the capacity to evaluate something novel for potential 
threat must take precedence over the slower process of recognition and classification. For 
example, the initial reaction of certain primates to the presentation of a length of hosepipe 
is inunediate and fearful, demonstrating an immediate avoidance motivation. To sit and 
observe the hose for colour, texture, quality and direction of movement and to attempt to 
classify the object (is it a snake? Is it venomous? Is it approaching? ) wastes valuable time 
should the answers to those questions be yes. In such cases, where negative results of such 
cognitive process (not a snake, not venomous, not approaching) has no direct benefit to the 
organism, and the escape behaviour (even in the case of a false positive, i. e. a benign 
stimulus identified as dangerous) has no significant cost to the organism, such cognitive 
processes are redundant. 
There are many arguments in support of the predominance of affect in everyday life. 
Dijksterhuis (2000) observed that; "When evolution comes up with a new species, it does 
not throw away old modules or systems so as to make a fresh start. Instead, new parts are 
simply added to parts that already existed... " (P 37). The neurologist Richard Cytowic 
(I 993b) notes that human beings are unique among mammals in being advanced in both 
limbic and cortical dimensions. Reflecting the observation by Dijksterhuis, Cytowic notes 
that the limbic system did not get left behind in evolution, the limbic system and the cortex 
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co-evolved, and in humans it is the limbic system which reaches its greatest development. 
Neurological research has shown the number of limbic fibre tracts to be greater both in 
relative size and absolute number compared to any other fibre system. Moreover, the 
neocortex has more inputs from the limbic system than the limbic system has from the 
cortex. Cytowic points out that the functional significance of these connections turned out 
to be the reverse of what had been assumed for decades. Although there is a reciprocal 
relationship between the cortex and the limbic system, each regulating the other, "the 
number and nature of the recursive feedback circuits ensures that the influence of the limbic 
system is greater" (Cytowic, 1993b, p167). 
There are clinical examples of the predominance of affect. For example, when coma 
patients recover they undergo a 'set sequence' of recovery. They first manifest automatisms 
(involuntary movements), then voluntary movements and childlike speech that is 
emotionally immature. As recovery continues, their behaviour gradually becomes more 
rational and adult like. This pattern of recovery suggests that higher cognitive and 
intellectual processes cannot be recovered unless emotional processes recover first 
(Cytowic, 1993a). In cases of prosopagnosia (an inability to recognise faces), it has been 
shown that when patients are shown a picture of someone they knew well before their 
illness, two contradictory things happen. The patient fails to recognise the face on a 
conscious level, and denies knowing the person in the picture. However, at the same time 
a sharp galvanic skin response (GSR) shows that recognition has in fact occurred, but at a 
level outside of awareness (Cytowic, 1993a; Vanderwolf, 1998). In other words, 
recognition, on an affective level, can be dissociated from conscious awareness of it. 
In temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE), seizures originate in the limbic system. TLE can cause 
involuntary actions (automatisms) that seem purposeful, but for which the person has no 
awareness or recollection. In a review, Vanderwolf (1998) relates a case reported by J. 
Hughlings Jackson concerning a physician who developed petit mal epilepsy and kept 
careful records of his own seizures. Following an attack during a game of tennis 
he had no 
recollection of the strokes during a minute or two. However, 
his opponent noticed no 
change in his playing. On another occasion, the physician made a competent medical 
diagnosis during the course of a seizure, but was not aware that he had done so until later, 
when he discovered a note in his own handwriting. 
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There is also a large and growing body of experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis 
of a gTeater subcortical than cortical involvement in emotional processes (e. g. Schneider 
et al., 1995), and also that affective responses can occur outside of conscious awareness. 
For example, Bernat et al. (2001) conducted an EEG study measuring event related 
potentials (ERPs) in response to the presentation of positively and negatively emotionally 
valenced mood adjectives. The words were presented for both supraliminal and subliminal 
durations (40 ms and I ms respectively). They found that for both stimulus durations,, a 
greater amplitude positivity was elicited by unpleasant as opposed to pleasant stimuli, 
particularly for the P3 and LP (late positive potential) components. 
For the subliminal stimulus duration, these responses were lateralized to the left side. The 
supraliminal stimulus duration elicited bilateral effects for the P3 and LP components and 
left side effects for the earlier P1 and NI components. Berriat et al. conclude that evidence 
from this study supports the growing consensus that affective responses can happen without 
conscious awareness. They suggest further, that on the basis of evidence already available, 
it appears that an effective meaning can be modified (conditioned, be elicited and influence 
conscious appraisals) all without the direct involvement of consciousness. 
The evidence from their study suggests that such processes can occur within 100 
milliseconds, and can change from pleasant to unpleasant valence within seconds to 
randomly presented valenced words. Bernat et al. (200 1) conclude that given this evidence, 
it appears that a substantial range of affective processes can occur without benefit of 
consciousness. That subcortical perceptual, affective and motivational processes can and 
do occur without the benefit of consciousness is an underpinning principle of automaticity. 
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Automaticity 
"The strongest knowledge (that of the total unfreedom of the human will) is 
nonetheless the poorest in success, for it always has the strongest opponent: 
human vanity. " (Nietzsche, 1879). 
It has been suggested that much of everyday life; thinking, feeling and doing, is automatic 
and determined not by conscious intent and choice, but by recent and current features of the 
environment (i. e. the behaviour of others, social nornis, roles, contexts, objects and 
settings). Further, that direct control over affect and behaviour by the environment can and 
does occur (see Bargh, 1997; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; 
Spielman, Pratto, & Bargh, 1988). The term automaticity refers both to the pre-conscious, 
evaluative processes that determine affect and motivation, and to automatic behaviours that 
can occur as a result of those processes, which are developed by constant and frequent 
mapping of stimuli to responses. 
Research into automaticity concentrates on specifying the relationships between features 
ofthe environment and cognitive and behavioural responses to them. It attempts to establish 
the underlying 'if- then 'relationships between situations and behaviours that do not require 
conscious mediation between the perception of the situational features, and the cognitive 
and behavioural responses (e. g. Bargh, 1992). According to Bargh (1997) there are three 
distinctive systems that can operate outside of awareness to influence behaviour. 
Environmental features can trigger unconscious processing in the perceptual (cognitive) 
system, in the evaluative (affective) system and in the motivational system. Although these 
systems are interactive and operate in parallel, they have distinctive mechanisms and 
operating characteristics (see Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). As noted by Todorov (2002), the 
preconscious processing of environmental stimuli by these three systems "determines the 
psychological situation of the individual as phenomenologically perceived by himself'. 
Two main classes of automaticity are preconscious and goal-dependent. Preconscious 
automatic processes require only the presence of the environmental stimulus linked to the 
cognitive or behavioural response, whilst goal-dependent processes require a conscious 
intention to initiate the process. 
53 
A common characteristic of automatic processes is that they are autonomous, and once they 
have started, require little or no conscious control in order to run to completion. They are 
also fast and efficient, using few if any attentional resources (see Bargh, 1989, for a detailed 
description of different varieties of automatic effects). 
Examples of goal-directed automaticity are behaviours which occur during an activity such 
as driving, or playing a musical instrument. Automatisms associated with goal-directed 
automaticity are essentially the same as those occurring in preconscious automaticity, but 
would not occur in the absence of the goal-directed behaviour. They require a deliberate 
intent to engage in the activity, but once initiated, many of the actions involved are carried 
out automatically and without conscious thought, and in many cases will run to completion 
without conscious mediation. For example, an experienced guitarist can play a well 
practised piece of music whilst holding a meaningful conversation. A less practised 
musician, or one playing a novel piece could not. One or other activity would suffer. The 
conscious intent to play is necessary to initiate the activity, but once initiated, the action can 
continue automatically. Conscious mediation is required only to moderate the action. 
On the other hand, preconscious automaticity effects require no prior intent. These are 
effects such as attitude and stereotype activation and automatic (also known as preattentive) 
evaluation, and require only the triggering stimulus (attitude object or event), and occur 
prior to, or in the absence of any conscious awareness of that event (Bargh, 1989). These 
processes operate involuntarily, autonomously and are uncontrollable. It is important to 
note that although automatic processes are uncontrollable, the ultimate behaviour is open 
to moderation. For example, the Stroop colour word task, in which people have to name the 
colour in which a word is presented. People take longer to name the colour of the word, 
when the word itself is the name of a different colour (e. g. the word 'blue' in red ink). It 
is 
important to note that participants in this task are usually correct in their responses 
(e. g. 
saying 'red'). Although the competing response (saying the word 'blue') 
is automatically 
triggered, the increased response latencies comes from the participant consciously 
moderating the automatically activated competing response 
(see Bargh, 1988; Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000). In other words, it is the internal events and propensities towards 
subsequent behaviours which are uncontrollable, not the ultimate responses. 
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Of the two main forms of automaticity, preconscious automatic effects are most pertinent 
to this thesis. If environmental features trigger automatic effect in cognitive, emotional and 
motivational systems and can influence subsequent behaviour, then there are significant 
implications for the study of pain. 
As mentioned earlier, the experience of pain is entirely subjective and the emotional- 
motivational component forms a significant part of that experience, as it detennines the 
degree of unpleasantness and suffering associated with a painful event. Further, the only 
way one has of knowing that another is experiencing pain is through observation of their 
behaviour. Clinical pain assessment and experimental pain rating, be it verbal report, 
marking a point on a scale, or choosing a word from an adjective checklist are simply 
behaviours. Because of this, in its most basic form, experimental pain research (and clinical 
pain assessment) for all practical purposes, is generally restricted to a form of stimulus- 
response paradigm. An experimental pain stimulus is applied, and the behavioural response 
is measured. 
The underlying assumption is that the response relates directly and only to the stimulus. 
Even on this very specific level, there is the problem that people may respond to different 
aspects of the same stimulus (e. g. Fillingim & Maixner, 1995). On a broader scale and in 
light of the principles of automaticity, can it really be said that an individual exposed to a 
pain stimulus is responding only to the pain stimulus? Or might it be that current features 
of the environment (e. g. the behaviour of others, social norms, roles, contexts, objects and 
settings) are also determinants of the response? What follows is a brief investigation of the 
particular automatic effects (behavioural and affective-motivational) that are most likely 
to have implications for pain research, beginning with automatic effects on behaviour. 
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The Perception-Behaviour Link 
An important preconscious automatic effect is the perception-behaviour link5 which posits 
the existence of a non-conscious connection between the act of perceiving and the act of 
doing. Thus, for example, the act of observing a behaviour in another makes one more 
likely to engage in that same behaviour (see Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
A direct link between perception and behaviour can be seen in many other species, for 
example the fast, coordinated movement of herds of antelope or schools of mackerel (see 
Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Dijksterhuis, Bargh et al., 2000). These are prey animals, and the 
herding and schooling behaviours are adaptive, limiting the chances of fitter individuals 
being lost to predatory attack, as older and weaker animals get forced to the outside of the 
group or are left behind. As noted by Dijksterhuis et al. (2000), the mechanisms that drive 
such behaviours in other species are still present in the human brain. 
Bargh and Chartrand (1999) suggest that although William James popularized the principle 
of 'ideomotor action' (that the mere act of thinking about an action increases the likelihood 
of its occurring), the 'ideo' in ideomotor action could just as well come from outside the 
head as from within it. They suggest that automatic perception of features in the current 
environment induces the ideas to act. For example, an often cited example of the illusive 
nature of control over one's own behaviour is the 'readiness potential' (see for example 
Libet, 1985). Briefly, the readiness potential describes the buildup of activity that can be 
recorded in the motor cortex that begins around 800 ms before the conscious decision to 
move has been made. 
Cytowic (I 993b) suggests that one conclusion is that the 'decision' to move is simply an 
interpretation one gives to a behaviour that has been initiated by another part of one's self 
and which exists outside of consciousness, before one is aware of making a decision at all. 
According to Bargh and Ferguson (2000), the impetus or intention to move is directly 
traceable to the experimental instruction to move. Thus, the original propensity to move 
was triggered by an environmental event. 
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Based on the principle of ideomotor effect, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) suggested that 
simply observing an action increases the possibility that one will engage in it. They suggest 
that 'echo-reactions' such as echolalia (a tendency to mimic the speech of another) and 
echopraxia (a tendency to mimic the behaviour of another) which are both commonly 
observed in people suffering from conditions which compromise their ability to consciously 
and intentionally regulate their behaviour, show that in the absence of intentional forms of 
behaviour control, the perception-behaviour link remains intact. This contradicts the idea 
of conscious choice as a mediator. 
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) performed a series of three experiments based upon the human 
(and non-human primate) tendency to mimic the behaviours of those around them (see 
Bargh, 2001; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Dijksterhuis, Bargh et al., 2000). These experiments 
demonstrated a form of preconscious automaticity known as the 'chameleon effect' which 
can be described as the propensity for people to mimic the behaviour of others with whom 
they are socially interacting. 
In the first experiment, participants were paired with confederates in two trials involving 
non-related tasks (describing photographs). The confederates had been instructed to 
perform certain behaviours (either foot shaking or face rubbing, counterbalanced between 
trials) and facial expressions (smiling or not smiling) throughout the tasks. The deliberate 
mannerisms performed by the confederate was shown to result in the participant engaging 
in the same mannerisms, and the degree of mimicry by the participant was shown to be 
significantly higher than chance level. 
To test whether mimicry was a function of liking and rapport, or whether liking and rapport 
increased mimicry, the situations were reversed in the second experiment. During the same 
non-related task, the confederate either mirrored the mannerisms of the participant, or 
engaged in neutral, nondescript behaviours. After the task, participants were asked to 
complete questionnaires in which they were asked to rate how much they liked the 
confederate and how smoothly they thought the task had gone. Participants 
in the 
experimental condition (in which the confederate mirrored their mannerisms) indicated a 
greater liking for the confederate and that the task had gone more smoothly than 
participants in the neutral condition. 
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The third experiment measured mimicry as a function of individual differences in the 
cognitive structures that are activated by environmental features, in this case, perspective 
taking (the ability to take and understand the perspective of another). Results of this 
experiment showed that those assessed as high in perspective-taking engaged in mirroring 
behaviour significantly more frequently that those measured as low in perspective-taking. 
In all cases, participants were unaware of the mirroring behaviour in themselves or the 
confederates. 
Through these three experiments, Chartrand and Bargh demonstrate three important points. 
First, they demonstrate a direct, non-conscious link between perception and behaviour in 
a social interaction. Changes in the behaviour of a participant were caused by changes in 
the behaviour of the confederate and participants were unaware of the influence showing 
that the effect is unconscious, requiring neither conscious choice or intent. Second,, they 
show a causal direction which demonstrates the adaptive function ofthe behaviour; that the 
behaviour resulted in higher liking and rapport, acting as a kind of 'social glue'. Third, they 
demonstrate that patterns of automatic behaviours are at least partly dependent upon 
individual differences in the activation of existing cognitive structures. Pre-existing 
cognitive traits (in this case the ability to understand the perspective of another) influenced 
the degree to which the participant engaged in the automatic behaviour. 
It has been shown that in social situations, the expectancies of the perceiver can also 
influence the behaviour of the perceived (see Higgins & Bargh, 1987). An example of this 
was shown by Chen and Bargh (1997). They carried out an experiment involving two 
phases. The first phase was ostensibly a 'dot-estimation' task in which white participants 
were told that they had to estimate whether the number of dots presented 
for a short time 
on a computer screen was odd or even. During this phase, participants were 
'primed'. 
Before the dots were presented, participants were exposed subliminallyto ablack andwhite 
photographs of either an African American (according to 
Chen & Bargh, the African 
American stereotype includes hostility as a trait construct) or a 
Caucasian face for 13 ms. 
This was followed by two mask patterns, also presented 
for 13 ms each, after which a 
picture containing between 4 and 24 small coloured circles 
(the number vaned for each 
trial) appeared for 3 seconds. Participants were asked to indicate whether 
there had been 
an even or an odd number of circles. 
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The second phase of the experiment involved pairing the 'primed' participant with a non- 
primed 'target' participant. The participants were informed that they were to take part in 
a verbal performance task in the absence of any visual information. The task would involve 
them playing a game of 'Catch Phrase' in which one player (the guesser) has to guess a 
word or phrase from clues given by the other player, who was not allowed to say or spell 
the word or phrase. 
Each participant was placed in a separate room and the two communicated using 
microphones and headphones. Participants played for 3 minutes, after which they switched 
roles and played for a further 3 minutes. At the end of the session, participants completed 
Impression Formation Questionnaires on which they indicated their impressions of each 
other. Verbal interactions during the game were recorded and coded for hostility, using a 
standardised scale, by independent coders who were blind to the experimental hypothesis. 
The results showed that the non-primed target participants who had interacted with 
participants primed with African American faces were rated as more hostile by both their 
primed participant partner, and outside observers compared to target participants who had 
interacted with Caucasian-primed participants. The expectations ofthe primed participants 
had resulted in changes in behaviour concordant with the expectation of hostility. In short, 
the target participants had become more hostile. The increase in hostile behaviour of target 
participants was a response to this hostility, and served to confirm the expectations of the 
primed participants. 
The above are examples of a robust effect. The preconscious activation of a wide range of 
stereotypes and trait constructs has repeatedly been shown to result in changes in behaviour 
concordant with the trait construct activated, that occurs outside the awareness of the 
participants. For example, priming the trait constructs for rudeness or politeness results in 
a significant decrease or increase (respectively) in the time taken 
for participants to 
interrupt a conversation (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; see also Bargh 
& Gollwitzer, 
1994). Priming the trait 'forgetfulness' associated with the stereotype of elderly people 
resulted in poorer performance on memory tasks 
(Dijksterhuls, Aarts, Bargh, & van 
Knippenberg, 2000). Priming the traits of slowness and weakness associated with the 
stereotype of elderly people resulted in participants walking more slowly 
(Bargh, Chen et 
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al., 1996). Using stereotypes such as 'professor' and 'football hooligan' to pri me the traits 
'intelligence' and 'stupidity' resulted in increased or decreased performance (respectively) 
in participants answering questions from the game 'Trivial Pursuit' (see Bargh & Ferguson, 
2000). Similar results have been shown for traits such as hostility (Bargh, 1988; Bargh, 
Chen et al.,, 1996) and aggression (see Todorov & Bargh, 2002). 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate a link between perception and behaviour that 
occurs outside awareness. Activation of stereotypes, and their associated trait constructs 
through presentation of features in the environment associated with the stereotypes can 
result in behaviours congruent with the trait construct. Moreover, that expectancy plays a 
role and the behaviours resulting as a result of priming can in turn, influence the behaviour 
of others with whom the primed individual interacts (but who have not themselves been 
primed), in such a way as to confirm the expectation of the primed individual. 
Importantly, the studies by Chartrand and Bargh (1999) show that individual differences 
in the cognitive structures that are activated by the environmental stimuli influence patterns 
of behavioural. response. In terms of clinical and experimental pain measurement (which, 
as mentioned , is simply the observation of a 
behaviour), patients and participants represent 
one half of a social dyad in which clinicians and researchers represent the other. Thus, it is 
likely that the social context also influences the ultimate report of pain. 
As shown above, the presentation of a stereotype results in the activation of trait constructs 
associated with it. Snyder et al. (1977) state that "... stereotypes can and do channel dyadic 
interaction so as to create their own social reality. " Indeed, the fact that scientists, doctors 
and nurses are what they are may be sufficient in itself to activate certain stereotypical 
constructs and congruent behaviours. In the hospital environment for example, each part 
of the dyad (clinician and patient) have their own expectations. People admitted to hospital 
or undergoing medical examination tend to take a submissive psychological stance, 
adopting the 'patient role' (see Pickering & Friedman, 1991; Pitts, 1993b; Taylor, 1979). 
Particular features of the patient role are loss of control, reduction in self-efficacy and 
depersonalisation (Taylor, 1979). People can no longer decide for themselves when to eat, 
sleep or bathe. 
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Adoption of the patient role is often assisted (unwittingly) by hospital staff. To the medical 
staff, patients frequently become their condition: 'the compound fracture we admitted last 
night' or 'the transplant in room two that is doing particularly well'. The adoption of the 
patient role is facilitated further by the style of language adopted by clinical staff A mature 
adult who, for example, may hold a directorship in a large company, or carry the 
responsibility for hundreds of lives as an airline pilot is asked to 'pop into bed and slip off 
your clothes so we can look at your tummy' (see Pitts, 1993a). 
It is fair to say that doctors, nurses and scientists adopt roles when dealing with patients or 
participants. This is often necessary in order to maintain a degree of clinical detachment and 
professionalism. But in doing so, the clinician or researcher tends to behave in such a way 
so as to elicit confirmatory behaviour in the patient or participant; an example of the effect 
shown by Chen and Bargh (1997). Further, the stereotypical C clinician' behaviour activates 
patient-trait constructs (e. g. illness, helplessness and pain) and the patient role and 
associated behaviours are reinforced. 
Similar principles apply in the research environment. The work of Stanley Milgram (1963; 
1974) demonstrates the authority of the 'scientist' as perceived by the participant. The 
participant, naive as to the experiment, gives control to the scientist; who knows precisely 
what is going to happen. The scientist has responsibility and accountability for the welfare 
of the participant and so must adopt a controlling role. Even briefing the participant of their 
rights to stop or withdraw at any time reinforces this role. Even though it most certainly is 
not the case, the explicit statement of the right of the participant to withdraw implies that 
it is within the power of the researcher to either grant or withhold that right. 
The adoption of the clinician or scientist role confirms patient or participant stereotype 
expectations and facilitates the adoption by the patient or participant of the complementary 
roles and behaviours (the self-fulfilling prophesy effect). It is likely that the context in 
which the patients and participants perceive themselves to be will exert a universal 
influence on behavioural tendencies as a whole. 
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According to Higgins (1987), the hypotheses people form concerning what is likely to 
happen in a given situation play a critical role in the selection of infon-nation from the 
envirom-nent to be encoded. Moreover, these hypotheses are automatically driven by the 
data present in the current situational context, and cognitive organisation ofprevious related 
experiences (schemata, frames or scripts) have been hypothesised to guide the interpretation 
process. Therefore, just as in the example given by Chapman (1984), of the boy he observed 
in hospital who cried with pain only on discovery of his dressing, when a patient or 
participant is asked to quantify their pain, at least a portion of the rating may be due to the 
situational context. In other words, it may be that it hurts partly because in that 
environment, and situation, it is expected to hurt, and in that context 11 it is a part of the role 
of patient (or participant in pain research contexts) to say so. 
Of course, this is not to suggest the absence of pain, or that reports of pain influenced by 
environmental factors are dissociated from the subjective experience. This section has 
reviewed only behavioural effects of preconscious processes, and it is suggested here that 
pain report, as a behaviour, is likely to be influenced to some degree by the expectancies 
of the patient or participant which are driven by features of the environment, such as the 
behaviour of the clinician or researcher. However, as shown in Chapter Three, human 
interaction with the environment cannot be without an emotional component. The 
perception-behaviour link has shown two main ways in which behaviours within a social 
dyad can be influenced on a non-conscious level by features of the dyad, but by definition, 
each ofthese non-conscious behavioural responses has an underlying affective motivational 
component. Negative affect in the case of hostility in response to stereotype trait activation, 
and positive affect in the case of social mimicry. 
The above examples are dependent upon the behaviour of others, or interaction with others 
after exposure to some priming event or stimulus and therefore the effects require social 
interaction in order to manifest. There is another, more pervasive route by which affective- 
motivational state and subsequent behaviour can be influenced. This involves what maybe 
termed a direct perception-affect link and is a very basic process which produces changes 
in basic affective state and motivational tendency towards a given stimulus. 
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The Automatic Evaluation Effect 
It has been suggested that the valence of a stimulus (positive or negative) is the basic 
dimension by which the brain deals with information, and that decisions concerning the 
valence of a stimulus result in either a positive (approach) or a negative (avoidance) 
motivational system being activated by the stimulus (Bargh, 1997). Automatic evaluation 
refers to the processes underlying the preconscious decisions concerning the valence of 
environmental information. 
Automatic evaluation is described as a universal and unconditional process that is reflexive 
and uncontrollable, requiring neither intent nor awareness (e. g. Bargh, 1988; Bargh, 2001; 
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). In line with the suggestion that much of everyday life; thinking, 
feeling and doing, is automatic and determined by features of the environment, it has been 
shown that people evaluate the valence of most, if not all environmental information (objects 
and events both social and non-social) (e. g. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; 
Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). Further, that the classification of features in the 
envirom-nent as either 'good' or 'bad' has been shown to occur within 250 ms (see Bargh, 
2001; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Giner-Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh, 1999). 
This is in line with the neurological data reviewed in Chapter Three, showing that all sensory 
information passes through the brainstem and limbic brain where decisions are made 
concerning novelty and familiarity, emotional valence and salience ofthe information (Bloom 
& Lazerson, 1988; Cytowic, 1993b). As shown, the amygdala and ACC in particular have 
been implicated in recognition of negatively valenced information and the formation of 
stimulus-threat associations. Further support comes from data showing the prefrontal cortex 
to be involved in approach/avoidance behaviours and the evidence showing asymmetric 
prefrontal and anterior temporal activation in response to experimentally induced positive and 
negative affect, suggesting that approach and avoidance systems are implemented in partially 
separable circuits (Davidson et al., 2000). 
Automatic evaluation has also been shown to affect directly motivational state and 
subsequent behavioural tendency. In other words, one of the results of automatic evaluation 
is an immediate tendency to either approach or avoid the stimulus, 
depending upon the 
A 
valence of the stimulus. Chen-a'nd Bargh (1999) conducted two experiments in which 
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participants were presented with a series of 92 emotionally valenced words on a computer 
display. Attached to the computer was a lever attached to an electronic switch which would 
allow the direction of action (push or pull) and response latency to be recorded. 
In the first experiment, participants were told that they were being tested on how quickly they 
could classify words as good or bad. They were assigned to one of two conditions; congruent 
or incongruent. In the congruent condition, participants were instructed to pull the lever if 
they classified the word as positive in meaning, and to push the lever if they classified the 
word as negative in meaning. In the incongruent condition, the instructions were reversed 
(pull if negative, push if positive). The results showed that participants were faster to push 
than to pull the lever if they classified the word as negative, and faster to pull the lever than 
to push when they classified the word as positive. There was also an overall main effect for 
valence. Participants were faster to push when presented with a negative word than to pull 
when presented with a positive word. 
For the second experiment, everything was identical except that participants were not told to 
evaluate the words, just to always push (or always pull) the lever on presentation of a word. 
No mention of evaluation was made, and participants believed it to be a reaction time study. 
Halfway through the trial, participants were given new instructions. Those who had been 
instructed to always push the lever were told to always pull for the remainder of the trial and 
visa versa. The results showed that although latencies were faster overall (due to the absence 
of the need to classify the words) the overall pattern of congruence remained. Participants 
were faster to pull the lever when presented with positively valenced words, and faster to 
push when presented with negatively valenced words. The main effect for valence was also 
reproduced. 
The results of the first experiment demonstrate a direct link between the automatic process 
of classification and motivational state. The results of the second experiment show that the 
effect occurs in the absence of any conscious intent to classify the stimulus. The non- 
conscious evaluation of a stimulus object or event immediately prepares the appropriate 
muscular tendency to approach or avoid the stimulus. Further, the main effect 
for valence (a 
faster congruent response to negatively valenced stimuli) is in 
line with the neurological 
evidence (Chapter Three) that limbic systems are particularly responsive to cues pertaining 
to threat or danger in the environment (e. g. Davidson et al., 
2000). 
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The adaptive value of such a mechanism is clear. For example, the survival of an organism 
often depends on the order in which questions such as 'can I eat it?, and 'can it eat me? ' are 
answered. As the former question becomes entirely academic should the answer to the latter 
question be yes, it is more than likely that organisms in which the avoidance system was faster 
than the approach system were more likely to survive. The mechanism is a way of answering 
the most important questions first (e. g. is it dangerous, should I avoid it? ), and therefore 
mechanisms which evolved to help the organism avoid danger are faster. 
It has been noted that emotions differ from affective-motivational state. Automatic evaluation 
results in direct (i. e. preconscious) activation of affective-motivational systems within 250 ins. 
This occurs outside of conscious awareness, but emotions are declarative (I feel sad, I feel 
happy) and therefore must be conscious (e. g. Clore, 1997). However, Isen and Diamond 
(1989) point out that there are two ways to conceptualise affect. Firstly as a quality (valence) 
assigned to a stimulus, for example rating a stimulus with regard to its degree of goodness or 
badness, or pleasantness or unpleasantness. Thus, although as noted above there are 
distinctive mechanisms for affect and motivation, at the evaluative level affective response 
to a stimulus and motivation to either approach or avoid the stimulus are indivisible for all 
practical purposes. Secondly (according to Isen and Diamond), affect can be conceptualised 
as a declarative feeling state. Studies have shown that automatic evaluation is a non-conscious 
contributing determinant of emotional state, mood and subsequent judgement (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982), and to influence 
the way in which subsequent information is interpreted. For example, interpreting deliberately 
ambiguous stimuli in a way that is congruent with the valence of a previously presented 
subliminal 'prime' (see Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). 
According to Bargh (2000), research on the effects of priming on subsequent mood 
"... demonstrates that the automatic appraisal of stimuli accrues over time into an effect on 
one ýs general mood state: given that the process and effect is entirely nonconscious, it would 
seem that evaluation processes serve as a kind of signal as to the overall quality of one's 
environment. " Further, the behavioural consequences as shown by Chen and Bargh (1999) 
shows that automatic evaluation results in behavioural readiness within a fraction of a second 
to either approach positive or avoid negative objects in the environment. Chen and Bargh 
conclude that through its effect on mood, the automatic evaluation effect serves as a signalling 
system for the overall safety versus danger of the environment. 
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The continual universal and unconditional evaluation of the environment, and immediate, 
nonconscious classification of features of the environment into either'good' (approach) or 
'bad' (avoid) categories has clear adaptive grounds and reflects precisely the kind of 
mechanism suggested in the summary of Chapter Three. The evidence reviewed supports 
the suggestion by Zajonc (1980; 1984) of a separate affective information processing 
system to account for the fact (among others) that one can usually declare a preference 
between several items, before being able to state the reason for that preference. 
The effects of automatic evaluation of features of the environment have been shown to 
influence behaviour, mood and subsequent cognition. As such, automatic evaluation is a 
significant determinant notjust of behavioural propensity, but of the way in which a person 
experiences and interprets life. As noted previously, the preconscious processing of 
environmental stimuli "determines the psychological situation of the individual as 
phenomenologically perceived by himself' (Todorov & Bargh, 2002). This echoes the 
observation by Spielman (1988) that "All aspects ofphenomenal experience are determined 
at least in part, by forces in the environment operating outside awareness". 
As shown in Chapter Three, all information reaching higher areas of the brain have already 
undergone some level of processing in the limbic regions and therefore carries with it 
information pertaining to the emotional si icance (valence and salience) ofthe incoming 
information. The evidence reviewed above goes further, showing that not only can human 
interaction with the environment not be without an emotional quality, but that preconscious 
determinations concerning the valence of incoming information have direct consequences 
for subsequent emotion and behaviour. Therefore, as suggested previously, in terms of the 
perception of pain , it cannot 
be simply trait determinants (sex, ethnicity/cultural affiliation 
and personality factors), or qualities of the pain stimulus itself that influence the experience 
of pain. The evidence reviewed above suggests that situational and contextual factors; 
events leading up to the advent of pain and features of the environment in which a painful 
stimulus occurs, must also exert some influence. In other words, factors that are not an 
inherent characteristic of the individual and are unrelated to the pain stimulus are also 
likely 
to influence the way in which a painful event is experienced. 
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In ternis of the research into preconscious automaticity, individual differences in response 
to pain discussed in Chapter Two, can be described as combinations of chronically 
accessible cognitive structures, comprising stereotype traits and personality trait constructs 
that are acquired through social learning. That is, they represent individual differences in 
relatively stable, socially acquired long-term cognitive structures, which are activated by 
preattentive evaluation of features of the environment in predictable ways during painful 
events. Thus, as mentioned, they can be characterised as 'trait-determinants' of the 
perception and response to pain stimuli. 
It is suggested here that automatic evaluation of social, contextual and environmental 
features can account (at least partly) for within-individual variation in the perception and 
response to pain stimuli. In other words, social context and environmental features can be 
characterised as 'state-determinants' or modifiers of the perception and response to a 
painful stimulus. The evidence reviewed in Chapters Three and Four show that social 
context and environmental factors determine (at least partly) the affective-motivational state 
of a person, and as affective-motivational state is a significant component of pain, it is 
suggested that manipulation of social context and environmental features can influence the 
interpretation of a painful stimulus. 
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RESEARCH Alms 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the effects of social, contextual and environmental 
factors on the interpretation of a pain stimulus. The research reviewed above shows pain 
to be a multidimensional experience, which includes both sensory-discriminatory and 
affective-motivational components. The affective-motivational component is responsible 
for the 'suffering' associated with human pain; the negative emotional and psychological 
response to a pain sensation, the sense of 'unpleasantness' associated with the pain 
stimulus, and the motivation to avoid it. 
It has been shown that social learning is strongly implicated in the development of long- 
term cognitive structures associated with constructs such as gender-role stereotypes and 
expectations, self efficacy, locus of control and neuroticism. These have been shown to 
influence patterns of emotional arousal in response to pain and as such are reliable 
predictors of pain response. Painful events generate strong affective responses in 
themselves, and the affective-motivational component of pain is usually associated with, 
and spoken of in terms of being a component of the response to a painful event. 
However, the evidence reviewed above has shown that all information entering higher areas 
of the central nervous system undergoes some level of emotional processing, thus human 
interaction with the envirom-nent cannot be without an emotional quality. Evidence 
provided by research into automaticity described above suggests that individuals monitor 
their environment constantly, and that the emotional valence of features in the environment 
has a direct influence upon the basic affective-motivational state of an individual. In other 
words, the net valence of emotionally salient information signalling the relative safety or 
danger (potential for harm) within the current environment deten-nines basic affective- 
motivational state (positive/approach or negative/avoidance). This process has been 
described as 'universal and unconditional' and has been shown to have measurable 
behavioural and emotional consequences. 
This being the case, the research question is: Can differences in social, 
contextual and envirom-nental factors influence the perception of a pain 
stimulus? 
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Whilst the presentation of emotionally valenced words or images have been shown to have 
an effect on affective-motivational state, these stimuli are often presented through means 
which would not usually occur in natural situations (e. g. flashing emotionally valenced 
words or images on a computer monitor). But what of factors which are inherent in more 
natural conditions such as clinical situations? Are there features of normal interactions 
preceding an acutely painful procedure, which are likely to influence significantly the 
perception of a pain stimulus? 
A series of experiments were conducted with the aim of investigating the influence of 
contextual factors on the perception of a pain stimulus. In other words, factors which , in 
light of the research reviewed above, are likely to influence the affective-motivational state 
of the individual by altering the meaning of the situation as perceived by the individual. 
Two experiments were conducted to assess the validity of a pressure algometer designed 
and built by the author for the purposes of this investigation (see general methods), and 
used in conjunction with subjective pain rating using visual analogue scales (VAS). Three 
experiments were designed to test the influence of social and environmental factors (i. e. 
factors other than intensity or quality of the pain stimulus) on the perception and reporting 
of pain. The factors under investigation represent three common facets of clinical and 
research situations: The perception of the context according to the information provided 
within the situation (what is said), the activation of sex stereotypes within the social dyad 
(who says it), and the evaluation of features of the environment in which a pain stimulus 
is applied (where it is said). 
What is said 
In clinical and experimental situations, the context as perceived by an individual is 
determined largely by the information provided by the clinician or researcher. The provision 
of information within these dyads is usually one-way (i. e. from clinician to patient) 
infori-ning the patient or participant of what they may expect to happen (providing 
predictability). This facilitates the adoption of congruent roles within the dyad (e. g. Pitts, 
1993b; Taylor, 1979), and a function of this interaction is a shift in the locus of perceived 
control (Taylor, 1979). 
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The perception of the context is one determinant of the affective-motivational state of the 
individual, and as discussed above, individual differences in cognitive structures activated 
by features of the environment determine individual differences in the interpretation of an 
event. Therefore, it was expected that changes in the perception of the nature of the context 
in which a pain stimulus is applied would result in changes in the experience of the pain 
stimulus, subject to individual differences in chronic trait activation. 
Who says it 
One step down from the explicit nature of the provision of information within a given 
situation is the implicit nature of social stereotypes. Aside from the stereotypes of 'doctor' 
'nurse" and 'scientist', clinicians and researchers are people and possess individual 
characteristics. For example, a clinician can be female, male, black or white or any 
combination of these and many other characteristics. 
The acquisition of gender roles through social learning (Chapter Two) influence not only 
what behaviours are appropriate for one's self as a member of a gender category within a 
given culture, but what behaviours a person might reasonably expect from members of the 
opposite sex within that culture. Exposure to members of these groups (males and females) 
is much greater than exposure to 'construct' groups such as clinician and researcher, thus 
the male and female sex stereotypes and expectancies concerning the behaviour of each 
category are likely to be more deeply ingrained than for 'doctor' or 'scientist' stereotypes. 
As shown, the activation of stereotypes and stereotype trait constructs has been shown to 
result in changes in behaviour that are congruent with the stereotype or construct activated 
(e. g. Bargh, 1988; Bargh, Chen et al., 1996; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000), and that are 
confirmatory ofthe expectations heldbythe individual concerning the stereotype (e. g. Chen 
& Bargh, 1997). Therefore, it was expected that stereotype activation occurring as a result 
of the social dyad (the mere presence of a male or a female) would influence the perception 
and reporting of pain in a way that is congruent with the sex stereotype. 
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Where it is said 
Automatic evaluation of features in the environment is a universal and unconditional 
process that has direct effects on affective-motivational state and subsequent interpretation 
of events. Thus, beyond the explicit facet of social interaction and the implicit factors of 
social stereotypes, are non-social objects and features of the environment which are 
automatically categorised as good or bad, providing information concerning the safety or 
otherwise of the immediate situation. The results of this evaluation elicit directly a general 
behavioural propensity to either approach or avoid a stimulus (Chen & Bargh, 1999). 
Therefore, it was expected that the mere presence of negatively valenced attitude objects 
in the environment would influence the perception of a pain stimulus. 
It should be noted that the objective of these studies was not to establish or test for the 
existence of automatic effects that have already been shown, but taking these preconscious 
automatic effects as given, to investigate their influence, in ecologically valid conditions, 
on the interpretation of a potentially painful event and subsequent response to a pain 
stimulus. Thus, the purpose was to bring together two (largely disparate) areas of 
psychological investigation (models of automaticity and pain research), and in doing so, to 
investigate whether the automatic (preattentive) effects described above could account for 
within-individual. variation in the perception and reporting of pain. 
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CHAPTER 
GENERAL METHODS 
Ethics and other considerations 
By definition ethics applies equally to all research involving human participants. However, 
research involving the administration of noxious stimuli carries with it particular ethical 
considerations as a result of the increased potential for harm, and is therefore in a sense, 
first among equals. Every effort was made to ensure that the research conducted for this 
thesis adhered to the Ethical Guidelines for Research with Human Participants, as laid 
down in the British Psychological Society Code of Conduct, Ethical Principles and 
Guidelines (Appendix VM). As such, all participants were of an age and condition that 
allowed them to provide informed consent and participants were provided with information 
concerning all aspects that might reasonable be expected to influence the provision of 
consent (section 3; 3.1). In experiments involving repeated measures, consent was obtained 
at the start of each measure (section 3; 3.9). The rights of the participants to halt or 
withdraw fTom the experiment at any time, or to withdraw retrospectively their consent and 
to require that their data be destroyed were stated explicitly at the start of each experimental 
session (section 6; 6.1). 
No participant was directly misled. Where it was not possible to reveal the full 
experimental objectives without compromising the experiment, or where through necessity, 
information was withheld, it was deterinined through consultation with colleagues and non- 
participating members of the participant population that the information withheld would 
not result in any negative effects once it was revealed during debriefing (sections 4; 4.1 & 
4: 4.3). All participants were fully debriefed after their participation. The debriefing revealed 
fully the objectives of the research and the nature of any manipulation involved. All 
participants were given the opportunity to have answered any questions they may have had 
concerning the experiment, and all participants were provided with contact details of the 
principal researcher should any issues arise at a future time (sections 5; 5.1 & 8; 8.2). 
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All participants were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. In experiments involving 
repeated measures, where it was necessary to ensure that data collected from a participant 
at one time point could be related to subsequent measures from the same participant, this 
was achieved through coding. No information that would allow the identification of any 
participant was recorded (section 7; 7.1). 
Research conducted on the premises of the University of Westminster (Experiments 1,4 
and 5) was covered by the University Ethics committee based at Northwick Park. 
Experiments 2 and 3 were conducted off University premises and in these cases the 
research confonned to the ethical principles and guidelines as laid down by the relevant 
institutions. 
Experiment 2 was conducted in the Clinical Neurophysiology department of Great Ormond 
Street Hospital. Ethical approval was granted by the Ethics Co ittee of The Hospital for mmi 
Sick Children, Great Ormond Street. Experiment 3 was conducted in a cubicle adjacent to 
the Renal Transplant Unit of the Royal Free Hospital in Hampstead. Ethical approval was 
granted through Chairman's action by Dr. Pegg, Chairman of the Ethics Committee of The 
Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust. Both institutions required that participants were 
provided with form giving full infori-nation concerning the study in which they were to 
participate, conforming to the principle of informed consent (see Appendix III). Volunteers 
participating in these studies were also required to sign a consent form. 
Pain stimuli 
The administration of pain stimuli through any modality (e. g. mechanical, electrical, 
thermal, or chemical), will always carry the risk (however slight) of long-terin damage or 
actual tissue injury. Further, a major criticism of pain research is that pain induced 
experimentally in a laboratory setting does not relate to pain experienced in a clinical 
setting, and thus lacks ecological validity. The aim therefore, was to select a method ofpain 
stimulus that would avoid unnecessary suffering, that was high in ecological validity and 
was as low as possible in the potential for harm. There are many pain induction techniques 
available, most of which have been developed for specific purposes. However, each has 
advantages and disadvantages. 
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Electrical stimuli 
Electrical stimulation is commonly used as pain stimulus in animal and human pain research 
(Handwerker & Kobal, 1993), principally because it is easy to control. However, electrical 
stimuli excite afferent fibres in an unnaturally synchronised fashion. They also excite all types 
of peripheral nerves, both small and large, and activate the fibre directly, bypassing the 
receptor. Whilst low voltage currents applied peripherally may hold little potential for actual 
harm, the unnatural nature of the stimulation means that this method is low in ecological 
validity. 
Chemical stimuli 
Chemical pain stimuli have been developed for particular purposes and are often used to 
selectively excite nociceptive nerve endings and to study inflammatory processes 
(Handwerker & Kobal, 1993). These substances may be applied in a variety of ways (e. g. 
topically, or subcutaneously). However, should the participant request that the stimulation be 
removed, it is difficult to stop the chemical action immediately. Moreover, many of these 
chemical hold the potential for harm. For example, Capsaicin (C18H, 7NOA the active 
ingredient found in hot peppers, is often used to research inflammatory responses. As with 
electrical stimulation in the form of Transcutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulation (TENS), 
capsaicin also has applications in pain control. Capsaicin cream is also used to treat the 
neuropathic pain of post-herpetic neuralgia. Application of capsaicin causes a burning 
sensation, but a part of its function is to allow an influx of calcium ions to enter the neuron, 
and extended exposure to calcium ions causes the fibres of the neuron to die. 
Thermal (heat) stimuli 
Tonic heat stimuli are not used in pain research as prolonged exposure to heat at noxious 
levels quickly results in damage to the skin. Studies using radiant or contact (thermode) heat 
stimulation tend to be used to study specific small (myelinated and non-myelinated) fibre 
neuropathy and abnormalities in heat sensation (see for example Dyck et al., 1993). Thermal 
stimuli is known to primarily involve C-fibre activation, which makes this form of pain 
stimuli less suitable for more general pain research. Moreover, there appears to be a low 
density and variable distribution of thermal receptors over the surface of the body, compared 
to the denser and more generallsed distribution of cold and pain receptors (Dyck et al., 1993). 
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This may account for the often unpredictable results shown in studies using thermal 
stimulation discussed in Chapter Two, where some researchers have found that females rated 
supra threshold thermal pain stimuli as significantly more painful than males (e. g. Feine et al., 
1991; Fillingim et al., 1998), whilst others have found no such difference (e. g. Bush et al., 
1993; Lautenbacher & Rollman, 1993). 
Thermal (cold) stimuli 
A commonly used experimental stimulus is the cold pressor test. This involves the participant 
immersing their hand and distal forearm in water held at a temperature between I OC and 40C. 
The pain is thought to be a result of the activation of deep nociceptors associated with large 
veins. Pain occurs as a result of vasoconstriction as the temperature of deep tissue layers 
rapidly decreases (Handwerker & Kobal, 1993). The pain is quite intense and the onset ofpain 
is almost immediate, hence the cold pressor test is usually used as a measure of pain tolerance 
rather than threshold. However, unlike most acutely painful clinical procedures, the cold- 
pressor test is self-administered. The pain is a result of the action of the participant and not 
the researcher. Therefore, whilst undeniably effective as a method of pain induction, it was 
thought firstly, that the cold pressor test would induce greater pain than necessary in light of 
the nature of this investigation. Secondly it was thought that as the cold-pressor test is a self- 
administered stimulus, the locus of perceived control would be different (and therefore not 
comparable) to clinical situations in which painful stimuli are applied to the patient by 
another. 
Mechanical stimuli 
Mechanical stimuli in the form of pressure (force) is easy to control, and evokes a deep, tonic 
pain (Janal, 1996; Kosek, Ekholm, & Nordemar, 1993; Kosek & Hansson, 
1997). As 
discussed in Chapter Three, mechanical stimuli of sufficient intensity to evoke the experience 
of pain activates both Ab and C fibres (p 41), and is generally considered to equate 
to the 
experience of acute (non-experimental) pain (Bartholomew, 
Lewis, Linder, & Cook, 1996). 
Moreover, measures of pain threshold using mechanical stimuli means that the stimulus 
is 
removed at the advent of pain, thus the suffering of the participant 
is kept to an absolute 
minimum. Of all methods available therefore, mechanical pain stimulation was considered 
the 
most ecologically valid, and the most ethically acceptable. 
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Measures 
Pain stimulus: The Pressure Algometer 
The application of pressure (force) is one of the oldest methods of inducing experimental 
pain. Manual palpation used as a diagnostic tool to assess sensitivity Is at least as old as 
physical therapy. However, the need for reproducibility and quantification ofmanual pressure 
gave rise to the development of the pressure algometer, which has also gone under the names 
of dolorimeter (Fischer, 1987), palpometer and pressure threshold meter (Hogeweg, 
Langereis, Bemards, Faber, & Helders, 1992). 
As noted above, pressure pain stimulus evokes a deep pain (Janal, 1996; Kosek et al., 1993; 
Kosek & Hansson, 1997), which is thought to be closely related to the experience of acute, 
non-experimental pain (Bartholomew et al., 1996). Evidence for the ecological validity of 
pressure algometry as a measure of pain threshold has been found in the investigation of 
individual differences in pain. For example, in their meta-analysis on gender differences in 
the response to noxious stimuli, Fillingim & Maixner (1995) concluded that sex associated 
differences occur most consistently with pain induction techniques that produces deep, tonic 
pain sensations similar to those experienced in the natural environment. On the other hand, 
evidence for sex associated differences in pain responses has been inconclusive in studies 
employing electrical or thermal pain stimuli (e. g. Bush et al., 1993; Lautenbacher & Rollman, 
1993). 
There are a range ofpressure algometers currently available, for example, Kosek et al. (1993) 
used a Somedic' hand held pressure algometer. This consists of a pistol-grip with a pressure 
sensitive strain gauge at the tip and is used by pushing the tip of the algometer onto various 
body surfaces. Mersky and Spear (1964) used a simple pressure algometer consisting of a 
plunger mounted on a calibrated spring, rather like the inverse of the spring scale used by 
fishermen. Reeves et al. (l 986) and Fischer (1987) used a Pain Threshold Meter Model PTH- 
AF2, which consists of a plunger which drives a pointer round an analogue dial calibrated 
in kg/cM2, while Jensen et al. (1986) used a pressure algometer sirnIlar to the Somedic', 
consisting of an acrylic handle shaped like a large pen, with a pressure-sensitive strain gauge 
at the tip. This is connected to a power supply and an amplifier, which in turn is connected 
to a pen recorder. 
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Figure 5. The nail-bed pressure algometer. A participant's hand can be seen in 
position. 
As mentioned, all currently available algometers (e. g. the Somedic'), require that the tip 
of the instrument be pushed with varying force into soft tissue. Although such instruments 
come with a range of tip sizes, (e. g. circular discs ranging from 0.5 cm' to 2. CM2 in area), 
the application of force to soft tissue will always carry the risk (however small) of bruising. 
When researching clinical pain, such as myofascial trigger point sensitivity (e. g. Delaney 
& McKee, 1993; Reeves et al., 1986), patients with arthritis (e. g. Gerecz Simon, Tunks, 
Heale, Kean, & Buchanan,, 1989; O'Driscoll & Jayson, 1975) or post operative pain (e. g. 
Dahl, Rosenberg, Molke Jensen, & Kehlet, 1990), the application of force to specific soft 
tissue target sites is unavoidable. However, for the purposes of this thesis (and other 
research in which the site of pain stimulus application is not considered a factor), the 
prototype algometer is thought to provide an advantage by virtually eliminating the risk of 
soft tissue trauma. 
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The reliability and validity of pressure algometers has been investigated for many years. In 
general, the results of such studies have indicated a high degree of reliability (see for 
example Brennum, et al., 1989; Fischer, 1987; Jensen et al., 1986; Mersky & Spear, 1964; 
Reeves et al., 1986). Some investigators have reported an increase in PPT over time. Jensen 
et al. (1986) recorded an increase in PPT over five consecutive determinations at weekly 
intervals. Kosek et al. (1993) reported no change in mean PPTs between the first and 
second session one week apart, but a significant increase in PPTs at the third session 
approximately ten weeks later. However, they note that most of their subjects had their 
summer vacation between the second and third session and suggest that it is possible that 
their subjects were less strained and fitter, which may have influenced the measurements. 
Other researchers report no such increase, for example Ohrbach and Gale (19 89) report no 
differences between sessions for eight consecutive weeks after the first session. Differences 
in Pressure Pain Threshold (PPT) have been found in different anatomical locations such 
as muscle bellies, joint capsules, nerve tissue and ligaments (Kosek et al., 1993), 
nonetheless, pressure algometry has been shown to be reliable within subjects, that is, PPTs 
obtained from any one point on any one participant tend to be reliable over repeated 
measures. The high degree of reliability reported applies across the range of pressure 
algometers and output modes. 
All these pressure algometers are used in essentially the same way, in that they all involve 
the tip of the instrument being pushed with some force onto soft tissue. Brennum et al. 
(1989), using the Somedic' reported that following PPT measurements, skin indentations 
were seen in most subjects which could last for hours. They state that it is thus possible that 
a decline in pressure pain threshold could have been found if the measurement had been 
repeated at a later time when a local inflammatory response may have developed. 
With this in mind, the author developed a prototype algometer that would 
deliver a safe and 
scalable mechanical pain stimulus, but which would avoid the application of 
force to soft 
tissue (Figure 5. See Appendix I for details). 
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The application of nail-bed pressure is common custom and practice on hospital wards by 
nurses performing neurological observations. It is one of several 'rough guide' techniques 
used for quickly assessing the level of unconsciousness of a patient, without causing 
physical trauma, however slight. Other techniques include supra-orbital pressure (using the 
ball of the thumb) pinching the earlobes, or medial-stemal pressure (applied by rubbing the 
knuckles firmly on the patient's sternum). The latter is less commonly used as it is more 
likely to cause bruising. 
The prototype nail-bed algometer delivers a scalable force via a 1.5cm straight edge 
rounded to 0.5mm radius (Imm. dia. ) to the lunula of the nail of the index finger. The force 
is applied by tightening the screw (Figure 6, top), and is read from a digital display 
(invisible to participants during use) calibrated in grammes. By replacing the screw with 
a weight of a known value, the scale can be calibrated between trials, and is known to be 
accurate to ± 0.1% (5g). The algometer can be used to measure either pressure pain 
threshold or tolerance. Participants report either the point at which the increasing pressure 
becomes painful, or the point at which they are no longer prepared to tolerate the pain. 
The weight of evidence shows pressure algometry to be a safe, simple and reliable method 
of inducing experimental pain that is ecologically valid, inducing acute pain which shares 
the same qualities as acute pain suffered in the natural environinent. The application of 
pressure to the nail-bed causes the area to blanch whilst the pressure is applied, but causes 
no lasting effects; it leaves no soft tissue indentation, carries no risk of bruising or other soft 
tissue trauma and produces no local inflammatory response. 
Moreover, in trials during the construction of the algometer, It was consistently reported by 
volunteers that the point at which the increasing pressure became painful was abrupt and 
'obvious'. It also lacks the 'unpleasant' pre-pain quality that can occur applying force to 
soft tissue in certain areas, for example, the area between the thumb and forefinger, which 
induces an unpleasant, dull sensation that is hard to classify as pain. This being the case, 
it makes the application of force to the nail-bed an ideal method for experimental pressure 
pain threshold measures as used in this investigation. 
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The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) define pain threshold as - the 
least experience ofpain which a subject can recognize". The IASP note that traditionally 
pain threshold has been defined as the least stimulus intensity at which a subject perceives 
pain. Moreover, that it has been common for most pain research workers to define pain 
threshold in terms of stimulus intensity. The IASP point out that pain threshold is the 
experience of the subject whereas the stimulus intensity measured is an external event, and 
that the stimulus is not pain and therefore cannot be a measure of pain (IASP, 1994). The 
IASP acknowledge however, that the threshold stimulus can be recognized as such and 
measured. Therefore, taking into consideration the IASP definition of pain threshold, for 
the purposes of this investigation, PPT is defined as the stimulus intensity at which the 
participant reports the advent of pain. 
Pain Rating: The Visual Analogue Scale 
There are a number of pain measures available, such as verbal descriptor scales, category 
scales and Visual Analogue Scales (VAS). Any of these may be appropriate for use in this 
type of investigation. However, the VAS was chosen as there is considerable evidence that 
it fulfills most, if not all of the criteria for an ideal method of pain measurement (Price & 
Harkins, 1987). 
A major advantages is that these scales are quick and easy to administer with minimal 
instruction. This is an important practical consideration in investigations employing more 
than one measure per trial. Also, being simply a ten centimetre line anchored at each end 
by a simple descriptor (from 'no pain', to 'the worst possible pain'), it is more likely these 
scales have essentially the same meaning to different subjects. This is not the case with 
verbal category scales as any given adjective does not necessarily have the same meaning 
for different people, and the choice of response option can influence the response (Duncan, 
Bushnell, & Lavigne, 1989; Gannon & Ostrom, 1996). 
In an overview of pain measurement, Chapman et al. (1985) conclude that of the two 
primary methods of subjective pain reports (VAS and category scales), visual analogue 
scales are more sensitive, just as valid and may be more reliable, as category scales may 
produce artificially augmented scores. Moreover, when response categories are taken at face 
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value, it is difficult to specify the size of each category and whether the categories are of 
equal spacing. A further advantage to the VAS over category scales, is that it provides a 
large possible response continuum (100 for practical purposes), between two semantic 
absolutes. Category scales, on the other hand, may have a tendency to restrict the subjects 
response to the categories presented by the scale, though the boundaries of each category 
cannot be known as it will vary from individual to individual (Chapman et al., 1985). 
A study by Duncan et al. (1989) comparing the verbal descriptor checklist and visual 
analogue scales concluded that both visual analogue and verbal descriptor measurement 
techniques successfully quantify both sensory intensity and affective aspects for noxious 
and near-noxious temperatures. However, they note that data derived from the verbal 
descriptor scales showed that participants rated the painful temperatures as relatively more 
intense than unpleasant. A difference which could not be detected using the visual analogue 
scales. 
They conclude that while both visual analogue and verbal descriptor techniques 
successfully quantify sensory intensity and affective aspects ofpain, verbal descriptors may 
provide the more sensitive tool for separating intensity and unpleasantness. However, a 
weakness of verbal descriptor scales is that they imply that as pain increases beyond a level 
described as, for example "discomforting" it is replaced by an experience described as 
"distressing" (Price & Harkins, 1987). As Price and Harkins note, this is not necessarily the 
case as pain may just as easily pass from being discomforting to being frustrating or 
irritating. 
Visual analogue scales have been shown to be quick and simple for participants to 
understand and to use; requiring minimal instruction, and as reliable and sensitive as other, 
more complex instruments, whilst avoiding some of the pitfalls associated with them. 
Visual analogue scales represent an efficient way of quantifying subjective pain experience 
in a manner that means essentially the same to each participant, without unduly influencing 
(by providing adjectives that the subject may not necessarily have chosen under the same 
circumstances) or forcing (by limiting the subjects responses to pre-set categories) the 
participant response. 
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The data yielded by VASs are straightforward. Although some researchers choose to treat the 
data obtained from VASs non-parametrically (Chapman et al., 1985), many consider 
multidimensional VASs to be a convenient method to quantify the intensity and 
unpleasantness of pain in a way that is appropriate for parametric analysis (Chapman et al., 
1985; Duncan et al., 1989). 
Why Combined Measures? 
As pain is a multidimensional experience involving physiological, psychological and 
emotional components, it makes sense to use an experimental method which would address 
these different components. Price and Harkins (1987) assert that separate measures of pain 
sensation, intensity and affect are necessary for assessing psychological and contextual 
influences on the experience of pain and subsequent behaviour. Measures of PPT have been 
classed as 'semi-quantitative' (combined subjective and objective) (e. g. Dahl et al., 1990) and 
require minimal processing by participants. On the other hand, pain rating, where participants 
are required to quantify the pain experience, is entirely subjective and requires a deeper level 
of processing and interpretation by the participant. 
At face value it might seem pointless to ask participants to quantify their pain experience at 
pain threshold stimulus intensity. Intuitively, one might expect that as pain threshold signals 
the advent of pain, subsequent quantitative measures of pain intensity would be just above 
"nopain". However, such an expectation assumes a direct correspondence between stimulus 
intensity and subjective experience. It also assumes that these tools measure only what they 
purport to measure. 
Chapman et al. (19 8 5) in a review of pain measurement methodology note that a common 
problem is that use of VAS assumes pain to be a unidimensional experience that vanes only 
in intensity. But to assume that a pain intensity rating scale measures only the intensity or 
'amount' of pain contradicts the multidimensional nature of the pain experience. The 
experience of pain, by definition, must contain all the elements that make it 'painful', 
including the affective motivational component. Therefore, it seems likely that any subjective 
measure of pain intensity will be influenced by the current affective-motivational state and 
interpretation of the situation as a whole, and reflect not only the stimulus intensity, but the 
degree of unpleasantness associated with it. 
82 
-ld 
The evidence presented in Chapters Three and Four suggests that any method of assessing 
pain intensity (including VAS), is in fact a measure of the sum of the multidimensional pain 
experience, reflecting a combination of perceived intensity and emotional-motivational 
response to the situation. Similarly, measures of PPT, whilst in themselves measuring only 
stimulus intensity at pain threshold, reflect more thanjust the advent of pain. It is suggested 
that they will be influenced by evaluation of the context and the subsequent affective- 
motivational state of participants. Thus it is proposed that observations of the relative 
changes between measures of PPT and subjective pain rating (VAS) will provide a greater 
degree of infon-nation than either measure alone. 
Methods 
Experimenter 
The experimenter in all Experiments was a white male, 36 - 41 years of age. The same 
experimenter conducted each Experiment. For Experiment 4 investigating the effect of 
experimenter sex, a female experimenter was paired with the male experimenter. She was 
of an equivalent age and of the same ethnic background as the male experimenter. 
Participant inclusionlexclusion criteria 
All participants were healthy adult volunteers. Participants from the student body of the 
University of Westminster were recruited under the University research participation 
scheme 3. No financial or other incentive was offered to potential volunteers. All volunteers 
needed to be healthy, and of sufficient age to provide consent (>16 years). Exclusion 
criteria were that volunteers should not be suffering from any chronic pain condition. 
Volunteers should not be suffering from any arthritic or osteoporotic condition, particularly 
of the hands. Volunteers should not currently be taking any form of analgesia. 
3 
The research participation scheme is a method of encouraging active participation of undergraduate students of 
Psychology in practical 
research. All students of Psychology at the University of Westminster are required to 
become involved in research, either as participants 
or assistants for a total of 3.5 hours over the course of their 
first year. All students have the option of not participating, in which case 
they are required to write a short essay. 
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Materials 
In all Experimental trials, the nail-bed pressure algometer was used to take measures of 
PPT. Subjective ratings of pain were taken using aI Ocm VAS scales, anchored at each end 
from "No pain" to "The wostpain imaginable" (Appendix 1). 
General procedure 
Prior to measures of PPT, participants were instructed on the use of VAS scales, (and the 
LOC questionnaire and category scales for Experiment 3). As soon as participants indicated 
that they were clear on the use of these scales, they were given a standardised briefing: 
"Place yourfinger on the rest and when you are ready, Iwill begin to increase thepressure 
slowly. As soon as youfeel that thepressure has become painful, say stop, and I will stop. 
As soon as the measure is complete, please indicate how much pain youfelt using the VAS 
scale". 
To obtain pressure-pain threshold measurements, participants placed the index finger of 
their dominant hand on the finger rest (see Figure 6). The experimenter zeroed the scale and 
when the participant was ready, began to apply pressure at a rate of approximately 100 g 
s-1 as measured by the sweep hand of a watch. Once the participant reported pain threshold, 
the pressure was removed and the force was recorded. The participants then rated the pain 
using the 10cm VAS (from "No pain" to "The wostpain imaginable"). Prior to dominant 
hand PPT measures, each subject underwent a familiarisation trial, using their non- 
dominant hand. 
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CHAPTER 
EXPERIMENTAL SECTION 
Experiments I and 2 were designed as validation studies. They were conducted principally 
in order to establish the reliability and validity of the prototype nall-bed pressure algometer 
(VASs already having been validated as a reliable measure (e. g. Chapman et al., 1985)). 
Experiment I examines the test-retest reliability of the nail-bed algometer, and Experiment 
2 examines the sensitivity of the nail-bed algometer to an intervention known to be 
effective in moderating deep, tonic pain; vibration stimulation. 
VALIDATION STUDIES 
ExPERIMENT 1: TEST - ]RETEST RELIABILITY 
Introduction 
The aim ofthis Experiment was to assesses the test-retest reliability of the nail-bed pressure 
algometer and the combined measures protocol. As discussed above, the pressure algometer 
as a method of experimental pain induction has been shown to provide highly reliable 
measures of stimulus intensity at pain threshold within participants. In other words, PPTs 
obtained from any one point on any one participant tend to be reliable over repeated 
measures. Therefore, it was expected that under stable conditions (the same environment 
and the same experimenter), the nail-bed algometer would provide reliable measures of 
pain-threshold stimulus intensities over repeated measures. 
Methods 
Design 
Using a repeated measures design, 5 consecutive measures of PPT and VAS pain rating 
were taken at weekly intervals. 
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Participants 
The participants were 22 healthy first-year student volunteers who had responded to 
advertisements placed on the University research participation scheme noticeboard. 
The sample consisted of 7 males and 15 females (mean age 30 years, SD 8.26 years, range 
19 - 57 years). 3 were left handed (two male, one female). 
Procedure 
The experimental trials were conducted in an empty classroom in the University of 
Westminster. Measure of PPT and VAS pain rating were taken (as detailed in general 
methods) at weekly intervals for five consecutive weeks. Each participant was tested 
individually in the same room, at the same time of day, on the same day of the week at each 
trial. At the first session the participants were briefed on the procedure and on the use of 
Visual Analogue Scales. For all subsequent sessions, the participants were simply asked if 
they knew what to do and if they had any questions. The rights of the participants to halt or 
withdraw from the study were re-stated at the start of each trial. After the final trial, all 
participants were given a full debriefing concerning the nature and objectives of the 
Experiment and asked if they had any questions or issues concerning their experience. 
Results 
The data recorded consisted of five measures of PPT and five measures of VAS pain rating. 
Figure 6 presents the means and standard deviations of PPT values and pain ratings for all 
22 participants over five successive weeks. 
2500- 
2000- 
1500- 
1000 - 
500- 
011 
TRIAL 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Figure 6 Means for PPT and VAS scores over 5 trials. Error bars present ±1 
standard deviation. 
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The large (but stable) standard deviations and the large ranges (Table 1) for PPT and VAS 
reflect a wide distribution of pain thresholds and subjective pain ratings between- 
participants. However, the Standard Errors of the means (Table 1) suggest that the measures 
are reliable over the series of trials, indicating that pain thresholds are stable within 
participants. 
Table 1. Ranges (SE Means) of PPT and VAS pain ratings over 5 
trials. 
TRIAL 12345 
PPT (g) 3720 3850 4135 3555 4300 
(202.37) (193.26) (194.35) (188.52) (219.02) 
VAS (mm) 55 51 49 78 66 
(3.99) (3.45) (3.53) (4.31) (3.98) 
The data were analysed using repeated measures ANOVA. There were no significant main 
effects for either PPT 
(F4,84 =0.5 8 1, p=0.6 8) or VAS p ain rating 
(F4,84 =1.499, p=0.2 1) 
over five trials. 
As examples of the relationship between-trials for PPT and VAS measures, Figures 7 and 
8 present the data from the trials furthest apart (first trial measures against the last trial 
measures) for measures of PPT and VAS pain ratings (respectively). 
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Figure 7 Relationship between trial land trial 5 PPTs 
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Figure 8 Relationship between trial 1 and trial 5 VAS pain ratings. 
Pearson product-moment correlations revealed strong between-trial correlations for both PPT 
and VAS (Tables 2& 3). 
Table 2. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients for measures of PPT by trial 
CORRELATIONS TRIAL I TRIAL 2 TRIAL 3 TRIAL 4 
TRIAL 5 (N22) 0.802** 0.924** 0.835** 0.950** 
TRIAL 4 (N22) 0.815** 0.936** 0.824** 
TRIAL 3 (N22) 0.630* 0.773** 
TRIAL 2 (N22) 0.925** 
p<0.005 (2-tailed) 
p<0.0005 (2-tailed) 
Table 3. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients for VAS pain ratings by 
trial. 
CORRELATIONS TRIAL I TRIAL 2 TRIAL 3 TRIAL 4 
TRIAL 5 (N22) 0.811 ** 0.923** 0.938** 0.981** 
TRIAL 4 (N22) 0.770** 0.882** 0.890** 
TRIAL 3 (N22) 0.811 ** 0.965** 
TRIAL 2 (N22) 0.893** 
** < 0.0005 (2-tailed) 
The mean correlation coefficient for PPT was 0.84 and the mean correlation coefficient for 
VAS pain rating was 0.89. There were no significant correlations between PPT and VAS on 
any trial. 
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Discussion 
The aim of Experiment I was to assess the test-retest reliability of the nail-bed pressure 
algometer and the combined measures protocol (the use of nail-bed pressure algometry in 
conjunction with subjective pain rating). The results ofthis study demonstrate ahigh degree 
of test-retest reliability and are in accordance with those of other studies (see for example 
Brennum et al., 1989; Fischer, 1987; Jensen et al., 1986; Mersky & Spear, 1964; Reeves 
et al., 1986). 
The strong between-trials correlations for both PPT and VAS pain rating show that the 
values obtained from any participant from each trial are highly predictive of values from 
the same participant over subsequent trials under stable conditions. This suggests a high 
degree of stability for pain threshold within participants. Also shown are large between 
participant variances for PPT and VAS pain rating, indicated by the large standard 
deviations and ranges recorded. Due to individual differences and the personal and 
subjective nature of the pain experience, this was to be expected. 
Although it has been argued that it is a matter of dispute whether there is such a thing as 
a measurable pain threshold (Mersky & Spear, 1964), numerous investigations since then, 
which have demonstrated reliable measure of PPT, and also Experiment 1 presented above, 
suggest that there is such a thing. Whilst it is acknowledged that PPT is a measure of 
stimulus intensity at the advent of pain rather than pain per se, it is highly improbable that 
participants tested for PPT could report a reliable cut-off point for an increasing stimulus 
intensity over five consecutive trials, each a week apart, without there being some kind of 
cue. 
It is suggested therefore that the reliability of such measures is in itself an indication of 
validity, in so far as the most probable cue a participant has for reporting the same cut-off 
point to a stimulus of increasing intensity over repeated trials (all else being equal) is the 
advent of pain; a pain threshold. This in turn suggests that under stable conditions, pain 
threshold in response to a given stimulus applied to the same location is stable within 
participants. 
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As mentioned previously, the large between participant variance shown for PPT and VAS 
pain rating are a function of the subjective nature of pain rating and as such, are to be 
expected. Jensen (1986) stated that due to high inter-individual variation, determinations 
of PPT for group comparisons should include large sample populations, whereas in paired 
studies, the relatively small intra-individual variation allows the Investigation of much 
smaller groups. The results of this study are in accordance with this view and show that this 
approach is appropriate for further experiments in this investigation. 
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ExPERIMENT 2: THE EFFECT OF VIBRATION ON PRESSURE-PAIN THRESHOLD AND 
SUBJECTIVE PAIN RATING 
Introduction 
Having shown that the nail-bed pressure algometer provides a reliable measure of PPT, the 
next step was to assess its sensitivity to an intervention known to be effective in the 
moderation of pain. Vibration has long been acknowledged as an effective intervention for 
the mediation of many forms of pain, such as experimental cutaneous pain (Kakigi, 
Matsuda, & Kuroda, 1993),, acute and chronic musculoskeletal pain, acute oro-facial pain 
(Hansson & Ekblom, 1984) and chronic pathological pain (Kosek & Hansson, 1997). The 
majority of these studies demonstrate effects consistent with the Gate Control Theory of 
Pain (Melzack & Wall, 1965; Wall, 1978). 
Broadly, the Gate Control Theory proposes an interaction between four classes of neurons 
in the dorsal hom of the spinal cord (figure 9). C fibres (non-myelinated nociceptive 
afferent fibres) have both a direct and indirect influence on the projection neuron. Impulses 
resulting from noxious stimuli are attenuated by the simultaneous inhibition of the 
inhibitory interneuron and excitation of the projection neuron (the activity of which results 
in the sensation of pain). The application of mechanical stimulation (vibration) excite the 
larger myelinated Aa and AP afferent fibres which simultaneously excite both the 
inhibitory interneuron and the projection neuron resulting in attenuation of nociceptive 
signals. 
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Figure 9 Possible gating mechanism, modified from Melzack and wall (1965). 
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It has been shown that in order for the stimulation of Aa and AP fibres to be effective in 
the attenuation of nociceptive signals, it is necessary that the stimulation be applied to a 
related receptive area (dermatome), that is, intra segmentally (e. g. Ekblom & Hansson, 
1985; Kakigi et al., 1993; Kakigi & Shibasaki, 1992). Further, there is evidence that 
distance is a factor in the intra-segmental application of vibration stimulus. Sherer et al. 
(1986) tested two sites for the application of vibratory stimulation (VS), one distal and one 
proximal to the site of pain stimulation. 
Their results reveal an increase in pain threshold in both conditions, but a significant 
elevation of pain threshold only in the group receiving VS distal to the site of pain stimulus. 
Importantly however, the distance between the site of VS and pain stimulus were different 
between groups. The distal VS was applied adjacent to the site of pain stimulus (within 4- 
6cm), whilst the proximal VS was applied 20-30 centimetres from the point of pain 
stimulus. 
Clinical literature reports a change in subjective pain rating following VS, but these studies 
are generally investigating the effect of VS on the experience of (often chronic) 
suprathreshold pain (e. g. Ekblom & Hansson, 1985; Hansson & Ekblom, 1984; Lundeberg, 
1984; Lundeberg, Nordemar, & Ottoson, 1984), and VS has generallybeen shown to reduce 
the intensity of existing (non-scalable) pain. On the other hand, experimental pain studies 
have investigated the effect of VS on pain threshold in healthy subjects (e. g. Kakigi et al., 
1993; Kakigi & Shibasaki, 1992; Kosek & Hansson, 1997; Sherer et al., 1986) but these 
studies did not include measures of subjective pain experience. 
As by definition, pain threshold signals the advent of pain, it is suggested that the subjective 
experience at pain threshold should remain the same, irrespective of the stimulus Intensity 
required to achieve it. Therefore, it was hypothesised that, in line with previous research, 
intervention in the form of vibratory stimulation would result in an elevation of PPT. No 
changes in VAS pain rating were expected. 
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Methods 
Design 
Using a repeated measures design, PPT and VAS pain ratings were taken at three time 
points. Baseline (pre-vibration), at 30 minutes (during vibration) and at 45 minutes (15 
minutes post-vibration). 
Participants 
The participants were 10 healthy volunteers who had responded to advertisements placed 
in both the University of Westminster (under the research participation scheme) and the 
Royal Free Hospital. 4 males and 6 females (mean age 34.20 years, SD 6.78 years, range 
26 - 46 years), of which 2 were left handed (one male, one female). All participants were 
naive as to the experimental hypotheses. 
Materials 
The nail-bed pressure algometer was used to obtain measures of PPT. Subjective pain 
ratings were collected using I Ocm Visual Analogue Scales. Vibration was applied through 
a steel T- bar, approximately 7cm long by 4mm in diameter. This was attached to a Ling 
Dynamics V201 vibrator, powered by a model LDS PA 25E amplifier. The wave-form and 
amplitude were controlled using an AM/FM Function Generator (8105, Topward Electric 
Instruments Ltd. ). The vibration stimulus took the fon-n of aI mm amplitude sine wave at 
lOOHz. 
Procedure 
The Experiment took place in a laboratory in the department of Clinical Neurophysiology 
of Great Ormond Street Hospital. In accordance with the ethical guidelines of Great 
Ormond St. Hospital, each volunteer was presented an information sheet describing the 
nature of the study, and including a description of the procedure and instructions on the use 
of visual analogue scales (see Appendix III). 
Each participant was given the standard verbal briefing (as shown in general methods), after 
which baseline measures of PPT and VAS pain rating were taken. Participants were then 
asked to rest their index finger on the T-bar of the vibrator. 
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The elbow and proximal forearm of the participant was supported so that with the ann 
relaxed, the finger rested on the T-bar with sufficient force to maintain contact with the bar 
during vibration. Vibration was applied to the palmar aspect of the first phalanx of the 
dominant hand index finger, approximately 5 cm proximal to the site of pain stimulus (both 
sites within the C7 dennatome) for 30 minutes. At 30 minutes a second measure of PPT 
and VAS pain rating were taken. The vibration was removed and the subjects remained 
seated for a further 15 minutes, after which the final set of measures were taken. 
The entire procedure took 50 minutes. After the trial, participants were given a full 
debriefing and the objective ofthe Experiment was explained. Before participants left, each 
was asked whether they had any residual effects ofthe vibration, such as numbness, tingling 
or other persisting sensations. 
Results 
The data consisted of measures of PPT and VAS pain rating taken over three time points. 
Figure 10 presents the means (± I standard deviation) of PPT and VAS scores for all 
participants (N = 10) over three measures; Pre-VS baseline, at 30 minutes VS and 15 
minutes post VS. 
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Figure 10 Means for PIPT and pain rating over baseline, vibration and post- 
vibration measures. Error bars represent ±1 standard 
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As for Experiment 1, the comparatively large standard deviations (Figure 10) and ranges 
(Table 4) indicate large between-participant di in PPT and VAS pain rati fferences i ing. 
Table 4. Ranges of PPT and VAS pain ratings over 3 
measures. 
TRiAL 12 
PPT (g) 2250 2300 2900 
VAS (nun) 40 40 49 
The data were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA. The results revealed a 
significant increase in PPT at 30 minutes vibration (F2,18= 6.5 7, p=0.007). However, 
there was no significant change in VAS pain rating over three measures (F2,18= 0.379, p 
= 0.74). Analysis using a paired sample Mest showed no significant difference between 
baseline PPT and PPT at 15 minutes post vibration (t = -0.905, df = 9, p=0.39). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrate the attenuation of pain through VS, congruent 
with the Gate Control Theory of Pain (Melzack & Wall, 1965; Wall, 1978). Significantly 
greater force was required in the presence of VS to achieve the advent of pain than in the 
absence of VS. The results show no change in subjective pain rating across three measures, 
congruent with the suggestion that as pain threshold signals the advent of pain, 
experimental measures of PPT will result in similar pain experiences even though, due to 
VS intervention, a significant increase in force was required to reach pain threshold. In 
short, the subjective experience of pain threshold is the same, regardless of the stimulus 
intensity required to reach it. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that the absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of 
absence, the VAS is a validated measure and has been shown to be sensitive to changes in 
the experience of pain. Therefore, had there been any significant change in subjective 
experience, it is reasonable to expect this to have been indicated by changes in VAS pain 
rating. 
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The results of Experiments I and 2 show the nail-bed pressure algometer to be a reliable 
measure of PPT and sensitive to an intervention of known efficacy. Further, they have 
shown that under experimental conditions where participants have explicit control to halt 
the procedure at pain threshold, manipulations designed to influence PPT do not result in 
changes to subjective pain rating, supporting the contention that the experience of pain 
threshold remains the same, regardless of the stimulus intensity required to reach it. 
As stated, the first two experiments were conducted in order to validate the prototype nall- 
bed algometer. The next series of experiments constitute the investigative component ofthe 
experimental section. These experiments were designed to investigate the role of social, 
contextual and environmental factors in the perception of acute pain. 
As discussed previously, the factors under investigation represent three common facets of 
clinical and research situations: The perception of the situation and context according to the 
information provided (what is said), the activation of sex stereotypes within to the social 
dyad (who says it), and evaluation of features of the current environment (where it is said). 
Experiment 3 investigated the effects of manipulation of the context, as perceived by 
participants, on the perception of a pain stimulus. Perception of the context was 
manipulated by differences in pre-procedure briefings relating to levels ofpredictability and 
locus of perceived control. 
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CHAPTER 
ExPERIMENT 3: INFORMATION9 PERCEIVED CONTROL AND LOCUS OF CONTROL: 
EFFECTS ON THE PERCEPTION OF A PAIN STIMULUS. 
Introduction 
The situation as perceived by individuals in clinical and research contexts depends largely 
upon the information with which they are provided by the clinician or researcher. The 
provision of preparatory information within these dyads usually take the form of briefings 
concerning what is about to happen (common to both research and clinical situations). This 
facilitates the adoption of roles within the dyad placing the locus of perceived control with 
the clinician or researcher, as the possessor of the information and controller of subsequent 
events (e. g. Taylor, 1979). As stated in the introduction, perceived control has been defined 
as "the belief that one has at one's disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness 
of an event" (Thompson, 1981, p. 90). As noted by Higgins (1987, p387), "... temporary 
expectancies are automatically driven by the data present in the current situational context". 
Briefings given in clinical and experimental situations constitute (arguably) the most salient 
environmental data available, therefore differences in the information presented will result 
in differences in interpretation of the situation, and different expectancies concerning the 
outcome. 
The inforination provided in such circumstances may vary in at least two ways; what one 
may expect to happen (predictability) and the degree of control one has over it. An example 
of this in a clinical context is the difference in the instructions given for two very similar 
acute procedures; vempuncture (blood sampling) and cannula insertion (for the intravenous 
delivery of fluids over time). Both procedures are invasive and the physical stimulus is 
more or less the same; the insertion of a needle into a vein. However, with venipuncture 
greater control can be given to the patient. It is a very quick procedure and the needle may 
be withdrawn at any time. On the other hand, the process of cannula insertion, though the 
physical trauma is more or less identical, takes a little longer and once the process is 
instigated, it is clearly pointless to stop until the cannula is fully in position. 
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The briefing for venipuncture amounts to 'You will just feel a little scratch, let me know if it 
hurts too much and I'll stop' (high predictability, high control). The explicit provision to stop 
is usually given in venipuncture as the normal site for venipuncture (brachial fossa) also 
contains the median and radial nerves (medial and lateral to the fossa, respectively). The 
precise location of these nerves varies between individuals, so any 'shooting' pains the patient 
experiences indicates that the needle is approaching one of these nerves, and the procedure 
should be halted in order to prevent nerve damage. Therefore, within this short briefing there 
is both information pertaining to what the patient is likely to experience, and the provision of 
a degree of control over the event. 
On the other hand, the usual sites for cannula insertion are more distal and away from joints 
(the back of the hand, or the lower dorsal or ventral aspects of the forearm), thus the chances 
of striking a nerve are minimal. Moreover, as mentioned, it is pointless to stop the procedure 
before the cannula is in position, therefore the briefing given to the patient undergoing cannula 
insertion amounts to 'this may be a little uncomfortable, but try to hang on until it's in place' 
(low predictability, low control). In this example, the briefing is different on both dimensions. 
The patient is warned that the procedure may be a little uncomfortable, and the freedom to 
stop the procedure is not given explicitly, although the clinician would have to stop upon 
direct request from the patient, as this counts as withdrawal of consent. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, locus of control (LOC) style represents an individual difference 
in long-term cognitive structures that are acquired through social learning. The acquisition of 
particular LOC style (internal or external) determines the particular traits of the LOC construct 
which are chronically accessible within the individual. It has been shown that people are more 
sensitive to environmental information that is relevant to their individual long-term trait 
constructs (e. g. Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Pratto, 1986). Therefore, features of a briefing which 
are relevant to control are likely to have different effects depending on the chronically 
accessible trait-availability detennined by the LOC style of the individual. In other words, 
information within a briefing which indicates a shift in the locus of perceived control from the 
patient or participant to the clinician or researcher, is likely to have a 
different effect on 
someone who already believes control to lie in the hands of luck, 
fate, or powerful others (i. e. 
that they have little direct control themselves), than someone who believes that events within 
their personal environment are under their own control. 
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In summary, information may vary in the provision of both predictability and controlý 
influencing participant expectancies and degree of perceived of control respectively. The 
former will influence the hypotheses held by the individual concerning what is about to 
happen and thus the interpretation of the nature of the situation, and the latter will be 
interpreted according to the long-term trait accessibility of the individual. Together, these 
are likely to have a significant influence on the evaluation of the situation as a whole. 
Therefore, it was expected that differences in the information provided in a pre-procedure 
briefing would result in different interpretation of the second of two pain stimuli of 
identical intensities. 
The hypotheses were that participants provided with information providing predictability 
with respect to the impending stimulus intensity, but denied any apparent means of 
influencing it would rate the second of two identical pain stimuli as being more painful 
compared to the first. Further, it was predicted that pain ratings from participants denied 
both preparatory information and perceived control, having nothing explicit to influence 
their coping strategy, would depend on the activation of chronically accessible traits 
associated with their individual LOC style (those with a more internal LOC reporting lower 
pain than those with a more external LOC). 
Methods 
Design 
Using a mixed 3 (conditions) x2 (measures) design, three experimental groups were 
generated using verbal briefings. The conditions were Information plus Control (I+C: 
Control group), Infon-nation with No Control (I-NQ and No Information and No Control 
N-NC)4. 
4 
There was no 'control - no information'condition 
because the aim was to assess the effects of differences in pre-test briefing upon the 
perception of the second of two pain stimuli of identical Intensities. 
Participants presented with perceived control but denied information 
would probably have shown a reduction in PPT measures 
for the trial condition. This would invalidate the trial, as participant's 
subsequent pain rating could not be compared with their baseline. 
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For the purposes of this study, preparatory information was designed to provide 
predictability with respect to the intensity of the impending stimulus and was either 
provided or withheld. Control was defined as the explicit authority to stop the trial using 
a verbal signal (instrumental control). Control was perceived by the participant as being in 
the hands of either the experimenter or the participant. It is important to note that overall 
control (the option to halt or withdraw from the experiment) was never withheld from 
participants. 
Participants 
The participants were 61 healthy volunteers recruited from the staff of the Royal Free 
Hospital, Hampstead NES Trust. Volunteers had responded to advertisements placed on 
the medical school and hospital staff notice-boards. The sample consisted of 20 males and 
41 females (mean age 29.10 years, SD 7.04 years, range 19-50 years). 7 were left handed; 
4 male, 3 female. 
Materials 
PPTs were measured using the nail-bed algometer. Subjective pain measures were collected 
using I Ocm VAS (as detailed in general methods). Participants were required to compare 
the second of two identical pain stimuli with the first using a five-point Likert type scale 
from I (much less) to 5 (much more). Measure of internal/extemal locus of control were 
taken using the Internal/Extemal Locus of Control Questionnaire (Rotter, 1966) (Appendix 
IV). 
Procedure 
The experimental trials were conducted in an empty (save for a table and chairs) room next 
to the annexe of the Renal Transplant Unit of the Royal Free Hospital. In accordance with 
the ethical guidelines of The Royal Free Hampstead NHS trust, each volunteer was 
presented an information sheet describing the nature of the study, and Including a 
description of the procedure and instructions on the use of visual analogue scales. 
Participants were also required to sign consent forms (Appendix 111). 
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Participants were allocated randomly to one of the three groups and were tested 
individually. Each participant was instructed on the use of the scales and fully informed of 
their rights to halt the study and withdraw at any time. Participants were told only that the 
objectives of the experiment was to test for a correlation between LOC and pain threshold. 
Each participant was given the standard verbal briefing (as in general methods). Baseline 
measures of PPT and VAS pain rating were taken. Participants were then required to 
complete the LOC questionnaire. Lower scores indicate a more internal LOC style and 
higher scores indicate a more external LOC style. After completing the LOC questionnaire, 
participants were presented with one of three verbal briefings designed to induce the 
experimental conditions. The briefings were as follows: 
Information + Control: 
"This time 171 look only atyour dominant hand. Again, I'll slowly increase thepressure. As 
soon as you feel the pressure has become pain, say stop and I will stop. After that, you 
mark the scale again". 
Information - No control: 
"This time I'll look only at your dominant hand. Again, I'll slowly increase the pressure. 
However, there is nopoint in saying stop this time. Iknowyourpain threshold value is (x) 
from thefirst measure, so I'll take you up to that value, after which you mark the scale 
againýl. 
No Information - No Control: 
"This time I'll only look at your dominant hand. Again, 171 slowly increase the pressure. 
However, there is no point in saying stop this time. I'm going to take the pressure up to a 
predetermined value, after which you mark the scale again". 
The briefing given in the I+C (control) condition was identical to the initial baseline trial 
briefing given to all groups, reinforcing their explicit authority to halt the trial with a verbal 
signal (high predictability, high control). The briefing given in the I-NC condition gave 
information about the intensity of the impending pain stimulus (high predictability), but 
withheld explicit control from the participant and placed it with the experimenter - "... there 
is no point in saying stop this time... I'll take you up to that value... " (low control). 
The 
briefing given in the NI-NC condition provided neither information about the 
impending 
stimulus intensity nor explicit control (low predictability - low control). 
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After the briefing, participants in the I+C group simply repeated the baseline trial, halting the 
trial as soon as they felt the pressure had become painful. Each participant in the I-NC and 
NI-NC groups was subjected to exactly the stimulus intensity they had reported at pain 
threshold for their baseline PPT measures. No participant in the I-NC or NI-NC groups was 
subjected to pain stimulus greater than that which had been determined by their baseline PPT. 
All participants provided VAS pain ratings and compared their second pain experience to 
their first using the five-point comparison scale. 
After the trials were complete, participants were fully debriefed. The full objectives of the 
study were explained and it was made clear that regardless of any impressions they had 
formed due to the experimental pre-test briefing, the second stimulus intensity was identical 
to their first, and in no case had they been subjected to stimulus intensity greater than that at 
which they had reported pain threshold at baseline. Participants were given the opportunity 
to comment on the procedure and to discuss their responses to the debriefing. 
Summary of data 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to test for the effects of the experimenter briefing on the second 
of two identical stimuli. However, participants in the I+C (control) group were given explicit 
control to stop the stimulus increase at any time for both trials. Should there be no change in 
pain rating across measures for the control group (as expected), it was necessary to establish 
that there was also no change in stimulus intensity for the control group across trials. 
The mean PPTs for the two trials were extremely close (57<1 = 1535.26g, SD = 552.029; 57<2 = 
1523.16g, SD = 576.03g). Also, PPT measures were strongly correlated across trials (n = 19, 
r=0.93, p<0.0005). A paired samples Mest showed no difference between baseline and 
condition PPT measures for the I+C group (t = 0.25, df = 18, p=0.8 1), showing that, as for 
the experimental groups, the control group was effectively subjected to the same stimulus 
intensity across trials. 
The pain rating (VAS) data took the form of three samples over two repeated measures. The 
response distributions of each group for baseline and condition measures are shown 
in Figure 
II 
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Figure 11 VAS Pain rating distributions for each group across baseline and condition measures 
Changes in distribution can be seen across measures, particularly for the NI-NC group. 
However, the distributions also show a marked positive skew. To test for this, a diagnostic 
plot of the pain rating (VAS) data was carried out (Figure 11). The plot revealed a 
systematic relationship between log (SD) and log (Mean) across the experimental 
conditions. The slope of the regression line for predicting log SD from log mean indicated 
that a square-root (Sqrt) transformation of the data was appropriate (Box & Cox, 1964) (see 
Figure 12, also Appendix IV). 
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Figure 13 shows the changes in overall distribution of VAS data as a result of square-root 
correction for the baseline and condition VAS data. 
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Figure 13 Baseline and condition VAS distributions (totalled for condition) before and after 
square-root correction. 
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Results 
A mixed 3x2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for VAS pain rating across 
measures (F,, 5, ý 5.364, p = 0.024). There was a significant interaction between VAS pain 
rating and condition (see Figure 14). Participants whose briefing contained neither 
preparatory information nor perceived control reported a significant reduction in pain rating 
across trials compared to participants whose briefings provided both preparatory 
information and perceived control, or preparatory information but no perceived control (F 
2,58= 4.257, p=0.0 19). 
Participants in the control group (I+C) reported slightly lower pain for the condition trial 
compared to the baseline, whilst participants in the I-NC group reported slightly higher pain 
for the condition trial compared to the baseline, although neither difference was significant. 
Whilst the plot of the estimated marginal means in Figure 14 appears to show that 
participants in the I+C group provided lower baseline VAS ratings than participants in the 
I-NC and the NI-NC groups, analysis using One-Way ANOVA showed no significant 
difference between groups for the baseline VAS pain rating (F2,58 =1.50, p=0.23). 
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Figure 14 Estimated marginal means of the transformed pain rating (Sqrt. 
VAS) for I+C, I-NC and Nl-NC conditions over baseline and condition 
measures. 
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Participants were asked to compare their second pain experience with their first using a five 
point scale (I = much less to 5= much more). Figure 15 presents the response distributions 
for the comparison scale data. 
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Figure 15 Response distributions for comparison scale; participants rating the second pain 
stimulus compared to the first. 
Analysis using Kruskal-Wallis H revealed a significant difference between groups (X' = 
7.55, df= 2, p = 0.023). Participants in the control group (I+Q rated their second trial the 
same as their first, while participants in the I-NC group rated their second trial as more 
painful than their first compared to the control group. Participants in the NI-NC group rated 
their second trial as less painful than their first compared to the control group although 
responses in the NI-NC group show a bimodal distribution. Table 5 shows the mean ranks 
for each group. 
Table 5. Mean ranks for I+C, I-NC and NINC conditions 
CONDITION MEAN RANK 
Information + Control 29.03 19 
Information - No Control 38.90 
21 
No Information - No Control 24.88 
21 
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Analysis using Spearman's Rho correlation revealed that both the experimental condition 
VAS pain rating and comparison scale responses are strongly correlated (N- 61, r, = 0.54, 
p<0.0005). However, analysis within groups show no significant correlation between 
comparison scale and VAS pain rating for the I+C condition (n = 19, r, - -0.09, p = 0.71), 
but a significant positive correlation between VAS pain rating and comparison scale 
responses for both the I-NC condition (n = 21, r, = 0.53, p=0.01) and for the NI-NC 
condition (n =21, r, = 0.69, p<0.0005) (Figures 16 & 17 respectively). 
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Figure 16 Condition trial VAS pain ratings by comparison scale responses for 
the I-NC group. 
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Figure 17 Condition trial VAS pain ratings by comparison scale responses 
for 
the Nl-NC group. 
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Analysis using Pearson product-moment correlation revealed a significant overall 
correlation between LOC and pain rating for the condition trial (N- 61, r= 0.26, p = 0.04). 
However, analysis within groups showed no correlation between LOC and pain rating for 
the I+C group (n = 19, r=0.03, p=0.9 1), nor for the I-NC group (n =2 1, r=0.05, P= 
0.80), but a strong positive correlation between LOC and pain rating for the NI-NC group 
(n = 21, r=0.53, p = 0.01). Participants with a more internal LOC style generally reported 
less pain than participants with a more external LOC style (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18 VAS pain rating (mm) by LOC score for the NI-NC condition. 
Discussion 
The results show that differences in the content ofpre-procedure briefings had a significant 
effect on the perception of the second of two identical stimuli. In effect, that participants 
experienced as more or less painful, a pain stimulus of an intensity identical to their own 
pre-measured pain threshold level. 
Participants presented with the briefing containing both preparatory information and 
explicitly granting perceived control (I+C) reported slightly (though not-slgn, ficantly) lower 
VAS pain ratings for the condition trial compared to the baseline trial, and rated the 
condition trial as the same or less painful in comparison to the baseline trial. 
There was no 
correlation between VAS pain rating and comparison scale response 
in this condition. 
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Participants in the I-NC group who were presented with the briefing providing preparatory 
infonnation (high predictability) but placing perceived control in the hands of the 
experimenter (low control) reported slightly (though not significantly) higher VAS pain 
ratings for the condition trial. However, in comparing the second stimulus with the first, a 
significant proportion (66%) ofparticipants in this condition rated the second pain stimulus 
as being more painful than the first. There is a strong, positive correlation between VAS 
pain rating and comparison scale responses in this condition. 
Participants in the NI-NC group who were presented with the briefing which neither 
provided preparatory information nor explicitly granted perceived control (low 
predictability, low control) reported significantly lower VAS pain ratings for the second 
trial. VAS pain rating from the second (condition) trial is strongly related to LOC style in 
the NI-NC group (Figure 16). A more internal LOC style related to lower pain rating and 
a more external LOC style related to higher pain rating. Also, comparison scale data from 
this group show a bimodal response distribution (33% found it more painful and 38.7% 
found it less painful). As with the I-NC condition, VAS pain ratings and comparison scale 
responses from the N1-NC condition show a strong, positive correlation. 
It is possible that participants' expectations had some influence on the results. Thus, an 
alternative explanation for the results may be simply that the briefings for the second trial 
for the I-NC and NI-NC groups were different to the first. It maybe that the simple fact that 
the second briefing was different resulted in an overall higher level of attention in the I-NC 
and NI-NC groups, as participants in those groups were alerted to the possibility of other 
unexpected changes in procedure. 
However, whilst this alternative may account for differences between the I-NC and 
NI-NC 
groups and the control (I+Q group, it does not account for the systematic 
differences in 
pain rating between the I-NC and NI-NC groups (i. e. the 
difference in the direction of 
changes in pain rating between those groups). Therefore 
it is more likely that the content 
of the second trial briefings had more of an influence than the 
fact that the second trial 
briefings were different to the first. 
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The effects ofmanipulating the content ofpre-procedure briefings, as shown by Experiment 
3, suggests that the provision of preparatory information concerning a potentially painful 
event results in a more negative appraisal of the event, irrespective of LOC. when a 
perceived means of influencing the event is unavailable. This supports the suggestions that 
information can act as a stressor if an individual has no perceived means of influencing the 
event (e. g. Miller & Mangan, 1983; Thompson, 198 1; Weisenberg et al., 1985). However, 
withholding preparatory information (in the absence ofperceived control) resulted in a pain 
response that is strongly related to LOC. Pain rating was lower from those with a more 
internal LOC, and higher in those with a more external LOC. In other words, for 
participants who had little perceived control over events, withholding information 
concerning the impending stimulus intensity resulted in different evaluations of the 
situation, based upon differences in their individual LOC style. 
It is worthy of note that upon debriefing, participants in the NI-NC group expressed surprise 
that the second stimulus was identical to the first, and reported spontaneously that the 
second stimulus had 'genuinely felt different' (less or more painful according to their 
experience). 
The change reflected in VAS rating across trials for the NI-NC condition also supports the 
suggestion that VAS s are sensitive to more than just the intensity of the pain stimulus. As the 
stimulus intensities for the second trial were identical to those in the first trial, it is clear that 
changes in VAS pain rating cannot have been related to changes in stimulus intensity. 
Therefore any differences must be due to changes in evaluation and subsequent differences 
in affective-motivational components of the experience. In other words, the VAS ratings, 
rather than reflecting changes in the intensity of the pain stimulus, reflected changes in the 
degree of unpleasantness associated with the event. 
As shown, there is a positive correlation between the VAS data and the comparison scale data 
for the I-NC and NI-NC groups. However, the trends shown in the VAS data appear to have 
been magnified by the comparison scale. For example (and in particular), participants in the 
I-NC condition, when asked to compare the second pain stimulus with the 
first, and having 
to make a deliberate choice between explicit options, showed a more pronounced 
(and 
statistically significant) effect than that detected by the VAS. 
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This suggests the possibility that whilst the second stimulus may not have been immediately 
felt as significantly more painful by participants In the I-NC condition (as rated using the 
VASs), the stimulus was remembered as being more painful in comparison to the first. In 
other words, participants asked to recall and compare their experiences appear to have 
significantly more 'unpleasantness' associated with their memory of the second stimulus. 
This in turn suggests that the higher level of processing required to recall and compare 
experiences allowed a greater opportunity for pre-conscious changes in affective motivational 
state to influence subsequent judgements. 
It is apparent that differences in chronic trait accessibility relating to individual LOC style 
produced differences in the way the situation was interpreted by participants, and that this in 
turn, was brought about by differences in the content of pre-test briefings and not differences 
in stimulus intensities. Therefore, as a salient determinant of evaluation of context, 
differences in what is said within a researcher-participant (or clinic ian-patient) dyad relating 
to predictability and control, has been shown to have a significant influence of its own. 
However, one may expect patients and participants to pay direct attention to and be aware of 
what is explicitly said within the dyad. On another level, what may be obvious, but not 
necessarily deliberately attended to, are the characteristics of who is saying it. Experiment 4 
investigated the effects of the sex of the experimenter on the interpretation of a painful event. 
III 
CHAPTER 8 
EXPERIMENT 4: THE EFFECT OF EXPERIMENTER SEX ON PRESSURE-PAIN THRESHOLD 
AND SUBJECTIVE PAIN RATING. 
Introduction 
There have been very few studies investigating directly the effects of experimenter sex on 
pain perception and rating. Those that have been done tend to focus on the effect as a 
function of participant gender-role. For example, Levine and De Simone (199 1) found that 
males reported significantly less pain to a member of the opposite sex than to another male 
during a cold-pressor test. They suggest that "This result is congruent with the standard 
gender-role requirement of males appearing macho and not allowing females to know they 
are weak. " (Levine & De Simone, 1991, p. 71). Otto & Dougher (1985), suggest that in 
measures of pain threshold, delaying the report of pain would provide an advantage to men 
wishing to appear macho, with no appreciable cost. Further, it has been suggested that 
males are socially conditioned to suppress, or consider as a sign ofweakness, outward signs 
of pain (Fillingim & Maixner, 1995; Riley III et al., 1998). 
Whilst participant gender-role no doubt has some influence, the suggestion that delaying 
reports of pain threshold given to an opposite sex assessor may advantage males wishing 
to appear macho implies that males (if not females) consciously censor pain report 
according to what they consider appropriate to their gender-role. However, as shown in 
Chapter Four, there is compelling evidence that the automatic evaluation of a situation and 
activation of stereotypes are very basic events that can occur independently of cognitive 
process. In light of that evidence, it is suggested that the mere presence of a member of the 
opposite sex results in activation of stereotype trait constructs (e. g. Bargh, 1988,1996; 
Bargh, 2001; Dijksterhuis, Aarts et al., 2000; Todorov & Bargh, 2002). 
As discussed in Chapter Two, appropriate gender-roles are acquired through social 
leaming. 
But it is not just one's own gender identity that is acquired. 
A part of the process of the 
acquisition of gender identity is sex typing; the learning of stereotypes 
(sets of culturally 
designated traits) associated with maleness and femaleness. 
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Examples of gender traits associated with females are eagerness to soothe hurt feelings, 
gentleness, sensitivity to the needs of others, sympathy, tenderness, understanding and 
warmth. On the other hand, examples of gender traits associated with males are aggression, 
assertiveness, dominance, forcefulness and competitiveness (From the Bem Sex-Role 
Inventory. See for example Baron & Byrne, 2000, Chapter Five). Thus, whilst the 
acquisition of gender-roles will undoubtedly influence the behaviour of individuals,, 
limiting them to some degree to behaviours 'appropriate' to their particular gender role, it 
will also influence their expectancy with regard to behaviours from members of the 
opposite sex. T at is to say, people will be less likely to expect females to inflict paln than 
males, as this runs contrary to their gender traits of gentleness, sensitivity and 
understanding. 
Therefore , in potentially painful clinical and experimental situations, the presence of a 
female clinician or researcher as a part of the dyad is likely to result in a less negative 
evaluation of the situation and a lower avoidance motivation in the patient or participant 
than the presence of a male. In other words, under these circumstances, males reporting less 
pain to a female assessor may not be doing so deliberately or in a conscious attempt to 
impress, or conforin to their gender-role. Instead, differences in pain ratings may reflect 
differences in affective-motivational state occurring as a result of gender-stereotype 
activation, resulting in participants forming different expectancies concerning probable 
outcomes. 
If participants are influenced in their pain reporting principally by their own gender-role 
expectation, then the effect previously shown of males reporting higher pain threshold to 
female assessors, should not be apparent in female participants. To delay reports of pain in 
order to 'impress'runs contrary to the female gender-role stereotype (e. g. as being'passive' 
and non-competitive), and would have no benefit when reporting to a same sex assessor. 
Conversely, should a bias in pain report between male and female assessors 
be principally 
a result of gender-stereotype activation influencing expectancies in the participants, 
then 
the less negative evaluation of a potentially painful event resulting 
ftom the activation of 
female stereotype traits should result in higher reports ofpain threshold 
to a female assessor 
from both male and female participants. 
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Further, as shown in Experiment 2, the subjective experience of pain threshold is the same 
regardless of the stimulus intensity required to achieve it. Therefore, across two measures 
in which participants have explicit control to stop at pain threshold, there are no grounds 
to expect changes in VAS pain rating. Therefore, if the preconscious activation of female 
stereotype traits results in a less negative evaluation of the situation, then one would expect 
this to be reflected in a lower propensity to avoid the pain stimulus (indicated by a higher 
pain threshold), but no difference in the subjective experience because the subjective 
experience of pain at pain threshold intensity remains the same. 
On the other hand, if a reporting bias in males reporting to a female experimenter was a 
result of conscious 'censoring' of pain report, then it would be reasonable to expect higher 
PPTs to be accompanied by lower VAS pain ratings from male participants. There would 
be little benefit to males wishing to appear macho in provide an 'impressively' high report 
of pain threshold (look how much I can take! ), if it were to be accompanied by a high pain 
rating (but it really hurt! ). Therefore, it was hypothesised that participants (male and 
female) would report higher PPTs to a female experimenter than to a male experimenter. 
In line with the results of Experiment 2, no differences in VAS pain ratings were expected. 
Methods 
Design 
Using a mixed 4 (groups) x2 (participant sex) x2 (measures) crossover design, participants 
were randomly allocated to one of four groups determined by the order of the sex of the 
experimenter across two trials; male-female, female-male, male-male and female-female. 
Participants 
Participants were 40 (20 male and 20 female) healthy first-year student volunteers 
(mean 
age 25.94 years, SD 7.97 years, range 18-51 years) who had responded to advertisements 
placed on the University of Westminster research participation scheme notice 
board. 
Participants were naive as to the true purpose of the Experiment. 
114 
Experimenters 
The male and female experimenters were matched for age (male 40 years, female 42 years). 
The experimenters dressed similarly (casual dress, jeans and shirt) and no attempt was 
made to enhance their stereotypical gender characteristics. Experimenter-participant 
interaction was controlled through the use of standardised, scripted instructions (Appendix 
VI). 
Procedure 
To eliminate the possibility of competition, participants were not informed that they had 
been allocated to different groups. The two trials took place in the same room, one week 
apart. Participants were greeted by either the male or the female experimenter and asked 
to make themselves comfortable. Participants were told that the purpose of the experiment 
was to assess the reliability of measures of pain threshold over repeated measures. 
Instructions on the general procedure and the use of VAS were read to each participant. If 
participants had any questions, the appropriate section of the script was paraphrased. 
Before measures of PPT and VAS pain rating were taken, participants were asked to score 
their pre-test anxiety using a1 Ocm VAS from 'Not at all anxious' to 'As anxious as I could 
possibly be'. As soon as participants indicated they were ready to proceed, PPT and VAS 
pain ratings were taken. 
For the second trial (one week later), fresh consent was obtained from each participant, and 
their rights to halt or withdraw at any time were re-stated. Participants in the crossover 
conditions (male - female, female - male) were told, if they enquired, that 
due to unforseen 
circumstances, the original experimenter could not make it on time and had asked the new 
experimenter to stand in. 
After the final experimental trial, each participant was fully debriefed and the true 
objectives of the experiment were explained. Participants were given the opportunity 
to 
discuss their responses to the debriiefing and any issues arising 
from the manipulation. 
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Results 
The data took the fon-n of three measures (PPT and VAS pain and pre-test anxiety ratings), 
taken from four groups, determined by the order of the sex of the experimenter (male- 
female, female-male, male-male and female-female) over two trials. Tables 6,7 and 8 
present summaries of these data. As with the previous experiments, the data reflect a wide 
distribution of PPT and VAS pain ratings between participants, as shown by the 
comparatively large standard deviations recorded for these measures. 
Table 6. Mean PPT (g) (± SD) for each of the four conditions over two 
tri a] s. 
TRIAL I TRIAL 2 
CONDITION MEAN PPT (SD) MEAN PPT (SD) n 
MALE - FEMALE 1253.0 (451.2) 1880.5 (591.4) 10 
FEMALE - MALE 1337.0 (381.1) 904.5 (295.5) 10 
MALE - MALE 1171.0 (378.3) 1091.5 (467.1) 10 
FEMALE - FEMALE 1442.0 (634.5) 1427.0 (696.2) 10 
Table 7. Mean VAS pain ratings (mm) (± SD) for each of the four 
conditions over two trials. 
TRIAL I TRIAL 2 
CONDITION MEAN VAS (SD) MEAN VAS (SD) 
MALE - FEMALE 28.60 (15.37) 33-30 (19-08) 10 
FEMALE - MALE 30-90 (18.21) 37-00 (24.95) 10 
MALE - MALE 33-00 (21.00) 28-60 (16-67) 10 
FEMALE - FEMALE 26.70 (14.68) 27-80 (21.44) 10 
Table 8. Mean VAS anxiety ratings (nun) (± SD) for each of the four 
conditions over two trials. 
TRIAL I TRIAL 2 
CONDITION MEAN VAS (SD) MEAN VAS (SD) n 
MALE - FEMALE 
20.90 (18.14) 6.50(7.99) 10 
FEMALE - MALE 
34.50 (28.50) 23.60 (18.81) 10 
MALE -MALE 
23.40 (20-94) 14.70 (15.43) 10 
FEMALE - FEMALE 
16.50 (25-10) 21-90 (30.67) 10 
116 
The data were analysed using a rnixed 4x2x2 ANOVA. The results show no main effect 
for PPT across trials (F 1,32 0.316, p=0.58), but a highly significant interaction between 
experimental condition and PPT. Participants in the male-female condition reported higher 
PPTs on the second trial and participants in the female-male condition reported lower PPTs 
on the second trial 
(F3,32=: 24.37, p<0.0005) (Figure 19). 
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Figure 19 Estimated marginal means of PPT for female-female, male-male, 
female-male and male-female conditions. 
There was a significant between groups main effect for PPT, participants reported higher 
threshold levels to the female than to the male experimenter (F3,32= 3.198, p=0.036). 
There was also a significant between participant main effect for participant sex. Male 
participants reported significantly higher PPTs than female participants. (FI, 32 =14.76, p 
= 0.001), however, there was no interaction between participant sex and experimental 
condition (FI, 32= 2.410, p=0.09). 
The data presented in Figure 19 appear to show that partIcIpants In the male-female 
experimenter condition reported higher PPTs than participants in the female-female control 
condition for the second trial. Likewise that participants in the 
female-male expenmenter 
condition reporting lower PPTs than participants In the male-male control condition 
for the 
second trial. However, post-hoc analysis of trial 2 PPT 
data using Tukey's test of honestly 
significant difference (HSD) revealed that these differences were not significant 
(p = 0.25 
and 0.85 respectively). 
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9----o Female - Female 
Analysis of VAS pain ratings revealed no main effect for VAS pain rating (F 1,32= 0.445, 
p 0.5 1), participant sex 
(F,, 
32 =1.345, p - 0.25) or experimental condition (F3,32 == 0.2835 
p 0.84). Nor are there any interactions between experimental condition and VAS pain 
ratings 
(F3,32= 0.694, p=0.56), or participant sex and VAS pain rating (F,, 32 - 1.527, p 
0.23). However, there was a significant main effect for pre-test anxiety ratings. Pre-test 
anxiety was lower for the second of the two trials (F,, 32= 5.52, p-0.025) (Figure 20). 
There was no interaction between anxiety ratings and condition (F 3,32= 2.040, p 0.13), 
nor any main effect for participant sex on pre-test anxiety rating (F,, 32= 0.070, p 0.79). 
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Figure 20 Mean pre-test anxiety rating for first and second trial. 
Discussion 
The results show overall that male participants reported higher PPTs than female 
participants. This is in line with previous research (e. g. Brennum et al., 1989; Fischer, 1986, 
1987; Mersky & Spear, 1964). The results also show that both male and female participants 
reported higher PPTs to a female experimenter than to a male experimenter. Moreover, the 
results show a change in PPT resulting from a change of experimenter, from male to female, 
and from female to male across trials. Participants tested by a male experimenter in the first 
trial reported significantly higher PPTs when tested by a female experimenter in the second 
trial, and those tested by a female experimenter in the first trial reported significantly 
lower 
PPTs when tested by a male experimenter in the second trial. 
As in Experiment 2, there 
were no significant differences in VAS pain rating. 
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Whilst the higher PPTs reported to the female experimenter conditions agree with previous 
research (e. g. Levine & De Simone, 1991), the previous 'participant oriented' gender-role 
behaviour explanation of the effect (Le. males wishing to appear macho) does not account 
for the result that female participants showed the same effect. As noted previously, it is 
highly unlikely that females would benefit from delaying reports of pain threshold to 
another female. 
The suggestion that differences in pain rating from males reporting to a female assessor is 
the product of a conscious and controlled process Is further confounded by the absence of 
differences in pain ratings shown in this study. As previously suggested, should males have 
been consciously attempting either to conform to their beliefs concerning their own gender- 
role, or (by extension) to impress the female assessor, it would have been reasonable to 
expect a significant reduction in VAS pain rating from males reporting to a female, 
compared to males reporting to another male. 
Further, the results show a reduction in anxiety over the two trials (most probably due to 
familiarity with the procedure by the second trial). However, the results show no 
differences in pre-test levels of anxiety between conditions. In other words, participants did 
not report greater anxiety when confronted with a male experimenter, or less anxiety when 
confronted with a female experimenter. This suggests that whilst there was a change in 
affective-motivational state sufficient to significantly influence measures of PPT, 
participants were not aware of it on a conscious level. 
However, as with Experiment 3, the results could be interpreted in terms of participant 
expectation. The participants, having been tested by either a male or a female experimenter 
in the first trial, may have entered the second trial expecting to be tested by the same 
experimenter. Thus it might be argued that the simple fact that the experimenter was 
different (i. e. not the person who was expected) was sufficient to alert the participants to 
the possibility of further unexpected changes and result in a difference in their evaluation 
of the situation. 
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In fact, this alternative may go some way towards accounting for the 'overshoot' of 
participants in the male-female experimenter condition, who reported higher PPTs (though 
not significantly so) on their second measure than participants in the female-female 
experimenter (control) condition, and likewise for the similar overshoot of participants in 
the female-male experimenter condition, who reported lower PPTs (though not significantly 
so) on the second trial than participants in the male-male experimenter (control) condition 
(see Figure 19). However, as with Experiment 3, whilst participant expectation may have 
to some degree amplified the changes in PPT observed across trials, this alternative does 
not account for the systematic difference in the direction of changes in PPT observed 
between experimental conditions. 
So far, it has been shown that differences in information provided to participants in the 
form of pre-procedure briefings, influences the interpretation of a painful event so as to 
produce differences in the subjective rating of the second of two identical pain stimuli. 
Further, it has been shown that the presence of different sex experimenters results in 
significant differences in PPT. It is suggested that these occur as a result of differences in 
basic affective-motivational state due to activation of sex-stereotypes within the participant. 
It is suggested that the activation of sex-stereotypes influenced the expectancies held by the 
participants concerning the situation, and resulted in a more negative evaluation of an 
impending pain stimulus when delivered by a male experimenter, than when delivered by 
a female experimenter. 
The factors investigated in Experiments 3 and 4 are features of the social context (one 
explicit and the other implicit) which exists within research and clinical situations. The 
purpose of the final Experiment was to test the effect on PPT of an emotionally valenced 
non-social feature of the environment in which a potentially painful procedure takes place. 
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CHAPTER 
EXPERIMENT 5: MANIPULATION OF MECHANICAL PAIN THRESHOLD USING A VISUAL 
PRIME. 
Introduction 
It is no great surprise that most clinical procedures tend to take place in clinical 
environments. Clinical environments are known to produce certain effects on different 
people, for example, the white coat effect' (e. g. Pickering & Friedman, 1991), though in 
this case, patients usually have an existing underlying pathology (chronic hypertension). 
But what defines a clinical envirom-nent? Many people, when talking about hospitals, cite 
the odour as one of the most unpleasant factors. Odour has been shown to act as a 
contextual cue (e. g. Smith, Standing, & de Man, 1992), but this effect depends upon prior 
exposure to the context. The smell peculiar to hospitals could not evoke a memory of a 
hospital experience in an individual who has never has such an experience. 
It is more likely that in reality it is a combination of factors; sounds, smells and sights that 
serve to form the overall 'clinic' environment. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, all 
incoming information is evaluated for valence and classification of features in the 
environment as either 'good' or 'bad' occurs within 250 ms (Bargh, 2001; Bargh & 
Ferguson, 2000; Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999). Further, that this classification has been shown 
to directly affect the tendency to either approach or avoid the stimulus (Chen & Bargh, 
1999). Clinics and hospitals are full of 'clinically oriented' information pertaining to health 
and well being that is strongly valenced. For example leaflets stating that "Smoking Kills! " 
and "Drinking when pregnant can harm your baby! "' or posters promoting HIV awareness, 
or requesting that people "Do Something Special: Give Blood". 
As noted previously, continual evaluation of features of the envirom-nent serves to signal 
the overall safety or potential for harm within the current environment. 
It is suggested that 
the prevalence of negatively valenced information within the clinical situation produces an 
5 
The white coat effect describes the tendency for some individuals 
to show significantly higher measures of blood pressure when taken 
he patient's home using a 24 hour ambulatory 
BP recording system. 
by a doctor in a clinical environment, than when taken at t 
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overall negative evaluation and an increased avoidance motivation. This is likely to result 
in a more negative interpretation of a potentially painful stimulus, which in the case of non- 
scalable pain stimuli, such as acutely painful, minor surgical procedures, would manifest 
as the procedure being perceived as more unpleasant (e. g. as shown by Experiment 3). In 
the case of scalable pain stimuli in which intensity is variable and under the control of the 
experimenter, gTeater negative affect and avoidance motivation is likely to manifest as a 
reduction in pain threshold. Therefore, it was hypothes'sed that the presence of a negatively 
valenced feature in the environment will result in lower pain thresholds. Under the principle 
that the experience of pain threshold remains the same, regardless of the stimulus intensity 
required to reach it, no differences in VAS pain rating were expected. 
Methods 
Design 
An independent groups design was employed. Whilst it could be argued that repeated 
measures would be a better design for this study, the nature of automatic evaluation makes 
a repeated measures design hard to control. For example, a properly controlled repeated 
measures experiment needs to be counterbalanced with respect to stimulus presentation, 
one group tested under neutral versus stimulus conditions, and the other tested under 
stimulus versus neutral conditions. However, whilst the valenced environmental feature in 
this case was the wound classification chart, the automatic evaluation effect has been shown 
to be pervasive (e. g. Bargh et al., 1992; Chen & Bargh, 1999), thus the ultimate evaluation 
applies to the particular situation as a whole. 
Having formed an association between the evaluation and the situation, subsequent 
exposure to the same situation, even in the absence of the stimulus material, would evoke 
the previously formed evaluation (e. g. Bargh, 1989; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Higgins 
& 
Bargh, 1987). Thus, whilst no change in PPT for the neutral versus experimental condition 
would support the Null Hypothesis, the same result for the experimental versus neutral 
condition could indicate either no effect, or the carry-over of a previously 
fonned 
evaluation into the neutral condition, thus increasing the probability of a 
type H error. 
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Participants 
Participants were 40 healthy, first-year student volunteers who had responded to 
advertisements placed on the University research participation scheme notice board (33 
females, 7 males; mean age 22.48years, SD 5.54 years). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two groups, either the experimental or neutral condition. 
Materials 
The experimental condition was induced through the presence of a hospital wound- 
classification and dressings reference poster 6,7 (Figure 21) pinned to the wall behind the 
experimenter. For the neutral condition, the poster was absent. 
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Figure 21 Wound classification and dressings reference chart. Produced with permission from the Royal 
Free Hampstead NHS Trust. 
6 
Posters such as the one shown are common in clinical areas of hospitals and are 
frequently displayed in patient areas such as treatment 
and dressings rooms. 
7 
It should be noted that the Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust has recently ruled 
that all such posters be removed from all areas where 
patients are likely to come into contact with them. 
123 
Pain stimulus was applied using the nail-bed pressure algometer. Pain ratings were taken 
using the standard I Ocm VASs. Measures of pre-test anxiety were also taken using a 10 cm 
VAS from "Not at all anxious" to "As anxious as I could possibly be" (see Appendix 11). 
Participant-expenmenter interaction during briefing and de-bri I 'efing (probing) was 
controlled through the use of a script (Appendix VII) which the experimenter had rehearsed. 
Procedure 
The Experiment took place in the University of Westminster, in a2x2.5 m cubicle labelled 
'Health Laboratory Annex'. The purpose of the labelling was so that the presence of an 
educational clinical poster in the room would not seem incongruous. This particular poster 
was chosen because it is an educational tool, and so would not appear out of place in a 
University health psychology laboratory. Thus it was thought less likely that participants 
would perceive the chart as an experimental manipulation, or would associate it with the 
experiment at all. 
Participants were greeted and asked to sit. As a condition check, the experimenter 
apologised for not being quite prepared, picked up a note book, and holding it in front of 
him so the face of the participant was visible peripherally, began writing until the 
participants gaze switched to the poster (i. e. the experimenter could safely assume that the 
stimulus had been within the perceptual field of the participant), after which the 
experimenter closed the book and began the experiment. This procedure was carried out in 
the neutral condition also, to avoid possible systematic effects between groups (i. e. it is 
possible that this procedure may have resulted in those participants exposed to it feeling 
'slighted' in some way, which may have influenced their evaluation of the proceedings). 
Before the initial briefing, participants were told that the experiment was investigating 
factors influencing pain threshold, and that the objective of the experiment was to collect 
a number of pain threshold measures to use as a baseline. Participants were read the 
standard briefing concerning the procedure and asked to complete the 
first section of the 
score sheet asking their sex, age and handedness. At no point 
before the debriefing did the 
experimenter refer to, or in any other way acknowledge the poster. 
Measures of pre-test 
anxiety were taken. Following the usual protocol (general methods), a non-dominant 
hand 
familiansation measure of PPT was taken, after which dominant 
hand measures of PPT and 
VAS pain rating were taken. 
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Prior to a complete de-briefing, participants were probed (in the course of 'casual 
conversation') in order to ascertain what, in their own opinions, they assumed to be the 
purpose and objectives of the experiment, whether they worked or had been patients in 
hospitals or surgeries recently and, for participants in the experimental condition, whether 
they had ever seen charts like the one present and whether or not they had associated the 
chart with the experiment in any way. 
Awareness of the nature or true objectives of the experiment, familiarity with or recent 
exposure to the stimulus material or evidence that the participants had associated the 
stimulus material with the experiment were considered exclusion criteria. However, no 
participants admitted to associating the chart with the Experiment, nor to ever having seen 
the stimulus material or anything similar, thus no data were excluded. Finally, the true 
objectives of the study were explained and participants in the experimental group were 
given the opportunity to comment on the experiment, and in particular the chart, and to 
discuss their responses to it. 
Results 
The data took the form of three measures (PPT, VAS pain rating and VAS pre-test anxiety 
rating) taken from two independent groups. Table 9 presents a summary of those data. 
Table 9. Means (± SID) of PPT (g) and VAS (mm) pain and pre-test 
anxiety ratings for the two groups. 
EXPERIMENTAL NEUTRAL 
CONDITION CONDITION 
CONDITION MEAN (SD) MEAN (SD) N 
PPT (g) 1036.00 (645.08) 1629.75 (874.19) 40 
VAS pain rating (mrn) 37.40 (17.60) 35-60 
(19.93) 40 
VAS pre-test anxiety rating (mm) 36.00 (26.93) 29.60 
(20-71) 40 
Trials on the nail-bed pressure algometer revealed that the 
first measure taken from a naive 
participant is usually lower than the second (which 
increases slightly, probably due to 
familiarity). Due to this, in all Experiments, participants undergo a 
famillansation trial (as 
mentioned in general methods), which generally produces 
higher values and more 'noisy' 
data than subsequent measures. However, in this case, 
the familiansation data were 
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included in analysis as, if the effect of automatic evaluation is universal and pervasive, then 
it should produce a general effect on both familiarisation and test measures. 
Whilst the increased noise and unreliability ofmeasures taken under the familiansation trial 
reduce the probability of any effect achieving statistical significance, it was thought 
nonetheless to be of interest to include these data. Figure 22 shows the mean PPTs for both 
the familiansation and test trials for each of the two conditions. 
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Figure 22 Mean PPTs for familiarization and test measures for neutral and 
experimental condition. Error bars represent ± 'Istandard deviation. 
Analysis using independent samples T-tests revealed a significant difference between 
groups for both familiansation. and test measures of PPT. Participants in the experimental 
condition reported significantly lowerPPTs forboth the non-dominant hand familiansation 
trial (t = -2.442, df= 38, p = 0.019; 2-tailed) and for the dominant 
hand test trial (t = -2.444, 
df= 38, p = 0.0 19; 2-tailed). There were no significant differences between groups for VAS 
pain rating (t = 0.303, df = 38, p=0.76; 2-tailed) or pre-test anxiety (t = 0.843, df = 38, p 
= 0.40; 2-tailed). 
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Neutral Poster 
Discussion 
The results show that the presence of a negatively valenced object in the form of a clinical 
reference chart resulted in significantly lower PPTs recorded for the experimental group 
compared to the neutral condition group. This result is in line with data showing increased 
avoidance motivation in response to a negative prime (Chen & Bargh, 1999), and moreover, 
shows the influence of the automatic evaluation effect in an ecologically valid (quasi- 
clinical) context. 
As expected, there was no difference in VAS pain rating between groups, nor was there a 
difference in pre-test anxiety between groups. WhIlst a significant reduction in pre-test 
anxiety was recorded in Experiment 4, this is most probably due to a reduction in anxiety 
due to familiarity with the procedure by the second of the two repeated measures. 
In an independent groups design with only one experimental trial, participants would have 
no opportunity to become familiar with the procedure. Thus, as with Experiment 4, it is 
suggested that whilst there was a difference in affective-motivational state sufficient to 
induce a significant difference in measures of PPT between groups, participants were not 
aware of it on a conscious level. 
Automatic evaluation is said to be a continuous process that has been described as universal 
and unconditional. The effects of the process are pervasive and the balance of the 
evaluation of features in a given context serves to signal the overall safety, or potential for 
harm within the current enviromnent. The results of Experiment 5 demonstrate the 
pervasive nature of the effect, insofar as the mere presence of an educational reference 
poster containing negatively valenced information was sufficient to influence perception 
of the pain stimulus significantly, even though for all intents and purposes (as far as the 
participants were concerned), the chart itself had nothing to do with the situation. 
A possible weakness in this study is that the experimenter was aware of the conditions in 
which the measures were taken. Having just stated that the automatic evaluation effect is 
universal and unconditional, it is possible that the experimenter may 
have been subject to 
a similar effect. Although the experimental procedures and expenmenter-partic 
ip ant 
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interactions were controlled through the use of scripts (Appendix VII), it could be argued 
that the awareness of the condition was sufficient to alter , in some subtle manner, the 
behaviour of the experimenter. In this case, rather than there being the possibility of 
participant expectation effects (as each participant underwent only one trial, there was no 
opportunity for participants to generate particular expectations), there was the possibility 
of experimenter expectation effects. Whilst the controls in this Experiment, and the 
experimenters' awareness of the possibility of such effects, no doubt limited the influence 
any such effect might have had (in light of these controls, it seems unlikely that 
experimenter expectation effects alone would have been capable of producing the results 
shown), it is suggested (with the benefit of hindsight) that any replication of this 
Experiment ensure that the experimenter is blind to the conditions, perhaps through a 
confederate directing participants to neutral or valenced waiting areas prior to the trial. 
Nonetheless, the results of Experiment 5 are in line with the evidence that the presence of 
emotionally salient features and objects in the environment serve as significant elements 
in the formation of the context and its significance as perceived by a participant. Negatively 
valenced objects that may have nothing to do with the situation at hand, nonetheless 
influence evaluation of the overall context resulting in an overall more negative 
interpretation of a pain stimulus. It is reasonable to assume that had the stimulus not been 
scalable (as in minor, acutely painful procedures such as venipuncture), then the results 
would have shown more negative subjective pain rating (i. e. the stimulus rated as more 
painful, as shown in Experiment 3). 
As noted, clinical situations such as surgery waiting rooms, outpatient clinics and many 
public areas of hospitals contain large amounts of strongly valenced information, as in the 
example given above "Smoking Kills! ", "Drinking when pregnant can harm your baby! ", 
or requesting that people "Do Something Special. Give Blood". The results of Experiment 
5 suggest that whilst health related infori-nation presented in clinical situations may be of 
long-term benefit to individuals who choose to heed the messages, the mere presence of the 
information may in fact be detrimental in the short-term to individuals awaiting treatment 
involving an acutely painful procedure. Individuals exposed to negatively valenced 
information prior to a painful event may, in effect, be 'primed' 
for pain. 
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CHAPTER 10 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Precis ofResults 
Experiments I and 2 were conducted as validation studies for the prototype nail-bed 
pressure algometer. These experiments were designed to assess test-retest reliability and the 
effect of an intervention of known efficacy (intra- segmental vibration stimulation) 
respectively. 
The results of Experiment I show no significant changes in measures of PPT or VAS pain 
rating taken under stable conditions over five consecutive trials conducted at one week 
intervals. In Experiment 2, measures of PPT and VAS pain rating were taken at three time- 
points: Baseline, at 30 minutes during vibration and 15 minutes post-vibration. The results 
show a significant elevation in PPT at 30 minutes vibration. Pain thresholds returned to 
baseline at 15 minutes post-vibration. There were no significant changes in VAS pain rating 
over three measures. 
Experiment 3 tested the effects of differences in preparatory information relating to 
predictability (with respect to the intensity of the impending pain stimulus), and locus of 
perceived control, on the second of two pain stimuli of identical intensities. Participants in 
the control condition who were provided with both preparatory information and perceived 
control (I+Q showed no significant differences in VAS pain rating across measures, and 
rated the second stimulus 'the same' in comparison to the first (using the 5-point 
comparison scale from 1= Much less to 5= Much more)- 
By contrast, participants provided with full information,, but 
denied perceived control (I- 
NC) rated the second stimulus as significantly more painful 
in comparison to the first. This 
rating was accompanied by a slight (though non-significant) elevation in 
VAS pain rating. 
Comparison scale response and VAS pain rating are strongly correlated in 
this condition. 
Conversely, participants provided with neither information nor perceived control 
(NI-NQ 
rated the second stimulus as being significantly 
less painful than the first using the VAS. 
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Comparison scale responses show a bimodal distribution in the NI-NC condition, and there 
is a significant positive correlation between VAS pain rating and LOC score for the NI-NC 
condition which does not exist for the I+C and I-NC conditions. Participants with a more 
internal LOC style recorded lower pain ratings, and parti I icipants with a more external LOC 
style recorded higher pain ratings. Also, as with the I-NC condition, there is a strong, 
positive correlation between comparison scale response and VAS pain rating for the NI-NC 
condition. 
Experiment 4 tested the effect of the sex of the experimenter on measures of PPT. The 
results show that both male and female participants reported significantly higher PPTs to 
a female experimenter than to a male experimenter. Moreover, changing experimenter 
(from male to female or from female to male) between trials resulted in changes in 
measures of PPT concordant with that result (a significant elevation and reduction, 
respectively). There was also a significant main effect for participant sex. Male participants 
reported higher PPTs than female participants. There was a significant reduction in pre-test 
anxiety for the second of the two trials, but no effect on pre-test anxiety of either 
experimenter sex or participant sex. There were no significant differences in VAS pain 
rating between male and female experimenter conditions. 
The results of Experiment 5 show that the presence of a negatively valenced feature in the 
environment, that ostensibly had nothing to do with the experiment, resulted in significantly 
lower measures of PPT for both familiarisation and test trials, compared to the control 
condition in which the feature was absent. There were no significant differences 
between 
groups for pre-test anxiety or VAS pain ratings. 
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Examination of results, and principal findings 
The overall aim of this investigation was to investigate the roles of social, contextual and 
environmental factors as mediators of within-individual variation in the perception and 
reporting of acute pain. The studies reported in this thesis have demonstrated that 
manipulation of contextual factors unrelated to the pain stimulus results in changes in the 
perception of a pain stimulus and concomitant changes in sti II required to 
achieve pain threshold. Significant changes in the subjective experience of the second of 
two identical pain stimuli were also shown. 
Three factors common to clinical and experimental situations were investigated: Differences 
in a pre-procedure briefing, altering the degree of preparatory information (providing 
predictability) and the locus of perceived control provided within the situation, the 
influence of personal characteristics inherent within the situation (the sex of the 
experimenter) and features of the environment in which the procedure takes place. 
The subjective experience ofpain threshold is stable within individuals, and remains the 
same regardless of the stimulus intensity required to achieve it. 
Experiments I and 2 were conducted in order to assess the test - retest validity of the nail- 
bed pressure algometer and to assess its sensitivity to an intervention of known efficacy. 
These experiments show that the nail-bed pressure algometer provides reliable and valid 
measures of pain threshold (stimulus intensity at the advent of pain). 
Experiment 1 showed that whilst there is a very broad range of pain threshold 
between 
participants, measures of PPT using the nail-bed pressure algometer were 
highly reliable 
within participants over repeated measures. This suggests that all else 
being equal, pain 
thresholds within participants are stable over time. The same principle was 
found for VAS 
pain rating. For as long as the situation within each trial was unifonn 
(location, 
experimenter and experimental briefing), the subjective experience ofpain 
threshold within 
participants was also stable. 
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The results of Experiment 2 show that the nail-bed pressure algometer is sensitive to an 
intervention known to be effective in the mediation of deep-tonic pain. In line with previous 
research, the application of intra-segmental vibratory stimulation resulted in significant 
ies required to achieve pain elevation of stimulus intensiti IIi threshold (e. g. Kak'91 et al., 1993 
64; Kakigi & Shibasaki, 1992 67; Kosek & Hansson, 1997 59; Sherer et al., 1986). 
This result is concordant with the Gate Control Theory of Pain (Melzack & Wall, 1965; 
Wall, 1978). However, there was no concomitant change in subjective pain rating. This 
suggests that within participants, the subjective experience of the advent of pain remains 
the same regardless of the stimulus intensity required to achieve it. The results of the 
validation studies taken in combination with the results of the three principal studies 
demonstrate that the prototype nail-bed pressure algometer used in conjunction with VAS 
pain rating is sensitive to both a physical intervention known to be effective in ameliorating 
deep, tonic pain of the kind induced by mechanical pain stimuli, and psychological 
manipulations. The use of combined measures has been shown here to provide a greater 
degree of information than either measure alone. 
The provision of information can influence the evaluation of a potentially painful 
procedure 
Experiment 3 showed that the nature of preparatory information provided within a dyad 
significantly affects the perception of a pain stimulus. As suggested, within experimental 
and clinical dyads, pre-procedure instructions or briefings provided by the researcher or 
clinician are the most explicit environmental elements upon which patient or participant 
expectancies concerning the situation can be based. 
It was suggested that the content of such briefings may vary in at 
least two ways; 
preparatory information allowing predictability, and the 
locus of perceived control within 
the dyad (the degree to which the participants believe they can influence events within 
the 
situation). It was also suggested that the effects of elements of 
the briefings pertaining to 
control would depend upon the chronic accessibility of cognitive 
traits related to control 
within the participants. 
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The results of Experiment 3 show that when comparing the second of two identical stimuli 
to the first, participants rated the second stimulus as more painful when explicit control to 
halt the trial was perceived as being in the hands of the experimenter (low perceived 
control). It is of significance that this occurred even though the participants were informed 
that the experimenter knew their pain threshold stimulus intensity from the first (baseline) 
measure and that the intensity of the impending stimulus would be exactly the same (high 
predictability). This suggests that although participants were aware of what to expect in 
respect of stimulus intensity (high predictability), the absence of a perceived means of 
influencing the event (low control) led to a more negative evaluation of the situation, 
resulting in a more negative affective-motivational state than participants in the control 
(I+Q condition, who had been given explicit control over events. 
Therefore, the second stimulus, although no more intense than the first, was perceived more 
negatively, in effect, increasing the 'unpleasant' component of the experience. To extend 
the flat tyre analogy (p 30), this represents the difference, in the event of a flat tyre, between 
knowing one has access to a jack and a wheel brace, and knowing one does not. Although 
the immediate situation is no worse; the flat tyre Is no flatter, the situation is perceived as 
generally more unpleasant overall, as nothing can be done about it. 
The group provided with preparatory information but no control (I-NC), rated the second 
stimulus as more painful in comparison to the first. This occurred irrespective of LOC 
styles of the participants in that group. On the other hand, participants in the NI-NC 
condition who were not provided with preparatory information (low predictability), and 
who perceived control as being in the hands of the experimenter (low control) showed a 
significant reduction in VAS pain rating for the second stimulus. Moreover, 
VAS Pain 
rating and LOC score were strongly related in this condition (a more internal 
LOC style 
related to lower pain rating and a more external LOC style related to 
higher pain rating). 
Comparison scale responses from participants in the NI-NC condition showed a 
bimodal 
distribution that is strongly correlated with VAS pain rating, and concordant with 
the 
relationship between LOC style and VAS pain rating. 
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it appears that in the NI-NC condition, withholding preparatory information concerning the 
intensity of the impending pain stimulus resulted in different evaluations of the si ation 
between participants. That is, participants responded differently to the lack ofpredictability. 
These differences may be a result of the activation of different control related chronically 
accessible trait constructs within each participant. As stated previously, people are more 
sensitive to information in the environment that is relevant to their individual long-term 
trait constructs (e. g. Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Pratto, 1986). Thus, it appears likely that 
explicitly placing perceived control in the hands of the experimenter activated trait 
constructs pertaining to control within the participants, but that the activated representations 
are different, depending on the LOC style of the participants. In other words, withholding 
explicit control activated different representations in individuals with a more external LOC 
style and who believe already that control lies in the hands of luck, fate, or powerful others 
(i. e. that they have little direct control themselves), than in individuals with a more internal 
LOC style, who believe that events within their personal environment are under their own 
control. 
The provision of preparatory information in the I-NC condition (high predictability - low 
control) appears to have suppressed these differences. Participants knew exactly what was 
going to happen with respect to the intensity of the impending stimulus, but having no 
control over it increased the general unpleasantness associated with the event (as suggested 
above). 
However, withholding preparatory information in the NI-NC condition (low predictability 
low control) appears to have allowed expression of the differences 
in activated trait 
constructs between participants. Although participants in the NI-NC condition perceived 
control as being in the hands of the experimenter, there was now an element of ambiguity 
concerning the outcome. It seems likely that differences in activated control-related 
trait 
constructs between participants influenced the interpretation and ultimate significance 
of 
the ambiguous element to the participants. To those with a more internal 
style, the 
ambiguity may have represented an opportunity. Where the outcome is not explicitly 
stated, 
and thus not 'fixed', there may exist the possibility of influencing 
it. 
134 
To those with a more external LOC style however, the reduced tendency to look for, or act 
upon such a possibility to begin with, means that the element of ambiguity simply 
represented greater uncertainty. This is in line with previous research showing that 
information can act as a stressor and exacerbate distress during a potentially painful event 
if the person is denied any apparent means of controlling that event (Law et al., 1994; 
Miller, 1980; Miller & Mangan, 1983; Weisenberg et al., 1985). 
Differences in activation of chronically accessible traits relating to personal control may 
provide an explanation for the unpredictable effects of Information on the perception of 
pain shown in previous research. It has been noted that due to the diversity in the types of 
information used in research, no straightforward relationship has been found between the 
receipt of information about an event and the reactions to the event (Thompson, 198 1). 
However , if 
individual differences in socially acquired, long-term trait constructs are taken 
into account, it appears that the effects of information become more predictable. For 
example, Miller and Mangan (1983) suggest that preparatory information may exacerbate 
patient distress and that variations in coping style interact with and determine the impact 
of information. They suggest that patients are generally less aroused when the information 
with which they are presented is consonant with their coping styles. 
Evidence for that suggestion comes from an earlier study by Thompson (1981), who 
reported that the provision of information before a painful event (surgery) gave mixed 
results dependent upon the cognitive coping strategy employed by the patients. Patients who 
employed avoidant cognitive strategies experience less preoperative anxiety, but also had 
less favourable postoperative attitudes. Thompson suggests that the use of an avoidant 
strategy depends on the situation. If vigilance (information seeking) is likely to 
be effective 
in reducing or avoiding pain, it is useful. If not, it would only result 
in increased anxiety. 
The results of Experiment 3 showing that participants in the 
I-NC condition rated the 
second stimulus as more painful than the first (in the absence of perceived control) 
are in 
line with that suggestion, and support the idea that the activation of 
long-terin trait 
constructs relating to control, influences the ultimate impact of information. 
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Thompson goes on to suggest that the effects of a warning signal may depend on the 
strategies and goals it evokes in the recipient. It is suggested here that those strategies in 
turn, depend upon individual differences in chronic trait availability. 
Law et al. (1994), found that information in the form of stress inoculation training resulted 
in higher levels of reported pain for those participants with low desire for and fe lings of e 
control. Similarly, in a study by Weisenberg et al. (1985) the provision of information 
allowing predictability resulted in high Trait Anxiety participants reporting more pain than 
low Trait Anxiety participants. In these studies two different types of information; 
information on dealing with stress and information allowing predictability respectively, 
have a similar effect on the perception ofpain as the inforination concerning the impending 
stimulus intensity used in Experiment 3. Therefore, it seems probable that inforination does 
have a predictable effect, but that effect is dependant upon chronically accessible trait 
availability within participants. 
The results of Experiment 3 are in line also with the suggestion that information allowing 
predictability is likely to act as another ingredient in control (Weisenberg et al., 1985). 
When an individual feels capable of acting upon the information provided (internal LOC 
style or high perceived control), then that information is helpful. However, the same 
information may be seen as simply more pressure by somebody who already doubts their 
ability to manage (e. g. the I-NC condition in which information was provided, but control 
was withheld). Weisenberg et al. note also that many psychological techniques for the 
regulation of pain depend upon the willingness of the individual to accept control. 
Miller (1980) suggested that under circumstances where a person doubts their own ability 
to exercise behavioural control, or when the correct necessary action is unclear, that person 
may be willing to hand over control to another. This would especially 
be the case should 
the other person be seen to have greater expertise or skill to 
deal with the threat. It seems 
likely that this is how clinicians and researchers are perceived. 
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In the NI-NC condition of Experiment 3 it would have been reasonable to expect that 
participants with a more external LOC style would be more ready to yield control to a 
'competent other' than participants with a more internal LOC style who, in turn, would be 
reasonably expected to respond less well to having control taken from them. It could be 
argued then, that withholding control should have resulted in those with a more internal 
LOC style evaluating the situation more negatively than those with a more external LOC 
style. However, it should be noted that all participants had been informed at the beginning 
of the experiment of their rights to halt or withdraw from the experiment at any time, as 
required under ethical guidelines. Thus, under the experimental condition, it Is possible that 
participants with chronically accessible traits relating to a more internal LOC style (e. g. 
higher self-efficacy and confidence in their ability to control events), were generally more 
confident of their ownjudgernent concerning the situation. Therefore, should it have come 
to it, in the absence of an explicitly stated outcome they felt sufficient personal control or 
sense of self-efficacy to prevent events from progressing beyond their limits, in spite of new 
instructions from the experimenter. On the other hand, participants with chronically 
accessible traits relating to a more external LOC style (e. g. lower self-efficacy and lack of 
confidence in their ability to control events), may have lacked confidence in their ability to 
exert or regain personal control should events threaten to exceed their limits. Thus, 
evaluation of the situation by participants with a more external LOC style would be more 
negative overall compared to evaluations by participants with a more internal LOC style. 
Experiment 3 shows that qualities of a pre-procedure briefing can influence the 
interpretation of a pain stimulus and suggests that the interpretation depends to a degree 
upon individual differences in long-term cognitive structures that are activated by elements 
of the briefing. A situation in which control is in the hands of the experimenter and which 
has an explicitly stated (and thus 'fixed') outcome results in an overall more negative 
evaluation and a concomitant increase in unpleasantness associated with the pain stimulus. 
On the other hand, the evaluation of a situation in which control is in the 
hands of the 
experimenter but in which the outcome is ambiguous, appears to result in 
different 
interpretations depending upon differences in chronic control-related trait accessibility 
between participants. The activation of traits associated with a more internal 
LOC style 
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leads to a more positive evaluation of the situation and lower levels of unpleasantness 
associated with the pain stimulus. Conversely, the activation of traits associated with a 
more external LOC style leads to a more negative evaluation of the situation, and greater 
unpleasantness associated with the pain stimulus. 
Socially acquired gender-role expectations can influence the evaluation ofapotentially 
painful procedure 
In contrast to the explicit and variable nature of pre-procedure briefings, Experiment 4 
examined the effects of the sex of the experimenter (a social factor inherent to researcher- 
participant and clinician-patient dyads) on the perception of a pain stimulus. The results of 
Experiment 4 show a main effect for participant sex. Males reported higher pain thresholds 
overall. This is in line with previous research using mechanical pain stimuli (pressure 
algometry) (e. g. Brennum et al., 1989; Fillingim & Maixner, 1995; Fischer, 1986,1987; 
Mersky & Spear, 1964; Riley 1H et al., 1998). The results also show that both male and 
female participants reported significantly higher PPTs to a female experimenter than to a 
male experimenter. 
The higher pain thresholds recorded for the female experimenter group agree with previous 
research (Levine & De Simone, 1991), and the suggestion that gender-role behaviour may 
be an important determinant of individual responses to pain (Otto & Dougher, 1985). 
However, these results cannot be explained fully by the stereotypical gender-role motive 
of males trying to appear macho to a female. 
Firstly, if the male participants were fulfilling stereotypical gender-role requirements of 
appearing macho and hiding their weakness from females (Levine 
& De Simone, 199 1), it 
is reasonable to suppose that male participants would have attempted 
to demonstrate this 
by delaying reports ofpain threshold (as suggested by Otto 
& Dougher, 1985), but reporting 
lower levels of pain (lower VAS pain ratings). That is, there should 
have been a divergence 
between measures of pain threshold and pain rating 
for male participants reporting to a 
female experimenter compared to the same males reporting 
to a male experimenter. As 
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noted previously, there would be little benefit in providing an I impressively' high pain 
threshold if it is accompanied by an equivalently high pain rating. Secondly, if the 
difference in reports of PPT between male experimenter and female experimenter groups 
was a function of the desire by males to impress a member of the opposite sex, why should 
the same pattern of pain threshold reporting be observed in female participants? 
The key may lie in the fact that the cold pressor test, as used by Levine and De Sinionel is 
self-administered by participants (under instruction from the experimenter). In the case of 
mechanical pain stimulus, the stimulus is delivered by another (as indeed, are most acutely 
painful clinical procedures). In light of this, the simplest explanation of the results is that 
when the stimulus was delivered by a female, participants required greater stimulus 
intensity to achieve the degree of unpleasantness signalling pain threshold than when the 
stimulus was delivered by a male. In other words, the presence of an opposite sex assessor 
activated gender stereotype trait constructs within the participants (in line with Bargh, Chen 
et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997), and the activation of these trait constructs influenced 
subsequent dyadic interaction (e. g. Snyder et al., 1977). As noted, examples of traits 
associated with the female stereotype are sensitivity, understanding, gentleness and caring. 
As the delivery of painful stimuli runs contrary to these traits , it is most 
likely that 
participants confronted with a female experimenter formed different expectancies 
concerning the situation and possible outcomes (e. g. Higgins & Bargh, 1987) than 
participant confronted by a male experimenter. 
Evaluation ofthe situation and short-term hypotheses concerning probable outcomes based 
upon the activated female stereotype trait constructs of gentleness, caring and sensitivity 
were likely to be more positive overall. In effect, participants in the female experimenter 
conditions expected less pain than participants confronted with a male experimenter,, as a 
result of an overall less negative evaluation of the situation and its potential 
for harm. In 
short, the activation of female stereotype trait constructs appears to 
have resulted in a less 
negative evaluation of the situation and a less negative affective-motivational response 
compared to the activation of the male stereotype trait constructs. 
Thus, in the presence of 
a female, the entire situation, including the pain stimulus, was perceived 
less negatively (as 
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presenting less potential for harm) and so as less unpleasant. Therefore, it took greater 
stimulus intensity f rom a female experimenter than ftom a male experimenter to achieve 
the same level of unpleasantness signalling the subjective experience of pain threshold. 
In light of this, the influential factor in experimenter sex effects is less likely to be the 
conscious 'censoring' of behaviour by the participants according to their socially acquired 
ideals of gender-role behaviour (i. e. a participant oriented effect). Rather, it is more likely 
to be the result of differences in the evaluation of the situation by participants influenced 
by the activation of stereotypical traits associated with the experimenter, and subsequent 
differences in expectancies concerning the outcome (i. e. an experimenter/context oriented 
effect). 
This interpretation fits with the evidence reviewed in Chapters Three and Four, insofar as 
the evaluation of the environment for the likelihood of potential harm is less likely to 
depend to a major degree upon the characteristics of the individual than on the 
characteristics of the features evaluated. Environmental features signalling possible danger 
will have a similar meaning to both males and females, as what is potentially harmful to a 
female is also potentially harmful to a male and visa-versa. 
Features of the immediate environment can influence evaluation of events within that 
environment 
Within the experimental dyad, both what is said and characteristics of who says it have 
been shown to influence the perception of a painful stimulus, most likely through the 
effects of these factors on the evaluation of the situation by the participants. 
Experiment 5 
tested the effect of a non-social feature of the environment which signals the nature of 
the 
situation and its significance to the individual. In this case, a negatively valenced object in 
the form of a wound classification and dressings reference chart of a 
type commonly found 
in clinical environments. 
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The results of Experiment 5 showed that the mere presence of the clinical reference chart 
resulted in significantly lower measures of PPT for the group exposed to it, compared to 
the control group who were not exposed to it. This result is in line with the principles of the 
automatic evaluation effect discussed in Chapter Four. The work of Chen and Bargh (1999) 
demonstrates a direct link between the automatic process of evaluation of environmental 
objects as either positive or negative, and affective-motivational state and subsequent 
behavioural propensity. Experiment 5 extends these results by demonstrating the effect of 
these automatic processes on the perception of a potentially painful procedure in an 
ecologically valid research (and quasi-clinical) situation. 
The automatic evaluation effect, as noted previously, has been described as a continuous 
process that is universal and unconditional and requires neither awareness nor intent 
(Bargh, 2001; Bargh, Chaiken et al., 1996; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Its effects are 
pervasive, and can influence subsequent evaluations and higher cognitive processes (e. g. 
Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). The images on the reference chart 
were only two dimensional images, and as noted by Giner-Sorolla (1999), the immediate 
appraisal may be modified by later perceptions. In the case of Experiment 5 for example, 
the immediate impact of the images may have been mitigated by the fact that the stimuli 
were just pictures on a chart and not real wounds, thus reducing subsequent emotional 
response. But even so, the fact that an effect was shown for images, both by Giner-Sorolla 
and in Experiment 5, supports the contention that automatic evaluation is a basic and 
unavoidable process with pervasive effects, and is indicative of the implicit and inherent 
nature of the process. 
The results of Experiment 5 support the idea that the automatic evaluation of a negatively 
valenced feature of the environment, which for all practical purposes in the minds of 
the 
participants (as determined by post trial probing) had nothing at all 
to do with the 
experiment at hand, triggered an overall more negative evaluation of 
the situation (by 
signalling that the environment held a greater potential 
for harm) and an increased negative 
affective-motivational state, resulting in reduced pain thresholds 
for that group. 
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Exten ding th e prin ciple 
The automatic evaluation effect may also go some way to explaining the aversion to 
hospitals that many people express. When asking a person who expresses an aversion to the 
hospital environment, why they dislike hospitals (as the author has done frequently), the 
responses are usually ambiguous. Usually, the person cannot present a single precise reason 
for their aversion, rather they present a generallsed and ambiguous expression of dislike. 
One of the most frequent explanations given is 'the hospital smell'. In light of the principles 
of automatic evaluation, it seems more likely that the actual aversion stems from the 
increase in negative affective-motivational state generated by the prevalence of negatively 
valenced infort-nation present within the clinical enviromnent. 
As the evaluation of envirom-nental information occurs at a very low (pre-conscious) level, 
the resulting change in affective-motivational state and increase in arousal would appear 
as a general, non-specific sense of 'unease' or 'disquiet' which could not be attributed to 
any particular factor, but which would be accompanied by an urge (motivation) to avoid or 
remove one's self from the cause of the unease. As the specific cause of the feeling of unease 
may not have been consciously identified or attributed to any one thing in particular, the 
general sense of disquiet and increased arousal and avoidance motivation would most likely 
be generalised to the situation as a whole. Thus, with respect to the frequently expressed 
rationale of 'the hospital smell', whilst the odour itself is innocuous (at worst, Hycolin or 
some other general surface disinfectant), and often barely noticeable, it seems most likely that 
the odour serves as a signal, triggering the learned association between the smell and the 
situation (e. g. Smith et al., 1992). 
As noted by Bargh (1982), awareness of a source of environmental 
information is not 
necessary for it to affect conscious judgements. indeed, it has been shown that awareness of 
fects prevents the effects from occ ng (Dijksterhu* a prmung stimulus and its potential ef 11M is, 
Bargh et al., 2000). As people are not aware of the pre-consclous evaluation of 
features of 
the environment, or in many cases even the presence of the stimulus 
(Bargh & Pietromonaco, 
1982)5 it follows that the resulting affective-motivational state applies to the entire context 
rather than the particular stimulus per se, (as suggested above) and in 
this way the presence 
of such valenced stimuli serves to signal the safety or 
danger of the inu-nediate environment 
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as a whole (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Chen & Bargh, 1999). In light of this, and the often 
overwhelming predominance of such valenced stimuli II environments, it i in clinical I is 
reasonable to suppose that exposure to such environments will result in an increased negative 
affective-motivational state in people attending hospitals, regardless of whether they are 
attending as patients who may be expecting some unpleasant procedure, or simply as visitors. 
Moreover, an association between the environment and the affective-motivational response 
to it (the sense of 'unease') will begin to be laid down and will influence expectations on 
subsequent exposure to that environment. 
What does a measure ofpain threshold measure? 
The results of Experiment 5 suggest that people exposed to such environments and awaiting 
an acutely painful procedure (e. g. venipuncture) will have a significantly increased 
motivation to avoid potentially painful stimuli, and a significantly increased negative affective 
response to the administration of such stimuli. In other words, such individuals will in effect, 
be 'primed' for pain. Thus, pain stimuli of intensities that in other situations may not be 
perceived as being painful (or at least, not as painful), may be experienced as painful (or 
more painful), due simply to the envirom-nent in which the procedure takes place, rather than 
qualities or the intensity of the pain stimulus itself 
However, it should be remembered that, as stated by the IASP, pain stimulus is not painper 
se, and in experiments which rely upon measures of pain threshold, what is being measured 
is only the stimulus intensity at which participants report the advent of pain. Therefore, it 
must be acknowledged that in experiments (such as Experiment 5) where the presence of 
a negatively valenced feature of the environment is shown to result in a significant 
reduction in pain threshold, the evaluation of the participants which results in an increase 
in negative affective-motivational state, also increases the motivation and behavioural 
I ore, that participants propensity to avoid the stimulus (as stated above). It is possible theref 
in Experiment 5 could have been reporting pain threshold at sub-threshold stimulus 
intensities, in order to avoid the experience ofpain altogether. Due to the entirely subjective 
nature of pain, and the fact that pain itself is a non-observable phenomenon, this possibility 
exists in all studies which rely on measures of pain threshold. 
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However, participants were not overtly aware of the experimental manipulation, and as 
noted previously, conscious awareness of 'primes' and their effects tends to nullify their 
effect. Moreover, participants are unlikely to have been consciously aware of the increase 
in negative affective-motivational state or propensity to avoid the stimulus within the time- 
frame of the Experiment (around 5 minutes per trial), and all participants were acting under 
the explicit instructions to stop the trial as soon as they felt the pressure had become 
painful. It is most likely that participants were responding 'honestly', but that under the 
experimental condition, the general increase in negative affect resulted in the pain stimulus 
being perceived as being more 'unpleasant' (as opposed to more intense), thus lower 
stimulus intensities were required to achieve pain threshold in the experimental condition. 
That being said, in light of the evidence that stimulus intensities at pain threshold are stable 
within individuals over time (e. g. Experiment 1), and further, that the experience of pain 
threshold remains the same within individuals, regardless of the stimulus intensity required 
to achieve it (e. g. Experiments 2 and 4), those experiments showing differences in stimulus 
intensity required to achieve pain threshold resulting from psychological interventions raise 
questions concerning the nature of pain threshold: What does a measure of pain threshold 
(or to be precise, a measure of stimulus intensity at the advent of pain) reflect? Further, in 
situations showing significant elevation or reduction in pain threshold as a result of 
psychological manipulation over repeated measures or between groups, what accounts for 
the differences? The following section discusses the nature of pain threshold and proposes 
an integrated biopsychosocial. model which provides answers to these questions. 
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The Nature of Pain Threshold 
" When the right thing can only be measuredpoorly, it tends to cause the wrong 
thing to be measured only because it can be measured well. And it is often 
much worse to have good measurement of the wrong thing - especially when, 
as is so often the case, the wrong thing will IN FACT be used as an indicator 
ofthe right thing - than to havepoor measurement of the right thing. " (Tukey, 
1979). 
The intensity-unpleasantness equilibrium 
Taken together, the results ofthe experiments presented in this thesis suggest that measures 
of pain threshold reflect an equilibrium between the sensory and affective-motivational 
components of pain. In other words, the experience of pain threshold; the subjective 
psychological event that signals the advent ofpain, appears to be stable within participants, 
and to be a result of a 'tonic balance' between the sensory component (signalling stimulus 
intensity) and the degree of unpleasantness associated with the situation, as determined by 
the influence of preattentive limbic processes on affective-motivational state. 
The results of Experiment I show that under stable conditions across measures (no 
experimental intervention or changes in environmental conditions), repeated measures of 
pain threshold and subjective pain rating are stable for each participant over time. The 
results of Experiment 2 showed that subjective pain rating remained unaltered even though 
a significant elevation in pain stimulus intensity was required to achieve pain threshold. As 
mentioned, this suggests that the experience of pain threshold remains the same, regardless 
of the stimulus intensity required to achieve it. 
Experiment 4 showed that differences in appraisal of the situation due to the presence of 
a male or female experimenter resulted In differences In stimulus intensities requires to 
achieve pain threshold (higher in the presence of a female and lower in the presence of a 
male). However, as with Experiment 2, there were no differences 
in subjective pain rating 
across measures. In the same vein, Experiment 5 showed that 
differences in evaluation due 
to the presence of negatively valenced stimuli in the environment resulted in 
a lower 
stimulus intensity required to achieve pain threshold 
for the group exposed to the 
manipulation. Again, there was no difference in subjective pain rating 
between groups. 
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By contrast, the results of Experiment 3, in which participants rated the second of two pain 
stimuli of identical intensities (i. e. previously recorded pain threshold intensity), showed 
that differences in evaluation due to manipulation of preparatory information and locus of 
perceived control resulted in participants perceiving the second of two identical stimuli as 
either more or less painful compared to the first. In this case, whilst the intensity of the pain 
stimulus remained fixed for each participant, their perception of the stimulus changed 
significantly. 
Whilst at face value it might seem pointless to ask participants to quantify their pain 
expenence at pain threshold stimulus intensity, as intuitively it might be expected that as 
pain threshold signals the advent of pain, subsequent subjective measures of pain intensity 
would be just above "no pain". However, the expenence of pain, by definition,, must 
contain all the elements that make it 'painful'. This includes both the sensory component 
signalling intensity and the af II fu fective motivational component that makes a pain I 
experience 'unpleasant', and constitutes the drive to remove it (or remove one's self from 
it). As shown in Chapter Three, where a component is removed (e. g. the sensory 
component, as in the case of the cardioembolic stroke patient reported by Ploner et al., 
1999), the experience resulting from administration of a pain stimulus could not be 
classified by the patient as 'pain', but merely as 'unpleasant'. 
In this,, discussion of the components of the pain experience is rather like discussing the 
ingredients of a cake. Whilst the ingredients of a cake are eggs, butter, flour and sugar, once 
baked, the cake is something other than the sum of its ingredients. Thus, whilst it may be 
possible to state, for example, that the contributing elements of any given slice are flour, 
sugar, eggs and butter, in reality, the 'experience' of cake is none of those, it is just cake. 
In the same way, whilst the elements contributing to the experience of pain have been 
differentiated into sensory-discriminatory, cognitive-evaluative and affective-motivational 
components, the subjective experience of pain is a synergistic psychological event which 
is entirely subjective and unique to the individual. It is something other than the sum of its 
components, yet it requires all the components. 
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It is suggested that any subjective measure of pain intensity will also be influenced to some 
degree by the degree to which the participant perceives it as unpleasant. In other words, 
measures of intensity reflect notjust stimulus intensity, but (at least partly) unpleasantness, 
as determined by the current affective-motivational state and significance of the situation 
as a whole, as perceived by the participant. This is supported by studies that have attempted 
to use independent measures of intensity and unpleasantness but have found them to be 
related (e. g. Dahlgren et al., 1995). 
Measures of pain threshold are subject to the same principle. Whilst in themselves, 
measures of pain threshold measure only stimulus intensity at the advent of pain, it is 
suggested that the advent ofpain within individuals is determined by a balance between the 
intensity of the stimulus and the affective-motivational state of the individual. Whilst the 
inherent qualities of pain stimuli vary, depending on the nature of the stimulus (e. g. 
electrical, chemical, thermal or mechanical), for any given stimulus, the subjective 
experience of the advent of pain, almost by definition must be the same within individuals. 
However, previous research and the experiments presented in this thesis show that the 
advent of pain can occur within the same individual at different stimulus intensities. This 
begs the question, what exactly does a measure of pain threshold reflect? If an intervention 
is shown to result in a reduction in pain threshold, it cannot be said that the experience was 
more painful, as that would be a supra-threshold measure of pain (it is not likely that any 
participant exposed to a stimulus of increasing intensity would continue beyond the advent 
of pain after being instructed to 'say stop as soon as it becomes painful'). 
Similarly, if an intervention is shown to result in elevation of pain threshold, it cannot be 
said that the experience was less painful, as, by definition, any experience preceding the 
advent of pain, is not pain threshold. So, if the same experience is being achieved under 
different stimulus intensities, what accounts for the differences? In other words, when the 
advent of pain occurs at a lower stimulus intensity across repeated measures, what 
'makes 
up the difference' in subjective experience between the previously recorded threshold 
intensity and the lower Intensity? Conversely, when the advent of pain occurs at a 
higher 
stimulus intensity across repeated measures, what is removed? 
147 
It is suggested that whilst measures of pain threshold show simply stimulus intensity at the 
advent of pain, measures showing changes in stimulus intensity required to achieve pain 
threshold within the same individual are reflecting a shift in the balance between the relative 
contributions of the intensity of the stimulus and the degree of unpleasantness associated with 
it, as determined by preattentive emotional processing and the resulting degree and valence 
of affective-motivational state. 
A reduction in recorded pain threshold across measures represents the advent of pain at a 
lower stimulus intensity. But why should a pain stimulus at lower intensity than previously 
recorded threshold levels achieve pain threshold? As noted, it could be said that in instances 
where a significant reduction in pain thresholds are recorded, participants are simply 
attempting to avoid the expenience of pain altogether. Whilst this is not impossible, it does 
imply intent. Preconscious evaluation has been shown to occur immediately on perception 
of a stimulus and without intent (Bargh, 1996). Moreover, classification of environmental 
stimuli as good or bad (the basic affective-motivational response to the stimulus) has been 
shown to occur within 250ms (Bargh, 2001), thus it cannot be said that participants are 
necessarily aware of an increased motivation to avoid pain. As noted in Chapter Four, at 
the level of preattentive evaluation, affect and motivation are indivisible. Changes in both 
affect and motivation occurring as a result of automatic evaluation are collateral. In other 
words, an increase in the behavioural propensity to avoid a stimulus or situation is 
accompanied in parallel by an increase in negative affect; the psychological 'drive' to avoid 
the situation or stimulus. Therefore, it is more likely that participants are reporting the 
advent of pain as instructed, but that the stimulus is perceived as more unpleasant (due to 
the increased contribution to the experience of a negative affective-motivational state), and 
thus painful at a lower stimulus intensity. 
Similarly, elevations in pain threshold across measures beg the question, why 
does the 
administration of stimulus intensities greater than previously recorded pain 
threshold, not 
result in a higher subjective pain rating? Most probably 
because the same physical stimulus 
was perceived in light of a less negative affective-motivational state 
(lower negative affect 
and less motivation to avoid the stimulus), and so was perceived as 
less unpleasant, whilst 
the sum of the subjective experience at the advent of pain remains 
the same. 
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Figure 23 presents an integrated biopsychosocial model representing a possible explanation 
for the way in which stimulus intensity and automatic evaluation processes contribute to 
the experience of pain threshold. The model works within the parameters of what is known 
of the underlying neural bases of the sensory and affective divisions of pain (the pain 
matrix). The model acknowledges also the roles of automatic processes; the preattentive 
detection and processing of emotionally salient information in the environment, and the 
influences upon these processes of socially acquired, chronically accessible cognitive 
structures relating to individual traits. 
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Figure 23 Model representing the equilibrium between unpleasantness and 
intensity determining the advent of pain (automatic 
processes in blue). The roles of the amygdala and other structures associated with 
the detection and evaluation of emotionally 
salient environmental information are accepted as givens at those 
levels of the model. 
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The biopsychosocial model and individual differences in pain threshold 
At the detection, evaluation and classification levels of the model (as shown previously in 
Chapter Three), all incoming information is checked for novelty or persistence (reticular 
formation and locus coeruleus). The emotional significance of novel stimuli is recalled 
(amygdala) and determinations concerning its salience are made (ACC). Affective- 
motivational changes in response to the information are initiated (amygdala and ACC), and 
the appropriate behavioural response is selected (ACC). 
Preparatory autonomic and endocrine changes associated with arousal and motivated 
behaviour occur also (ACC and hypothalamus). In this way, all information falling within 
perceptual fields will have already undergone some level of processing in limbic regions 
before reaching higher areas of the brain, and therefore carries with it inforination 
pertaining to the emotional significance (salience and valence) of the incoming information. 
The continuous preattentive evaluation of environmental features therefore provides a 
constant stream of emotionally valenced information concerning the immediate situation. 
It has been shown that people are more sensitive to envirom-nental information that is 
relevant to their individual long-term trait constructs (e. g. Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Pratto, 
1986), and so the 'set' of socially acquired long-term cognitive structures unique to each 
individual act as a kind of filter. Information relating to any particular construct accessible 
in each individual is more likely to be detected and to activate the construct, and so will be 
4 weighted' according to the nature of the construct (e. g. the difference between internal or 
external locus of control, or high or low self-efficacy). 
The resulting net valence of incoming information and subsequent 'weighting' of that 
i ive information according to its relevance to the unique set of chronically accessible cogn 
ti 
structures within each individual, determines the psychological situation of individuals as 
they perceive it (e. g. Spielman et al., 1988; Todorov 
& Bargh, 2002). 
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The situation as perceived by an individual in light of the valence and strength of their 
affective-motivational state influences the way in which subsequent information is 
interpreted, formingakindof feedbackloop. Thus, detection ofnegat*velyvalenced stimuli I 
in the environment results in elevated levels of arousal and alertness and an increased 
sensitivity to other negatively valenced stimuli in the environment. 
The increased negativity of affective-motivational state results also in ambiguous or 
ambivalent stimuli being interpreted in a way that is congruent with the valence of 
previously detected stimuli (e. g. Bargh & Ferguson, 2000), and influences further 
'downstream' processes such as emotion, mood and judgement (e. g. Bargh & 
Pietromonaco, 1982). It follows that the more negatively the situation is perceived by the 
individual, the more negatively (unpleasant) any noxious stimulus delivered in that situation 
is likely to be perceived. 
In short, automatic evaluation provides a stream of emotionally valenced inforniation that 
has been is filtered and weighted by the set of socially acquired, chronically accessible trait 
constructs unique to each individual. This information is fed back into the system and 
influences subsequent evaluations. The set of chronically accessible constructs peculiar to 
each individual acts as a 'template' influencing sensitivity to, and evaluation of salient 
stimuli. Therefore , information 
in any given environment is likely to be evaluated 
differently according to its relevance to long-term constructs within each individual, and 
so will result in different affective-emotional states between individuals in the same 
environment. 
This accounts for individual differences in response to pain stimuli in the same 
environment, as shown by the wide range of PPT and VAS pain ratings recorded in 
Experiment 1. The stable PPT and VAS pain ratings recorded in Experiment I over five 
consecutive measures reflect the relative stability ofpain threshold within individuals, when 
measured under stable conditions. 
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The biopsychosocial model and individual variance in pain threshold 
Whilst the above accounts for between- individual differences in pain threshold, the 
experiments presented in this thesis show within- individual variation in the perception and 
reporting of pain resulting from manipulation of social, contextual and environmental 
factors. Figure 24 illustrates the way in which these manipulations influence individual 
pain thresholds in terms of the model presented in Figure 23. 
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Figure 24 Examples of the effects of experimental manipulations on the pain threshold equilibrium. 
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The elevation in pain stimulus intensity required to achieve pain threshold with no change 
in subjective pain rating shown in the male-female experimenter condition In Experiment 
3, reflect overall less negative evaluation of the situation and (thus) less negative 
expectancies by members of that group. Therefore the sti was perceived less 
negatively, and accompanied by a lower motivati I ion to avoid it (i. e. as being less 
unpleasant), and so greater intensity was required to achieve the subjective experience of 
pain threshold (Figure 24 A). 
Conversely, the reduction in pain stimulus required to achieve pain threshold with no 
change in subjective pain rating recorded from the female-male experimenter condition, and 
also the lower stimulus intensities recorded for the experimental condition In Experiment 
5, with no difference in subjective rating, reflects a more negative evaluation and greater 
negative affect (and avoidance motivation) for those participants. Thus, as the pain stimulus 
was perceived more negatively (i. e. as more unpleasant), a lower intensity was required to 
achieve the subjective experience of pain threshold (Figure 24 B). 
By contrast, Experiment 3 employed a fixed stimulus of an intensity identical to the 
previously recorded pain threshold of each participant, yet significant changes in subjective 
experience were shown. Under conditions which evoked an overall less negative appraisal 
of the situation (NI-NC condition), the same stimulus intensities at which participants had 
previously reported pain threshold were reported as significantly less painful than the 
baseline pain stimulus (Figure 24 Q. This suggests that a lower avoidance motivation and 
less negative affective state resulted in the same stimulus being perceived as less 
unpleasant. Conversely, under conditions which triggered a more negative appraisal of the 
situation (I-NC condition), the same stimulus intensities at which participants had 
previously reported pain threshold were perceived as being more painful in comparison to 
the baseline stimuli (Figure 24 D), suggesting that the same stimulus was perceived as more 
unpleasant. 
In short, whilst the stimulus is scalable, changes in evaluation result in significant changes 
in stimulus intensity required to achieve pain threshold, but no significant alteration in the 
4sum' of the subjective experience (Figure 24 A& B). On the other hand, when the stimulus 
is of a fixed intensity, changes in stimulus intensity are not a contributing 
factor, but 
differences in evaluation result in significant differences in the subjective experience 
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(Figure 24 C& D). This latter example Is important, as it suggests that under conditions in 
which a non-scalable, acutely painful stimulus8 is to be applied, the ultimate pain 
experience is, to a degree, controllable through the manipulation of social and 
environmental factors not related to the pain stimulus 
Experiment 2 is different in that it involved the application of a physical intervention 
(vibration) which is known to influence the sensory component in line with the principles 
of the Gate Control Theory of Pain (Melzack & Wall, 1965). In this case, the intervention 
influenced the perceived intensity of the stimulus through modulation of the sensory 
nociceptive system (i. e. the lateral division of the pain matrix). Nonetheless, the results of 
Experiment 2 support arguments for both the existence and stability of pain thresholds 
within participants, especially when viewed in conjunction with the results of Experiment 
I- 
Experiment I showed that participants reported pain threshold at the same stimulus 
intensities over 5 repeated measures, each a week apart. It was suggested that this would 
be difficult for participants to achieve in the absence of some kind of cue, and that in the 
presence of a stimulus of increasing intensity, the advent of pain was the most likely cue. 
Experiment 2 involved the application of an intervention known to mediate perception of 
the intensity of noxious stimuli. The result of this was that a significant elevation in 
stimulus intensity was required in order to provide participants with the same cue. Once this 
cue had been provided, participant reported pain threshold, but did not report any 
significant difference in the subjective experience of pain. 
Whilst the experience of acute pain is (normally) dependent upon contributions from both 
the sensory-discriminative division (signalling the intensity, quality and location of the 
stimulus) and the affective-motivational division of the pain matrix, the results of the 
experiments presented here suggest that activity in the affective-motivational division 
evoked by factors other than the nature (intensity and qualities) of a physical pain stimulus, 
nonetheless modulate the overall perception of the stimulus. Where sensory, cognitive and 
affective-motivational factors all contribute to the experience of pain, the experiments 
8 
To clarify, it should be noted that to term a stimulus 'painful' is inaccurate 
insofar as it suggests that pain a quality of the st mu us 
Clearly, this is not the case. What is meant here by the term 'painful stimulus' Is a stimulus of 
an intensity that one may reasonably expect 
to be perceived as painful by most individuals. 
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conducted for this thesis have shown that the contribution of the affective-motivational 
component is not necessarily dependant upon, nor a direct result of the pain stimulus or the 
experience of pain. Pre-existing affective-motivational states, or changes in state due to 
environmental influences are also determinants of the experience. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the medial (affective-motivational) division of the pain 
matrix is exclusive to pain, rather it shares components with the central system associated 
with the processing of emotionally salient information and the production of affect. Changes 
in this system evoked by factors that have nothing to do with a pain stimulus, will 
nonetheless influence the overall experience of a painful event, by weighting the degree of 
4 unpleasantness' (i. e. the degree of negative affect and avoidance motivation) associated 
with it. 
Implications 
To what degree can changes in affective-motivational state influence the perception of pain 
stimuli? The results of the experiments conducted in this thesis have shown that differences 
in affective-motivational state induced prior to a painful stimulus is a significant modifier 
of the perception of the stimulus and as such, can influence the stimulus intensity required 
to achieve pain threshold. The fairly simple and straightforward manipulations employed 
have also been shown to result in the stimulus being perceived as 'less painful' in 
comparison to the same stimulus at an identical intensity. It is not extending the principle 
too far to suppose that similar processes could result in a comparatively intense stimulus 
being perceived as 'not painful'. Thus it is quite possible that affective-motivational state 
not only influences the perceived seventy of a pain experience, but is a determining factor 
in whether the experience is perceived as painful or not. 
As shown in Chapter One, there are situations in which the presence of an undeniably 
intense physical stimuli do not result in pain. For example, the Indian hook-swinging 
ceremony, which involves the celebrant undergoing what by western standards would 
be 
considered an immensely painful procedure; having steel hooks inserted under the skin and 
muscle on each side of his spine and then being suspended 
from these hooks by ropes 
attached to a cart. Yet this occurs in the absence of any apparent signs of suffering 
(Melzack 
& Wall, 1982). What could account for the apparent absence of pain in this situation? 
155 
To the objective observer, the act of inserting the hooks 'looks' painful. However, as 
mentioned in Chapter One, the pain a person feels cannot be known to an observer. but the 
observer can relate the situation to his or her own experience and draw inferences from it. 
This is adaptive as observing harm in another acts as a strong si ignal for the potential for 
harm in the current environment. However, it seems highly probable that the situation as 
perceived by the celebrant was completely different to what might reasonable be inferred 
by an objective observer. The insertion of the hooks is not seen as 'harm' by the celebrant, 
but rather as the culmination of a long term of ritual preparation in his honourable role as 
'the chosen one'. 
Similarly, the example of the 9 year-old boy reported by Chapman (1984), who had 
undergone a comparatively major surgical procedure (a nephrectomy) and yet, in the 
absence of any post-operative analgesia showed no signs of suffering until he was given 
'proof that the procedure had occurred (the author worked on a renal-transplant unit for 
4 years and can report that the post-operative pain following a nephrectomy is generally 
rated by patients as quite severe). Again, to objective observers, the existence of the 
surgical wound, and the knowledge that the boy was not prescribed post-operative analgesia 
might suggest that the boy should have been in some pain. However, the situation as 
perceived by the boy (prior to the nurse 'proving' to him that the operation had been 
performed), was completely different. As far as he was concerned, the operation had not 
yet taken place. 
The common denominator in each of these examples appears to be the beliefs held by the 
individuals involved concerning the nature of their situation; their evaluation of the 
situation based upon those beliefs, and the subjective perception of its meaning and 
emotional significance which determines the 'reality' in which a person exists 
(e. g. 
Spielman et al., 1988; Todorov & Bargh, 2002). Suggestive evidence 
in support of this has 
been provided by research into hypnosis. Whilst the precise nature and mechanism of 
function of hypnosis is not fully understood, there is some evidence 
to indicate that one of 
its principal actions is to allow the participant to 'reinterpret' incoming information, 
which 
would have a direct impact on the reality of the situation as experienced 
by the person under 
hypnosis. 
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Hypnosis has been shown to affect anterior brain function and the ACC in particular 
(Kropotov et al., 1997). Further evidence has supported the suggestion that hypnosis 
interferes with normal anterior brain functi 11 order attenti on involving a high ional system 
(Croft et al., 2002). As shown in Chapter Three, the affective subdivision of the ACC is 
primarily involved in assessing the salience of emotional information and the regulation of 
emotional and motivational responses (Bush et al., 2000; Davidson & Irwin, 1999), and as 
noted, the cognitive subdivision of the ACC is a part of an attentional network distributed 
throughout the limbic system, and among the functions ascribed to this subdivision are 
selective attention and response selection. 
Kiernan et al. (1995) reported several mechanisms which may explain hypnotic analgesia. 
Hypnosis may block transmission of nociceptIve volleys to associative areas of the brain, 
possibly at the spinal and supraspinal levels. Moreover, they found (in line with previous 
research) that hypnosis resulted in a greater reduction in the unpleasantness of pain than in 
the intensity. They suggest that "... in addition to the reduction in unpleasantness directly 
related to reduction in pain sensation, a separate mechanism, perhaps related to 
reinterpreting the meaning of the painful sensation, is specifically related to a reduction in 
unpleasantness beyond that provided by reduction in sensation intensity" (p45). 
Faymonville et al. (1998), report that hypnosis resulted in patients experiencing 
significantly higher impressions of control during surgery. They suggest that hypnosis 
allows the transition from a passive suffering state, to an active and independent state, and 
that it completely changes the subjective experience and perceptions of the patient. 
Faymonville et al. suggest that consequently, analgesia will result not only from preventing 
awareness of pain, but also from a selective reduction in its affective dimension through 
reinterpretation of the meanings associated with the painful sensation. 
I lective plast" Faymonville et al. (1998) also found that in patients undergoing eI ic surgery, 
hypnosis resulted in significantly more stable autonomic functions (heart-rate, systolic and 
diastolic arterial pressures and respiration rate) compared to patients in the control group 
who were provided with continuous stress-reducing strategies. 
This is consistent with the 
evidence reviewed in Chapter Three demonstrating the involvement of 
the anterior 
cingulate cortex in autonomic function, including respiration, 
heart-rate and blood pressure, 
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and further supports the idea of ACC involvement in the hypnotic mediation of pain. It is 
possible therefore, that the rituals observed by the celebrant prior to the insertion of the 
hooks in the hook-swinging ceremony (for example), and the 'ritual' of hypnotic induction 
may be different paths to the same state. A state which allows the individual to reinterpret 
the meaning and significance of the situation and thus modify its emotional impact. 
In all, this suggests that the 'reality' of the situation as perceived by the individual (its 
meaning and significance) and the affective-motivational state concomitant with that reality 
is the determining factor in the perception of acute pain within participants. That is to say, 
differences in affective-motivational state may determine the difference between an intense 
experience and a painful one. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
"Ifyou are distressed by anything external, the pain is not due to the thing 
itseýf but to your estimate of it; and this you have the power to revoke at any 
moment. " Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121 AD - 180 AD). Meditations 167 
A. C. E. 
This thesis investigated the roles of social, contextual and environmental factors on the 
perception of acute pain. The results show that these factors are significant modifiers of the 
perception of a pain stimulus and of the experience of pain. The results further suggest that 
principles generated by research into automaticity and preattentive (automatic) processing 
are applicable in pain research, and provide a framework within which individual variation 
in the perception of pain may be conceptualised. 
Using these principles, this thesis has shown that it is not only post-hoc emotional response 
to pain or qualities of pain stimulus which influences the ultimate experience. A prion 
perceptions concerning the nature of the situation in its entirety are also significant 
modifiers of the experience. These perceptions are (at least partly) driven by social, 
contextual and environmental cues, which serve to signal the relative potential for harm 
(pain) within a given situation. From this principle, several conclusions may be drawn. 
With in-individu al variation in response to pain may be explained in terms of 
preattentive processes. 
The model presented above (Figure 23) illustrates a possible mechanism by which a 
balance 
between the intensity of a given stimulus and affective-motivational state 
determines the 
experience of a pain stimulus. It serves as a possible example of the way 
in which both 
between individual differences and within-individual variation in pain threshold may 
be 
understood. 
Between-individual differences in the perception of pain have been studied extensively. 
Factors such as sex, ethnicity and cultural affiliation and personality 
(as discussed in 
Chapter Two) have long been known to be relatively reliable predictors of 
traits in the 
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perception and reporting ofpain. It was suggested that these factors, rather than constituting 
direct influencesper se, are simply terms describing socially (and partly biologically In the 
case of sex) acquired differences in long-term cognitive structures related to constructs such 
as locus of control, self-efficacy and gender-role stereotypes. Evidence was reviewed 
showing that the repeated laying down of associations between a painful event and socially 
appropriate response (according to gender, familial and cultural nonns within a given 
society) can result in long-term changes in limbic structures associated with emotional 
processing (e. g. Bates et al., 1993; Davidson et al., 2000). 
It is suggested that the socially acquired differences in long-terin cognitive structures serve 
as 'trait-detenninants' in the perception and response to pain or potentially painful 
situations. That is, these stable combinations of chronically accessible trait constructs exert 
a stable influence on the way in which an individual interprets their situation. In this way, 
they act as 'templates' for the affective-motivational response of each individual to a 
painful event, and thus influence their response to a painful event in predictable ways. 
By contrast, this thesis has shown that the perception of pain by the same individual over 
repeated measures can be influenced through the manipulation of social, contextual and 
environmental features. That is to say, where the same pain stimulus is used (i. e. where 
differences in the qualities of a stimulus are not a factor), differences in the situation as 
perceived by the participants are sufficient to influence significantly their perception of, and 
response to the pain stimulus. 
As noted previously, automatic evaluation is a significant modifier not just of behavioural 
propensity, but of the way in which a person experiences and interprets their reality (e. g. 
Spielman et al., 1988; Todorov & Bargh, 2002). This thesis has shown that differences in 
the content of pre-procedure briefings relating to predictability and locus of perceived 
control, differences in stereotype activation depending on the sex of the experimenter and 
features of the environment in which procedures take place are all significant 
factors 
influencing the way in which individuals perceive a painful event. 
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It is suggested therefore, that where between-indivIdual differences demonstrated in stable 
conditions are attributable to differences in combinations of socially acquired traits, within- 
individual variation is principally a function of automatic evaluation processes which effect 
changes in affective-motivational state and thus the significance of a given situation as 
perceived by each individual. 
People can be 'primed' for pain by their environment. 
The influence that social, contextual and environmental factors have been shown to exert 
suggests that in many cases, people suffer more than necessary (if any suffering can be 
considered necessary). As suggested by Cardinal et al. (2002), emotions probably evolved 
from simple mechanisms mediating basic approach-avoidance behaviours which provided the 
capacity for organisms to seek physiologically valuable resources and to avoid harm. They 
suggest that simple and evolutionarily old brain systems may serve fundamental aspects of 
emotional processing. As noted by Dijksterhuis (2000), the structures involved are still present 
and still serve the purposes for which they evolved. 
It has been shown that the left amygdala is particularly responsive to environmental cues for 
threat or danger (e. g. Davidson et al., 2000) and is involved in the evaluation of negatively 
valenced environmental information across a range of different modalities (e. g. Cuthbert et 
al., 2000; Lane et al., 1999; Lane et al., 1997; Morris et al., 1999; Tabert et al., 2001). The 
ACC also has been strongly implicated in the emotional processing of environmental 
information (e. g. Cardinal et al., 2002; Lane et al., 1997), and also in approach/avoidance 
behaviours (e. g. Davidson et al., 2000). Moreover, cells in the ACC have been identified 
which respond specifically to pain related environmental cues and to the anticipation of a pain 
stimulus (Hutchison et al., 1999). 
As discussed in Chapter Three, these structures are phylogenetically ancient, and evolved to 
fulfill an evolutionarily critical function; to enable an organism to detect and avoid potentially 
harmful stimuli quickly, and without the need for the time-consuming conscious processes of 
identification and classification. Activity in these structures associated with the automatic and 
continuous processing of environmental information (which as noted, 
has been described as 
universal and unconditional) requires neither conscious awareness nor 
intent. 
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The affective-motivational responses to the net valence of incoming information is also 
automatic, occurring within 250 ms (e. g. Bargh, 2001; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Giner- 
Sorolla et al., 1999) as is the behavioural propensity consonant with that response (Chen 
& Bargh, 1999). Therefore it is reasonable to expect that an individual entering an 
environment containing large amounts of negatively valenced information, will 
automatically undergo affective-motivational changes in response to the information in that 
enviroinment. 
Thus in many cases, and particularly in clinical environments which often contain large 
amounts of negatively valenced information (e. g. the chart used in Experiment 5), 
individuals may be 'primed' for the experience of pain. This is to say, that the prevalence 
of negatively valenced infortnation in the environment will elicit a negative affective- 
motivational (avoidance) response, which will influence the expectancies and short-tenn 
hypotheses fon-ned by an individual concerning the probable outcomes of the situation. 
The already negative affective-motivational state is likely to be compounded by the fact that 
subsequent behaviour of an individual in clinical situations often directly contradicts their 
motivational state. For example, presenting an arm for vempuncture (an approach 
behaviour in the presence of an avoidance state). In short, where cues in the environment 
signal a high potential for harm and result in an increase in negativity of affective- 
motivational state and concomitant arousal, any noxious stimulus will be perceived as more 
unpleasant. Therefore relatively innocuous physical stimuli may be perceived as painful 
(and painful stimuli as even more painful) than they would be under different 
environmental conditions (e. g. Experiment 5). 
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Social, contextual and environmental factors may impact on pain assessment and 
measurement. 
The control of acute (e. g. post-operative) pain is known to be most effective when the pain 
is treated prophylactically. Earlier pain control regimen (e. g. strictly controlled 4-hourly 
doses of analgesia) often resulted in 'wind-up 59 . Put simply, wind-up manifests as follows: 
The first dose of analgesia is effective, but the pain returns before the second dose is 
administered 4 hours later. Thus, the second dose would reduce, but not fully control the 
pain, and so the pain would return to non-controlled levels yet more quickly and would 
increase in intensity. Therefore, the third dose had even less of an effect, and the pain-onset- 
pain-treatment cycle would shift out of phase and the pain would quickly spiral out of 
control. 
In practical terms, wind-up is the result of poor pain-control practice. More recent pain 
control methods addresses this by using smaller doses more frequently, and administered 
before the pain becomes intense. This requires frequent pain assessment, and the efficacy 
of the system is dependent upon the validity and reliability of the assessment. 
This thesis has shown that the perception and reporting of pain can be influenced by social 
and environmental factors. The author has often observed practical examples of this in the 
fon-n of disparities in pain report from the same patient responding to enquiries from 
different assessors. This was particularly pronounced when there was a large difference (as 
perceived by the patient) between the assessors. For example, the difference between a 
consultant on bi-weekly rounds, surrounded by their entourage, or a familiar nurse on the 
morning drug-rounds. 
9 
Wind-up occurs in the substantia gelatinosa, and is caused when 
N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors open. During normal 
transmission, glutamate acts upon NMDA and non-NMDA receptors, 
however, Na - does not flow through NM DA receptors, due to 
II 
0" 
blockade of NMDA receptors at resting potential. During 
high frequency transmission at the synapse, temporal summation the Mg - 
results in depolarisation of the post-synaptic membrane to a threshold that releases the 
N12' blockade, allowing an influx of Na , and 
Ca2'. Nitric Oxide (NO) is produced in neurons in response to Ca 
21 
. 
NO readily passes through cell membranes and acts as a retrograde 
messenger to the presynaptic membrane causing more transmitter release, even Nkithout 
stimulus, thus reinforcing the pathway. In short, 
an increase in wind-up results in an increase in sensitivity. 
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The results of this thesis suggest that a way to increase the validity and reliability of pain 
assessment would be to ensure the conditions under which pain assessment takes place 
remain the same. For example, by ensuring that the same assessor is used at each occasion 
(e. g. Experiment 4) and that the patient is not assessed in a novel or more threatening 
environment,, such as a treatment room (e. g. Experiment 5). 
The same principle applies to research situations. Where the conditions are stable, the 
researcher may be reasonably confident of reliable and valid measures of pain (as shown 
by Experiment 1). Where the conditions between measures vary, the researcher cannot be 
certain of the degree to which the participant is responding to their experimental 
manipulation, or (non-experimental) differences in the conditions, thus raising questions 
of validity. 
Whilst this sounds obvious as any researcher worth their salt would understand the 
principles of experimental controls, the results of this thesis suggests that factors that some 
pain researchers might consider irrelevant, may nonetheless have a systematic effect. For 
example the differences between different researchers collaborating on the same experiment 
(e. g. Experiment 4), differences in the wording of pre-test briefings (e. g. Experiment 3) or 
simply differences in envirom-nent, for example, where the original laboratory may be 
double booked and unavailable, 'so we have to use the anatomy lab for this session' (e. g. 
Experiment 5). 
Principles of automaticity may be useful in controlling acute pain. 
It has been noted that effective pain control often involves altering the affective- 
motivational components ofpain (Weisenberg, 1989; 1998). However, this generally refers 
to altering the affective-motivational response to existing pain. 
The results of the 
experiments conducted in this thesis suggests that changes in affective-motivational state 
prior to a potentially painful event can significantly alter the perception of 
that event. It is 
possible therefore, that controlled manipulations of context and environment 
designed to 
reduce negative evaluation and reinforce positive evaluation and expectancies 
within an 
ul event. individual, may ameliorate the experience of an acutely painf 
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Encouraging a more positive evaluation of the situation would result in a lower (negative) 
affective-motivational contribution to the experience, so that a greater pain stimulus 
intensity could be accepted before the advent of pain. Also, in the event of pain, this would 
result in lower levels of unpleasantness being attributed to the pain stimulus and lower 
levels of negative emotional response to it (suffering). 
This has practical applications in clinical situations. For example, as shown by Experiment 
3, the provision of information about an event can have a negative influence on the 
perception of a painful event if not presented concomitant with some means of influencing 
that event. As suggested by Miller and Mangan (1983), in clinical situations in which 
patients are entitled to as much information as is available, although the right to information 
is laudable, it is possible to predict circumstances in which there is a conflict between the 
rights of the patient to full disclosure of information, and the duty of the clinician to 
minimize patient distress. However, whilst it would probably benefit patients to ensure that 
the provision of information was consonant with their coping style, providing information 
only to those who utilize an information seeking coping strategy (i. e. those who request it), 
in reality, it would be impractical to assess the coping style of every patient about to 
undergo an acutely painful procedure. Moreover, in cases requiring inforined consent from 
the patient, it is an obvious prerequisite that all relevant information is presented. 
Nonetheless, under such circumstances, generating the perception of control in the patient, 
may change their perception of an event from one that is potentially unendurable, to one 
that is manageable (as suggested by Thompson, 198 1). As stated previously, control does 
not actually have to be provided, it simply needs to be perceived to be available. It 
is 
suggested therefore (as withholding information is out of the question), that promoting the 
perception of control by encouraging the patient in an active participant role could 
help 
avoid the conflict predicted by Miller and Mangan. Developing the perception of control 
within patients through active participation in their own treatment could 
help to alter their 
perception of the situation as a whole, and thereby alter the affective-motivational state 
associated with it. 
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A practical example 
Providing the perception of control can be achieved very easily, and does not require a 
significant change in practice. As a practical example, this was employed as a technique by 
the author in his role as a phlebotomist on a renal transplant unit. Patients with renal 
problems often require blood tests on a daily basis. Occasionally, patients would be 
admitted who expressed greater than usual, and in some cases extreme, fear of 
venipuncture, and (thus) greater levels of suffering during the procedure (expressed both 
verbally, and behaviourally by wincing, grimacing and flinching). 
In such cases, the author would encourage active participation by the patient, by giving 
them the power to influence events. Firstly, the importance of the tests to the patient were 
highlighted. The patient would be informed of the reasons underlying the necessity of 
taking blood every day, with emphasis on the fact that diagnosis and subsequent treatment 
(and thus the potential for recovery) depended upon the results of those tests. After this, the 
patients would be given as much control over events as possible. The patient would be 
informed that the phlebotomist would be on the unit for the next two hours, and the patient 
should call him when he or she was ready for their blood test. When the patients called, 
they would be encouraged to select the needle they wished to be used from a choice of 
'long' (3 8mm) needles, or 'short' (I 9.5mm) 'butterfly"" needles of different gauges. The 
patients were also encouraged to choose their own preferred site for venipuncture, and once 
the phlebotomist was ready, to give the signal for the phlebotomist to insert the needle 
(having been told that the needle would not be inserted until they gave the signal). 
Whilst some clinicians may hold the opinion that giving so much leeway to patients can 
only result in greater inefficiency (i. e. the need to spend more time with each patient), the 
end result did not support this. None of the decisions given to the patients made any 
significant, practical difference to the procedure, but they appeared to make a great 
difference to the patients. Within a short period of time (usually within a week), 
the patients 
appeared less anxious, more relaxed and ceased showing overt sips of pain or suffering 
in response to vempuncture. As a result, the phlebotomist no 
longer had to spend time 
coaxing reluctant and ffightened patients to accept venipuncture, and 
the time taken to 
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cover two wards and outlying patients actually dropped. Perhaps more important, as 
diagnosis and subsequent treatment, including dialysis (I. e. duration of dialysis and 
concentration of dialysis solution) depended upon the results of the blood tests, was the fact 
that instances of outright refusal dropped to zero for the renal unit. 
Although this is anecdotal evidence only, it is reasonable to suppose that the evaluation of 
the situation by the patient was altered by the shift in the perceived locus of instrumental 
control within the patient-climcian dyad. The phlebotomist was no longer the controlling 
party, but was willing to accept instructions from the patient. It is likely that the perspective 
of the patient changed from that of helplessness; as an individual to whom inevitable and 
uncontrollable things happen, to one of control, as an active participant in their own 
treatment, with the power to influence and (to a degree) direct events. In any event, 
changing the terms of the patient-clinician relationship in the manner described appeared 
to reduce the unpleasantness of the experience to a great extent, for both the patients" and 
(not unimportantly) the phlebotomist (sticking a large needle into a terrified person or a 
screaming child is an extremely unpleasant experience). 
Attenuation of the unpleasantness associated with a painful event is likely to have further 
'downstream' effects. The less unpleasant an experience, the weaker the association 
between the event and the context is likely to be. Therefore, it is less likely that subsequent 
exposure to the same or similar environments will result in a pronounced negative 
evaluation and a strong affective-motivational response. In other words, it would serve to 
inhibit the formation of (or at least weaken) the association between a particular 
environment or context, and a strong affective-motivational response. Subsequent meetings 
with the patients described above support this. After discharge, patients would often have 
to attend the outpatient clinic for blood tests in order to monitor their progress (often for 
months). None of the patients showed any resurgent signs of their Original anxiety or pain 
response to venipuncture. 
10 
it) 
One unfortunate side effect was that these patients appeared to associate the author with 
pain-free phlebotomy (as one patie t put 
to take their blood (in fact two of these patients refused venipuncture and so would always insist he be called 
from anybody else). 
Consequently, the author's workload increased dramatically. 
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Future aims and objectives 
Great progress has been made in the understanding of the nature of pain and the pain 
experience, from both physiological and psychological perspectives, and there is a growing 
body of evidence to suggest that the experience of pain can be manipulated through 
psychological interventions. Similar progress has been made in the understanding of 
automaticity, preattentive processes and their influence on affective-motivational state and 
subsequent behaviour. This thesis provides evidence that the experience of pain can be 
modulated through manipulation of social, contextual and environmental features. This 
indicates that the subjective perception and (preattentive) emotional evaluation of the 
situation as a whole is a significant modifier of the pain experience. 
Whilst for the moment, the degree to which these processes may influence the pain 
experience can only be surmised, as shown, there are examples of a complete dissociation 
between intense stimulation (including actual tissue damage) and the emotional and 
psychological response non-nally associated with it. In other words, pain and suffering are 
not necessarily a direct result of physical insult. This suggests at least the possibility that 
the experience of pain is entirely dependent upon the evaluation, perception and emotional 
significance of the situation. 
Whilst pain is a necessary and adaptive feature which restricts and alters behaviour in ways 
that promotes healing, the suffering associated with human pain can often be maladaptive 
and debilitating. Could it be that humans suffer so much because (as noted by Cytowic, 
1993a) humans are unique among animals in being advanced in both 11mbic and cortical 
dimensions, and that in humans, it is the limbic system that reaches its greatest 
development? In other words, could there be a correspondence between emotional 
(limbic) 
development and the suffering associated with intense physical stImull? 
As discussed, there are recorded instances of individuals suffening pain in 
the absence of 
any discernable physical cause. Pain can be experienced in conversion 
hysteria and 
hallucinations (e. g. Weisenberg, 1977), and can be induced psychologically 
(e. g. Bayer et 
al., 1991). The pain experienced in these conditions is without 
physical cause, but it is 
nonetheless real. This suggests that genuine suffering can result 
from states of intense 
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emotional arousal, in the absence of any input from peripheral nociceptive systems (i. e. 
from limbic activity alone). The opposite, that is, the apparent absence of pain in the 
presence of significant physical trauma, has also been observed (e. g. the Indian hook- 
swinging ceremony and surgery under hypnotic analgesia). Taken together, these opposing 
extremes would seem to suggest two things: Firstly, suffering is the result of l1mb1c activity 
and not exposure to noxious physical stimuli. Secondly, whether or not suffering occurs as 
a result of physical trauma in the first place, is dependent more upon qualities of limbic 
activity than the qualities, intensity (or even presence) of physical stimulation. 
As discussed previously, work in Experimental Social Psychology has provided evidence 
that automatic evaluation processes influence affective-motivatIonal state and behavloural 
propensity. These processes have further 'downstream' effects on explicit emotional 
experience and evaluation of subsequent environmental stimuli. Further, that the result of 
automatic processes has a direct influence on autonomic function, resulting in autonomic 
changes consonant with the affective-motivational state (in preparation for the appropriate 
approach or avoidance behaviour). The work presented in this thesis has extended this to 
show that automatic evaluation processes can influence the perception and expenence of 
a physical stimulus. Taken together, the implication is that automatic processes have a 
significant role in the way in which people experience and interact with their environment, 
at all levels, not just at the emotional level. 
This thesis focussed on pain as one index of the effects of preattentive processes. It showed 
that the effects of these processes were not limited to preconscious affective-motivational 
responses, but (as a function of those responses) extended into the Mllieu of physical 
(tactile) experience. In addition, evidence was presented in Chapter 
Two that there are 
relationships between personality factors and immunological 
function and endogenous 
opiold production (e. g. Bandura, 1987; Wiedenfeld, 1990). In 
light of this, the results of this 
thesis raise broader questions. Are there measurable effects of preattentive 
processes on 
other indexes? If negatively valenced envirom-nental 
features have a negative influence on 
the perception of a potentially painful stimulus 
by stimulating a negative affective state 
accompanied by an avoidance motivation, is the same environmental 
inforination causing 
other (negative) effects through the same mechanism? 
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For example, the triggering of a particular affective-motivational state is accompanied by 
autonomic changes associated with the appropriate (approach or avoidance) behaviour; the 
physical 'readiness' to behave in a way consonant with the motivational state. If automatic 
evaluation processes trigger a negative affective state (and avoidance motivation), but the 
individual is not in a position to avoid the situation, then it would be reasonable to expect 
the conflict between motivation and behaviour to result in dissonance and a degree of 
stress. This may be reflected in (for example) elevated levels of the stress hormone cort'sol 
or a reduction in levels of secretory IgA (or indeed, both). 
Therefore, a logical progression of the work presented here would be to replicate the 
research in a clinical situation in order to test whether the principles shown here generalize 
to both genuine (as opposed to experimental) conditions, and other pain stimuli 
(particularly those involved in acutely painful clinical procedures). Moreover, it is 
suggested that the experimental measures are extended to include stress and immune 
function indexes, in order to assess the possible impact of automatic evaluation processes 
on stress and immune system competence. It may be that clinical environments, built for 
the purpose of treating injury and illness, not only have the effect of compounding the 
experience ofpainful events, but have the collateral effect of impairing the ability of people 
to fight illness for themselves. 
Pain is inevitable: Suffering is optional 
(Unknown) 
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APPENDIX I 
NOTES ON THE NAIL-BED PRESSURE ALGOMETER 
The nail-bed pressure algometer (Figure 25) was designed to fulfil a need for a portable tool 
that could be used to administer a scalable mechanical pain stimulus without any risk of 
bruising or inflammatory response. To avoid applying force to soft tissue sites the nail-bed 
pressure algometer is designed to apply scalable mechanical force to the lunula of the nail. 
The application of nail-bed pressure is common custom and practice on hospital wards by 
nurses checking pain response in order to assess level of consciousness during neurological 
observations on unconscious patients. When applying nail bed pressure, nurses will often 
use a pen, however, during trials it was found that when applying pressure through an area 
approximating that of a pen (between 7mm. and I Omm diameter), considerably more than 
5kg pressure was required to achieve pain threshold in most participants. The optimal edge 
diameter that would reliably elicit pain sensation at less than 5kg pressure (usually around 
1.5 - 2kg) was found to be lmm. This edge was polished and chromed, and is blunt enough 
to ensure that there is no danger of scratching or splitting the nail or causing other damage. 
The measuring components of the machine came from a set of domestic electronic kitchen 
scales, made by Avery Berkel (Salter Weigh-Tronix). This type of electronic scales usc 
Strain Gauge technology. The transducer beam (load cell) is designed to bend in proportion 
to the load placed on the scales platform. A strain gauge is mounted on the beam. The 
electrical resistance of the strain gauge changes when stressed by the bending of the beam. 
The change in the strain gauge resistance is proportional to the bend of the beam. An 
Analog to Digital (A/D) converter located on the circuit board transfornis the varying 
analog signals from the strain gauge Into digital signals that are then sent to, and read 
by 
a microcontroller (comparator). The microcontroller compares the 
digital data to stored 
calibration data, and then processes the digital signals into electronic 
data and sends them 
to the Liquid Crystal Display (LCD). The LCD shows the data from the microprocessor as 
a standard number (le 100.00). Domestic kitchen scales of 
this type commonly have a 
maximum readout of 5kg, and are accurate to ± 
0.01% (5g). 
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Figure 25 Drawing of the prototype nail-bed pressure algometer, front view (top) and 
the floating cross 
member transducer beam and straight edge assembly, side view 
(bottom). 
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Non-slip rubber feet Ba se Control buttons 
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The transducer beam was mounted on a spacer of 6mm steel, which had been measured 
and cut precisely to the same length as the original spacer (to allow exactly the same 
degree of flexion in the transducer beam). This in turn was mounted on a bar of 6mm steel, 
cut to the same length as the stress bar. This allowed the straight-edge to be mounted 
exactly under the point at which the pressure would be applied to the stress bar. Thus no 
force is added or subtracted through leverage. 
Using the Algometer 
The screw is loosened from the stress bar to allow the floating cross member carrying the 
transducer and straight-edge assembly to be lifted clear of the finger rest (Figure 26). 
Figure 26 Cross member, transducer bar and straight edge 
assembly 
a 
The subject places the index finger of his or her dominant 
hand on the rest. The finger is 
positioned so that when the blade is lowered, the edge rests across 
the lunula of the nad, 
but far enough forward to be clear of the eponychiurn 
(Figure 27). 
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Figure 27 Straight edge in start position on the lunula of the dominant hand index fingernail 
Once the machine has been switched on and allowed to zero, the experimenter begins to 
tighten the screw. This should be done smoothly. With minimal practice a constant rate of 
increase can be achieved. During trials it was found that around I OOg/S-' is a reasonable 
rate,, as it generated the most consistent pain threshold reports. The volunteers used on 
these trial reported that the point at which the pressure became painful was "obvious" at 
that rate of increase. The pressure applied to the nail bed is read from the liquid crystal 
display which may be toggled to display grammes (kilograms) or pounds. From trials and 
during the Experiment, this machine proved to be an efficient and accurate tool for the 
delivery of safe, scalable mechanical pain stimulus. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Standard Participant Score Sheets 
V 
You have the right not to participate in this Experiment. Should you choose to continue, you have the right to withdraw at any time, you do not need to provide an explanation. 
Code: ................... 
Your age last birthday (Years): ............ Your sex (m/O: ............ 
Are you: Left handed ......... Right handed .......... (please tick) 
SCORE SHEETS 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This score sheet contains two Visual Analogue Scales. These scales are 10 centimetre lines. 
At each end there is a verbal anchor describing two extremes. To use the scales, place a 
vertical mark at a position along the line which you feel best describes your experience. 
IMPORTANT! 
This study and its results are anonymous. This sheet identifies you using a code, and is 
evidence of your participation. The researcher will sign this sheet at each session. 
Please 
keep it safe and return it to the researcher at the second session at which point your 
participation sheet can be signed. Be sure to bring your participation sheet to the second 
session so it can be signed. 
vi 
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APPENDIX III 
ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STUDIES CONDUCTED OUTSIDE OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER 
Pages x-xi: Participant information sheet as required by the 
Ethics Committee of Great Ormond Street Hospital for Sick Children 
(Experiment 11) 
Pages xii-xvii: Letter of application for ethical clearance to the 
Ethics Committee of The Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust 
(Experiment 111) 
Pages xviii-xx: Participant information sheet and consent form 
as required by the Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust 
(Experiment 111) 
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SUBJECT INFO 4ATION SHEET 
Project title. 
THE EFFECT OF VIBRATION ON PRESSURE PAIN THRESHOLD AND PAIN REPORT 
1) The aim of the study. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of vibration on pressure pain threshold (PPT) and 
pain report. Pressure pain threshold is defined as the point at which an increasing pressure becomes painful. 
2) Why is the study being done? 
The method used to measure PPTs in this study is new. For this method to be used it needs to be 
validated, that is, we need to be sure that it measures the same thing as other methods that have 
been tried and tested. One way to do this is to repeat an experiment that has been done using a 
tried and tested method to see if we get similar results. 
3) How is the study to be done? 
a) General. This type of study is called a repeated measures study. This means that the factors we 
are interested in (in this case, PPTs and pain report) are measured several times. Between 
measuresl we apply something we think will have some effect (in this case vibration). The 
measures are then compared with each other to see if our intervention made any difference. 
b) Measures. The method we use to measure pressure pain threshold is to apply a slowly 
increasing pressure to the nail-bed of your index finger. The moment you decide the pressure has 
become painful, you say stop, and the pressure is released. The amount of pressure applied 
(measured in grams) at the point you say stop is your pressure pain threshold. Immediately after 
this, you score the amount of pain you felt using a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). The VAS is a 
I Ocm line with the words "no pain" and one end, and "worst pain imaginable" at the other. All you 
do is place a mark at some point along the scale that you feel best matches the amount of pain you 
felt. 
Procedure. The measures described above will be taken three times. The first is called a baseline 
measure. This tells us what your normal PPT and VAS score is. After the first measure, you rest 
your finger on a vibrating bar for 30 minutes. At 30 minutes the second measure is taken. Finally, 
after 15 minutes rest, the last measure is taken. The whole procedure takes around 50 minutes. 
4) What are the risks and discomfort? 
There are no foreseeable risks. The pressure is only applied until it 
begins to hurt. By definition 
there will be some discomfort. As long as you are honest and 
do not try to see how much pressure 
you can take, or try to take more pressure than other subjects, the 
force involved Is much less than 
required to cause any damage. 
5) What are the potential benefits? 
There are no immediate benefits to people taking part in this study. 
However, if the method used 
in this study is validated, it may provide a useful new tool 
that can be used in the study of pain and 
more specifically, factors that affect the perception of pain. 
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6) Who will have access to the research records? 
Only the researcher, his immediate supervisors and a representative of the Research Ethics Committee will have access to the data collected during this study. 
7) What are the arrangements for compensation? 
This research has been approved by an independent Research Ethics Comm* ieve ittee who bel' that it is of minimal risk to you. However, research can carry unforseen risks and we want vou to be informed of your rights in the unlikely event that any harm should occur as a result of taking part in this study. 
The research is covered by a no-fault compensation scheme which may apply in the event of 
any significant harm resulting to you from involvement in this study. Under this scheme It 
would not be necessary for you to prove fault. You also have the right to claim damages in a 
court of law. This would require you to prove fault on the part of the Hospital/Institute and/or 
any manufacturer involved. 
8) Do I have to take part in this study? 
No. Should you decide not to participate in this study now, or at a later stage, that is entirely 
your right. 
9) Who do I speak to if problems arise? 
Please contact the researcher, Dave Williams directly with any problems relating to this study. 
If you have any complaints about the way in which the study has been, or is being conducted, 
please, in the first instance, discuss them with the researcher. If the problems are not resolved, 
or you wish to comment in any other way, please contact the Chairman of the Research Ethics 
Committee by post via the Research and Development Office, Institute of Child Health, 30 
Guilford Street, London, WC IN 3ER or if urgent, by telephone on 0 171 - 242 - 9789, ex. 2620 
and the Committee administration will put you in contact with him. 
10) Researcher: 
The researcher who will have contact with you is Dave Williams. You are welcome to contact 
him to discuss this project or any problems related to it on: 0 171 - 794 - 0500 ex- 4130/4131 
during the day, or 0370 - 050 - 1918 at other times. 
Please feel free to ask any questions if there is anything you do not understand. 
I have read and understood the infonnation presented above 
Signed ................................................................... 
xi 
D. C. Williams 
C/o RTU 3rd Floor 
Royal Free Hospital 
Ex.: 4130 - 4131 Chairman of the Ethics Committee 
The Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust 
Pond St 
Hampstead 
Dear Dr Pegg 
I am currently studying part-time for a PhD under a scholarship awarded by the University of Westminster. I am also currently employed by the Royal Free as a phlebotom'st/support worker on the Renal Transplant Unit. 
I wish to perform a study (the third of three validation studies) at the Royal Free, using 
volunteer members of staff as subjects. I have completed the enclosed document to the best of 
my ability, but as the form is oriented primarily to clinical trials, and as this particular study is non-clinical and is one of a series of linked studies, there are many sections which are not 
applicable. In light of this, I have enclosed the following information, briefly outlining the 
rationale behind my thesis, what has been done thus far and the protocol for the proposed 
study. 
RATIONALE: 
The provisional title of my thesis is Pain and Social Context. There is a large body of literature 
on experimental pain which concentrates on subject variables, such as extroversion and 
neuroticism (Miro & Raich, 1992), gender (Feine et al., 1991; LeResche, 1995; Rollman, 
1995), and ethnicity (Sternbach & Tursky, 1965; Bates, Edwards & Anderson, 1993). 
However, experimental subjects are individuals and as such will be affected by the context in 
which they find themselves. The context in experimental and clinical situations is, in effect, 
largely created by the clinicians and researchers. In light of this, it is surprising that with the 
exception of a few studies on the effects of experimenter gender (for example, Levine & 
DeSimone, 1990), no research has been done investigating the effects of experimenter 
variables. 
Experiments investigating the effects of subject variables such as gender, ethnicity and 
personality, overlook the possibility that these factors, rather than being discrete and fixed, 
producing fixed effects, in fact represent one half of a variable social dyad (subject - 
experimenter or patient - clinician), and that what is in fact being measured are 
(at least partly) 
the effects of the dyadic interaction. Snyder et al. (1977) suggest that 'many social stereotypes 
concern highly visible and distinctive personal characteristics, for example, sex and race. 
These pieces of information are usually thefirst to be noticed in social interaction and can 
gain high priority for channelling subsequent information processing and even social 
interaction'. It is argued that social stereotypes also include such constructs as'the scientist', 
'the nurse' and 'the doctor'. Snyder et al. go on to state that I stereotypes can and 
do channel 
dyadic interaction so as to create their own social reality. ' Indeed, the 
fact that scientists, 
nurses and doctors are what they are may be sufficient in itself to alter the affective state of the 
subject or patient. However, further to the 'fixed' factors of social stereotypes, are variable 
factors, primarily the behaviours of the expenmenter/clinician, as perceived 
by the 
xii 
In order to assess the effect of social context on the perception of pain, a new methodology has been designed. This involves a new pressure algometer (designed and built by the author, see figure 1) which applies a scalable force (calibrated in grams) through a straight edge to the lunula of the subjects nail. It was proposed that due to the location of the stimulus, and the nature of the resulting pain, this would provide a highly reliable and safe method of delivering pain stu-nulus. The Pressure Pain Threshold (PPT) measures are taken in combination with subjective pain ratings using visual analogue scales (VAS). It is proposed that observation ofthe relative changes between PPT and VAS measures provide a level of information that is not available using either measure alone. 
Figure I The Nail-bed Pressure Algometer 
Validation: 
Phase one of the research was to assess the validity of the comb mied measures methodology. To 
this end, a series of studies were designed in order to assess the reliability of the method, and its 
sensitivity to physical and non-physical intervention. 
Experiment 1: Test - Retest Reliability. 
To assess the reliability of the method, a repeated measures study was used, involving 22 student 
volunteers (7 male; mean age 30 years, SD 8.26 years, range 19 - 57 years; 3 left handed, 2 male, 
I female). Pressure Pam Threshold (PPT) and Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) measures were 
taken at weekly intervals, on the same days of the week, for five consecutive weeks. Due to time 
tabling, undergraduates were tested between 13: 30 and 14: 30 at each trial, Postgraduates were 
tested between 17: 30 and 20: 00 at each trial. 
The results showed a wide but stable distribution of PPT and VAS pain ratings 
between subjects. 
There were no significant differences between PPT values or pain rating over 
five trials. Repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions for time of day, 
handedness or gender on either PPT or VAS measures. Mean PPT values were 
highly correlated 
between trials (N = 22; r=0.5 8; - 0.95; p=0.0 1-<0.00 
1) and mean VAS scores were highly 
correlated between trials (N= 22; r=0.82 - 0,98; p<0.00 
1). This shows a high degree of within 
subject reliability. 
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of day, handedness or gender on either PPT or VAS measures. Mean PPT values were highly 
correlated between trials (N = 22; r=0.58; - 0.95; p=0.01 -<0.001) and mean VAS scores 
were highly correlated between trials (N = 22; r=0.82 - 0.98; p<0.00 1). This shows a high degree of within subject reliability. 
Experiment 2: The Effect of Vibration on Pressure Pain Threshold 
and Pain Report in Normal Subjects 
To assess the sensitivity of the combined measures protocol to mechanical intervention in the 
form of vibration stimulus (VS), a repeated measures study was performed involving 10 
healthy volunteers (4 male: mean age 34-20 years, SD 6.78 years, range from 26 to 46 years, 
2 left handed, I male, 1 female). Baseline PPT and VAS measures were taken, after which VS 
(Imin amplitude sine wave at IOOHz) was applied intrasegmentally (C7 dermatome) to the 
proximal phalanx of the index finger, proximal to the site ofpressure pain stimulus (but within 
6cm) for 30 minutes. At 30 minutes, a second set of measures were taken, after which VS was 
removed. The subjects remained seated for a further 15 minutes, at which point a third set of 
measures were taken. It was hypothesised that VS would result in an increase in PPT, 
congruent with the Gate Control Theory of Pain (Melzack & Wall, 1965), but, as the context 
in which the measures would be obtained were uniform, that is, no factors were introduced 
between measures to affect the subjects affective state or qualitative assessment of the 
situation, there would be no significant change in pain rating (VAS scores). 
The results showed a significant increase in PPT at 30 minutes vibration (F2,18= 6.57, p= 
0.007). Importantly, the direction of change was unifon-n in all subjects. There was no 
significant difference between baseline and 15 minutes post-vibration PPTs . There was no 
significant change in pain rating across three measures. A small control group (N= 4) received 
VS extrasegmentally (C6 dermatome) adjacent to the trapezium (-16cm proximal to the site 
of pressure pain stimulus). VS had no effect on either pain threshold or pain rating in this case. 
So far, the combined measures method has been shown to be reliable and sensitive to 
mechanical intervention (in the form of vibration stimulus). It has also shown that the change 
in PPT brought about by the application of vibration did not result in a corresponding change 
in pain rating, as by definition a pain threshold signals the advent of pain. Thus, it has been 
demonstrated that in the absence of any significant alteration in the affective state of the 
subject (resulting in changes in the qualitative nature of the experience), the experience of a 
pain threshold will be the same, regardless of the force required to achieve it. 
The following is the protocol for the study I wish to carry out at the Royal 
Free. 
Experiment 3: INFORMATION9 CONTROL AND PAIN RATING. 
PROTOCOL 
The aim of the study is to investigate the effects of 
information and control on the subjective 
experience ofpain. It has been shown that the nail-bed pressure algometer 
in combination with 
subjective pain report provides reliable within subjects pressure pain 
threshold and pain report 
measures. It has also been shown that intervention in 
the form of mechanical (vibration) 
stimulation resulted in increased PPT, but no change in pain 
rating. As a counterpoint, this 
study is designed to investigate the sensitivity of 
the combined measures methodology to non- 
x1v 
physical intervention under stable pain stimulus intensities. The conceptual hypothesis (to 
counterpoint experiment 2) is that changes which are designed to alter the affective state of the 
subject will produce changes in the experience of a pain stimulus, in the absence of any 
significant changes in pain stimulus intensity. 
This study will act as both counterpoint to the previous studies and as a bridge into phase two, 
providing a basis for further studies into social context, in so far as a part of any social 
interaction is the locus of control within the dyad (certainly in a clinical context), and the 
passing of information during the interaction. 
Measures: 
Pain pressure threshold (PPT) and pain rating using visual analogue scales (VAS) will be taken 
from each subject under one of three conditions, termed Information + Control, Information - 
No Control and No Information - No Control, operationalised as follows: 
At the beginning of each trial, each volunteer will receive an identical (scripted) primary 
briefing. This will explain the procedure, provide information on the use of VAS and explain 
the rights of the volunteer not to participate and/or to withdraw from the study at any time. 
After the primary briefing, PPT and VAS measures will be taken. After no less than 10 
minutes,, the volunteer will return for the second set of measures. Prior to the measures being 
taken, the volunteer will receive one of three secondary briefings designed to induce the 
experimental conditions: 
Information + Control 
This time 171 look only atyour dominant hand. Again, 171 slowly increase thepressure. As soon 
as you feel the pressure has become pain, say stop and I will stop. After that, you mark the 
scale again. 
Information - No control 
This time 171 look only at your dominant hand. Again, I'll slowly increase the pressure. 
There 
is no point in saying stop this time. I know your pain threshold value 
is (x) from the first 
measure, so 171 take you up to that value, after which you mark the scale again. 
No Information - No Control 
This time 171 only look atyour dominant hand. 
Again, 171 slowly increase thepressure. There 
is nopoint in saying stop this time. I'm going to take thepressure 
up to apredetermined value, 
after which you mark the scale again. 
The first is essentially the same as the primary 
briefing (control group), providing both control 
and information. The second removes control 
from the volunteer by stating that 'there is no 
or the purposes of this study is 
defined as 'the belief 
point in saying stop this time' (Control 
f 
that one has at one's disposal a response 
that can influence the ai, ersiveness oj an event' 
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(Thompson, 198 1)) whilst providing full information as to what is about to happen. The third 
removes control from the volunteer and also provides no information as to what intensity the 
subject may expect. In reality, the 'predetermined value'will, as in the second condition, be the 
volunteers own PPT as recorded in the first set of measures. Thus no volunteer will be 
subjected to a greater stimulus intensity than they have already reported as their pain threshold. 
A final measure will be taken where volunteers will be asked to rate the second stimulus in 
relation to the first using a five point category scale, the categories of which are Much Less; 
Less; The Same; More; Much More. (this is to allow an even bimodal response range, which 
may be restricted using VAS alone. The previous studied have shown that pain ratings of pain 
threshold stimulus intensity results in positively skewed data, which restricts the usable range 
of subsequent 'lower' responses on the VAS). 
Following the final measure, volunteers will receive a full debriefing appropriate to the 
condition, that is, where the study will be explained to all subjects, it will be explained to 
subjects under conditions two and three exactly what happened and that the second stimulus 
they received was, in fact, identical to the first. 
Initial analysis of data from a pilot to this study (N = 13) under the no control - no information 
condition reveal a bimodal response for the second VAS measure, with means moving either 
higher or lower than the first VAS measure means. 
The main reason for my wanting to carry out this study at the Royal Free is that it would enable 
me to expand my subject population beyond undergraduate students which, if through no other 
reason than age, tend to be unrepresentative of the general population. 
If further information is required, please contact me on RTU, extension 4130/413 1. 
My Ph. D supervisors are: Director of studies 
Second supervisor 
Third Supervisor 
Dr. Tony Towell. 
Dr. John Golding. 
Prof Keith Phillips. 
They may be contacted at: 
Yours Faithfully 
D. C. Williams. 
Department of Psychology. 
University of Westminster. 
309 Regent St. 
London. 
Tel: 01719115000 
Phlebotomist, Renal Transplant Unit. 
xvi 
]REFERENCES 
Bates, M. S., Edwards, W. T. & Anderson, K. 0., 1993. Ethnocultural influences on variation in chronic pain perception. Pain. 52: pp 10 1- 112. 
Feine, J. S., Bushnell, M. C., Miron, D., & Duncan, G. H. ) 1991. Sex Differences in the Perception of Noxious Heat Stimuli. Pain. 44: (3) pp 255-262. 
LeResche, L., 1995. Gender Differences in Pain. Pain Forum. 4: (4). pp 228-230. 
Levine, F. M. & DeSimone, L. L. 5 1990. The Effect of Experimenter Gender on PaIn Report in Male and Female Subjects. Pain. 44: pp 9-72. 
Melzack, R. & Wall, P. D. ý 1965. Pain Mechanisms: A New Theory. Science. 150: (3699). pp 
971-979. 
Miro, J. & Raich, R. M. ) 1992. Personality traits and pain experience. Personality and 
individual Differences. 13: (3) pp 303-313. 
Rollman, G. B., 1995 . Gender Differences in Pain. Pain Forum. 4: (4). pp 231-234. 
Snyder, M., Tanke E. D. and Bescheid, E., (1977). Social Perception and Interpersonal 
Behaviour. On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes, Journal of Personal Social 
Psychology. 35: pp 656-666. 
Sternbach, R. A. & Tursky, B., 1965. Ethnic Differences Among Housewives in 
Psychophysical and Skin Potential Responses to Electric Shock. Psychophysiology. 1: pp 241 - 
246. 
Thompson, S. C., 198 1. Will it hurt less if I can control it? A complex answer to a simple 
question. Psychological Bullitin. 90: (1) pp 89- 101. 
xvil 
VOLUNTEER INFQ'PX4 A TION SHEET 
Project title . 
INFORMATION, CONTROL AND PAIN RATING 
1) The aim of the study. 
The aim of this study is to investigate how different contexts and situations affect how 
people experience a potentially painful procedure. 
2) Why is the study being done? 
This study is one of several studies designed to validate a new method of measuring pain 
threshold and pain rating. Along with other studies that have been done, this study is designed to show that the method can measure the same things that other, previously 
validated methods do. 
3) How is the study to be done? 
a) GeneraL This type of study is called a repeated measures study. In this study, the factors 
we are interested in (in this case pain rating) are measured twice, about ten minutes apart. 
b) Measures. The method we use to measure pressure pain threshold is to apply a slowly 
increasing pressure to the nail-bed of your index finger. The moment you decide the 
pressure has become painful, you say stop, and the pressure is released. The amount of 
pressure applied (measured in grams) at the point you say stop is your pressure pain 
threshold. I[mmediately after this, you score the amount of pain you felt using a Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS). The VAS is aI Ocm line with the words 'nopain, and one end, and 
N worst pain imaginable' at the other. All you do is place a mark at some point along the 
scale that you feel best matches the amount of pain you felt. 
c) Procedure. The measures described above will be taken twice. The first is called a 
baseline measure. This tells us what your normal PPT and VAS score is. Ten minutes after 
the first measure, you will be given another briefing, and will be asked to complete a short 
questionnaire. After this, another set of PPT and VAS measures will be taken. 
4) What are the risks and discomfort? 
There are no foreseeable risks. The pressure is only applied until it begins to hurt. By 
definition there will be some discomfort. As long as you are honest and do not try to see 
how much pressure you can take, or try to take more pressure than other subjects, the 
force 
involved is much less than required to cause any damage. 
5) What are the potential benerits? 
There are no immediate benefits to people taking part 
in this study. However, if the method 
used in this study is validated, it may provide a useful new tool that can 
be used in the study 
of pain and more specifically, factors that affect the perception of pain. 
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6) Who will have access to the research records? 
Only the researcher, his immediate supervisors and a representative of the Royal Free 
Research Ethics Committee will have access to the data collected during this study. The 
data itself will be anonymous, that is, there will be no way to tell which measurements 
came from which volunteer. 
7) Do I have to take part in this study? 
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not want to. If you decide to take part, 
you may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. 
8) Who do I speak to if problems arise? 
Please contact the researcher directly with any problems relating to this study. 
If you have any complaints about the way in which the study has been, or is being 
conducted, please, in the first instance, discuss them with the researcher. 
9) Researcher: 
The researcher who will have contact with you is Dave Williams. You are welcome to 
contact him to discuss this project or any problems related to it on: 0 171 - 794 - 05 00 ex. 
4130/4131 during the day, or 0370 - 050 - 1918 at other times. 
Please feel free to ask any questions if there is anything you do not understand. 
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CONSENT FORM 
Thank you for volunteering to take part in this study. If, having read the information shea) 
you decide you wish to continue, please read the questions below. If you are satisfied that 
the answer to each question is yes, please sign the form in the space provided. If the answer 
to any question is no, please discuss it with the researcher before signing the form. 
1) Have you read the infonnation about this study? 
2) Have you had an oppoitunity to ask questions about this study? 
3) Have you received satisfactory answers to your questions? 
4) Have you received enough information about this study? 
5) Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from this study 
at any time Without giving a reason for withdrawing 
6) Do you agree to take part in this study? 
Signatures: 
Volunteer .......................................................... 
Researcher ..................................................... 
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APPENDIX IV 
Intern al/Extern al Locus of Control questionnaire 
(Experiment 111) 
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FOR EACH ITEM, PLEASE TICK THE BOX ATEMENT YOU 
AGREE WITH THE MOST 
Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much 
1 The trouble with most children these days is that their parents are too easy on them 
Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck 
2 People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make 
One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough 
interest in politics 
3 There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them 
In the long run, people get the respect they deserve in this world 
4 Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognised no matter how hard 
he tries 
The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense 
5 Most students don't realise the extent to which their grades are influenced by 
accidental happenings 
Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader 
6 Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their 
opportunities 
No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you 
7 
People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get on with others 
Heredity plays a major role in determining one's personality 
8 it is one's experience in life which determines what they're like 
I have often found that what is going to happen, will happen 
9 Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to 
take a 
course of action 
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In the case of a well prepared student, there is rarely if ever such a thing as an 
unfair test 
10 Many exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really 
useless 
Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it 
11 Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time 
The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions 
12 The world is run by the people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do 
about it 
When I make plans, I am almost certain I can make them work 
13 It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a 
matter of good or bad fortune anyway 
There are certain people who are just no good 
14 There is some good in everybody 
In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck 
15 Many time we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin 
Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right 
place first 
16 Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing to 
do with it 
As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can 
neither understand nor control 
17 By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can control world 
events 
Most people don't realise the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental 
happenings 
18 There really is no such thing as "luck" 
One should always be willing to admit mistakes 
19 it is usually best to cover one's mistakes 
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It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you 
20 How many friends you have depends on how nice a person you are 
In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balance by the good ones 
21 Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness or all three 
With enough effort, we can wipe out political corruption 
22 It is difficult for people to have much control over what politicians do in office 
Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give 
23 here is a direct connection between how hard I work and the grades I get 
A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do 
24 A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are 
Many times I feel I have little influence over the things that happen to me 
25 it is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my 
life 
People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly 
26 There's not too much point in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they 
like you 
There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school 
27 Team sports are an excellent way to build character 
What happens to me is my own doing 
28 Sometimes I feel I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking 
Most of the time I can't understand why politicians act the way 
they do 
29 In the long run the people are 
responsible for bad government on a national as well 
as local level 
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Researcher only: 
ROTTER9S INTER-NAL/EXTERNAL Locus OF CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE: SCORIN(, 
1: - 11: B 21: A 
2: A 12: B 22: B 
3: B 13: B 23: A 
4: B 14: - 24: - 
5: B 15: B 25: A 
6: A 16: A 26: B 
7: A 17: A 27: - 
8: - 18: A 28: B 
9: A 19: - 29: A 
10: B 20: A 
Score 1 point for each response matching the key above (Max. 23). 
The six items followed by a dash are 'fillers'. 
All itenis in the questionnaire are in A-B order. 
High score = External Locus of Control 
Low score = Internal Locus of Control 
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. 
Psychological Monogram, 80 (1), 1-28. 
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APPENDIX V 
Diagnostic procedure applied to VAS pain rating data 
to correct for marked heterogeneity of variance 
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BOX AND COX DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURE. 
Diagnostic and corrective procedure undertaken to correct the marked heterogeneity of 
variance within the VAS pain rating data of Experiment 3. 
Stage 1: Diagnosis. 
The means and standard deviations for VAS ratings for the baseline and condition measures 
were calculated (Table 10). 
Table 10. Means and standard deviations of VAS ratings at baseline 
and condition measures. 
GROUP VAS 1 VAS 2 
Mean SD Mean SD 
I+C 25.42 19.36 22.26 17.25 
I-NC 35.19 22.67 37.48 24.57 
NI-NC 36.81 24.26 28.10 27.29 
Logs of the means and standard deviations were taken (Table 11). 
Table 11. Logs of means and standard deviations. 
GROUP VAS 1 VAS 2 
Log (R) Log (SD) Log (R) 
_ 
Log (SD) 
I+C 1.405 1.286 1.347 1.236 
I-NC 1.546 1.355 1.573 1.390 
NI-NC 1.565 1.384 1.448 
1.436 
Log(SD) values were plotted against log 
(5-<) for each cell in the design (FigLire 28). The 
plot demonstrates a linear relationship 
between log (5ý, ) and log (SD). 
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Figure 28 Plot of log (SID) against log (57<) 
Stage 2. Appropriate re-expression of data 
According to Box and Cox (1964), selection of the appropriate transformation depends 
upon the value given by the forinula: X-) = X(I-b) (see Table 12), where b is the slope 
(regression coefficient) of the regression line 
Table 12. Conventional transformations indicated by X' = X(I-b) (Box & Cox, 1964). 
b1-b TRANSFORMATION 
0 X, = x (Untransformed) 
0.5 0.5 XO-5 = 
NX 
(Square root) 
1 0 X, = Log (By convention Log,, transforination) 
1.5 -0.5 
X-0.5 = 
Nl/X 
(Square root of the reciprocal) 
2 -1 X-1 = I/x 
(Reciprocal) 
The regression coefficient for the VAS data was calculated: b=0.54 and I-b=0.46. Thus, 
according to the conventions presented in Table 3, a square root transforniation was 
appropriate. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Experimenter instructions and briefing script 
Experiment IV 
xxix 
PROCEDURE 
I will have the lab set out for you. I will also attend the 'female experimenter' sessions, but 
will be outside the lab. 
Materials: 
I have provided a PPT score sheet, 10 sets of score sheets and a watch with a sweep hand, 
or a stopwatch. The score sheets consist of a cover page (I" session only) and two pairs of VAS scales (one for anxiety, one for pain). The cover page contains instructions to the 
participant on the use of VAS scales. The cover page and each pair of VAS scales are 
uniquely labelled. 
When the participant enters the room, greet them and ask them to sit down. Read 
them the first section of the briefing (asking them to read the instructions). If they 
are still unsure how to use VAS scales, paraphrase the instructions for them. 
When they are confident that they can use the VAS scales, ask them to complete the 
first scale (anxiety). 
After they have done so, continue with the briefing. Try to stick closely to the script, 
but be natural. Your demeanour should be normal/neutral, as you would be dealing 
with any student you don't know under any other circumstance. The script is simply 
to control Experimenter/Pt interaction (i. e. to ensure that each participant receives 
the same information in more or less the same manner, over the same period of 
time). 
If they have any questions at the end of the briefing, paraphrase the relevant section 
(as concisely as possible). 
When you are satisfied that they know what they are doing, take the first PPT using 
the index finger of the non-dominant hand (the first reading is usually the lower 
of the two,, and serves to reduce bias due to initial anxiety). Record the force on the 
PPT score sheet, using the highest value you saw before the participant said 'stop' 
(the participant should not see the value, it gives them a 'target'). 
If the participant is happy to continue, take the trial PPT in the same manner from 
the dominant hand and record the reading on the PPT score sheet. 
Having recorded both PPT measures, ask the participant to complete the pain 
VAS. 
When they have done so, thank them and explain that a full debriefing cannot be 
given until the end of the experiment. At that time 
I will issue full debriefing sheets. 
If any participant has any concerns or wishes to 
be debriefed before the end of the 
experiment, give them my contact details and 
I will provide them ", ith a full 
debrief 
xxx 
NB: Before they leave, give them the cover page from their score sheets, and 
remind them that they have to keep it safe and present it at their second 
session. 
Between their leaving the room and the next participant entering, copy the PPT 
values from the rough sheet to the boxes provided under their pain VAS (dummy 
trial in box 1, real trial in box 2). This way, all the data pertaining to any participant 
is kept on their individual sheets, and we won't mix them up, or lose them. 
The score sheets should be given to the next experimenter ready for the second 
session (if crossover), or kept for the second session by the same experimenter (if 
control). 
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BRIEFING SCRIPT 
Before we do the experiment, I'll give you a moment to read the instructions on the score 
sheets and fill in the blanks. 
(After participants have read the instructions) 
Do you understand how to use the VAS scales? 
Using the first scale, please indicate how nervous you are about doing this test. 
(Once they have done so, continue .. ) 
This test is designed to measure pain threshold. This doesn't mean how much pain you can 
take, or for how long, it means the point at which the pressure becomes painful. This isn't 
a competition. Your scores aren't going to be compared with anyone else's, they'll all be 
added to find an overall average. 
When you're ready, I'll ask you to place the index finger of your dominant hand on the plate, 
then I'll slowly tighten the screw and you'll feel the pressure increase. The moment the 
pressure becomes painful, say "stop" and I'll stop. 
This procedure is perfectly safe and won't even leave a mark as long as you don't try to see 
how much you can take. As I said, this isn't a competition 
Please don't think too long and be as honest as possible when you fill out the score sheets, 
your fist response is always the best. 
Do you have any questions? 
This first test will be a'dummy run', so you'll know what to expect. For this we'll use your 
non-dominant hand. 
(Record 'dummy'PPT, then continue .. ) 
Now we'll take the same measure using your dominant hand. This will 
be the one you score 
on the VAS scale, ok? 
(Record 'real'PPT, then continue .. ) 
Finally, using the second VAS scale, please rate the amount of pain you 
felt during the 
second trial. 
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APPENDIX V11 
Standardised briefing and debriefing script 
Experiment V 
xxxill 
POSTER STUDY BRIEFING AND DEBRI 
This experiment is part of an on-going investigation into factors influencing the perception of pain. 
All we need in this experiment is a simple measure of your pain threshold. This does not mean how much pain you can take, or for how long, it means the point at which you decide the pressure becomes painful. 
Here is a set of score sheets. Please read the instructions on the first page and fill in the details where required. 
Are you happy about how to use VAS scales? 
Please turn to the first scale and complete it as appropriate. Don't think too long about it, 
your most immediate response is always the best. 
The first measure I'll take will be from the index finger of your non-dominant hand. This is 
a practice run, just to give you an idea of how it feels and what to expect. You do not score 
this measure. 
Do you have any questions? 
01s', place your finger on the rest, and when you're ready, I'll begin to increase the pressure 
slowly. As soon as you decide the pressure has become painful, say stop, and I'll stop. 
(Take measure) 
That was the practice run. Now I'll take the test measure. The procedure is exactly the same, 
but this time we use the index finger of your dominant hand, OK? Remember, as soon as you 
decide the pressure has become painful, say stop, and I will stop. 
(Take measure) 
Please score the final scale now. 
Probe: 
OK, that's all done. I'll sign your participation time sheet now. VvThile I'm doing that, can you 
tell me what you think this experiment was testing for? 
I noticed you were looking at that poster on the wall. 
Did you think that was anything to do with the experiment? 
Have you ever seen a poster like that before? 
It comes fi7om a hospital. Posters like that are quite common in 
hospitals. Have you worked 
in, or visited a clinic or hospital recently? 
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Debriefing 
Experimental group: 
This experiment was testing the effects of features of the environment on the perception of 
a painful stimulus. That poster is the experimental stimulus and there were in fact two 
groups. You were a member ofthe experimental group. The only difference between groups 
was that for the other group, the poster was absent and the wall was bare. This experiment 
is testing the hypothesis that the mere presence of that poster will influence the way in 
which you perceive this situation, and that this influence will be reflected in a difference 
in pain threshold measures between this group and the neutral group. 
Do you have any issues or concems relating to this study or the poster? 
Do you have any questions or comments at all? 
Please DO NOT discuss this study with any other students. 
Neutral group: 
This experiment was testing the effects of features of the environment on the perception of 
a painful stimulus. There were in fact two groups. You were a member of the neutral group. 
The only difference between groups was that for the other group, a poster was pinned to the 
wall behind me. This experiment is testing the hypothesis that the mere presence of the 
poster will influence the way in which participants perceive this situation, and that this 
influence will be reflected in a difference in pain threshold measures between the 
experimental group and this group. 
Do you have any issues or concerns relating to this study? 
Do you have any questions or comments at all? 
Please DO NOT discuss this study with any other students. 
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APPENDIX V111 
Ethical principles for conducting research with human participants 
From the British Psychological Society Code of Conduct, Ethical Principles and 
Guidelines; January 2000 
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Ethical principles for conducting research with human participants 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The principles given below are intended to 
apply to research with human participants. 
Principles of conduct in professional practice are 
to be found in the Society's Code of Conduct 
and in the advisory documents prepared by the 
Divisions Sections and Special Groups of the 
Society. 
1.2 Participants in psychological research 
should have confidence in the investigators. 
Good psychological research is possible only if 
there is mutual respect and confidence between 
investigators and participants. Psychological 
investigators are potentially interested in all 
aspects of human behaviour and conscious 
experience. However, for ethical reasons, some 
areas of human experience and behaviour may 
be beyond the reach of experiment, observation 
or other form of psychological investigation. 
Ethical guidelines are necessary to clarify the 
conditions under which psychological research 
is acceptable. 
1.3 The principles given below supplement for 
researchers with human participants the general 
ethical principles of members of the Society as 
stated in The British Psychological Society's 
Code of Conduct (q. v, ). Members of The British 
Psychological Society are expected to abide by 
both the Code of Conduct and the fuller 
principles expressed here. Members should also 
draw the principles to the attention of research 
colleagues who are not members of the Society. 
Members should encourage colleagues to adopt 
them and ensure that they are followed by all 
researchers whom they supervise (e. g. research 
assistants, postgraduate, undergraduate, 
A-Level and GCSE students). 
1.4 In recent years, there has been an increase 
in legal actions by members of the general 
public against professionals for alleged 
misconduct. 
to their psychological well-being, health, values or 
dignity should be eliminated. Investigators should 
recognise that, in our multi-cultural and 
multiethnic society and where investigations 
involve individuals of different ages, gender and 
social background, the investigators may not 
have sufficient knowledge of the implications of 
any investigation for the participants. It should be 
borne in mind that the best judge of whether an 
investigation will cause offence may be members 
of the population from which the participants in 
the research are to be drawn. 
3. Consent 
3.1 Whenever possible, the investigator should 
inform all participants of the objectives of the 
investigation. The investigator should inform the 
participants of all aspects of the research or 
intervention that might reasonably be expected to 
influence willingness to participate. The 
investigator should, normally, explain all other 
aspects of the research or intervention about 
which the participants enquire. Failure to make 
full disclosure prior to obtaining informed consent 
requires additional safeguards to protect the 
welfare and dignity of the participants (see 
Section 4). 
3.2 Research with children or with participants 
who have impairments that will limit 
understanding and/or communication such that 
they are unable to give their real consent requires 
special safeguarding procedures. 
3.3 Where possible, the real consent of children 
and of adults with impairments in understanding 
orcommunication should be obtained. in addition, 
where research involves any persons under 16 
years of age, consent should be obtained from 
parents or from those in loco parentis. If the 
nature of the research precludes consent being 
obtained from parents or permission being 
obtained from teachers, before proceeding with 
the research, the investigator must obtain 
approval from an Ethics Committee. 
Researchers must recognise the possibility of 
such legal action if they infringe the rights and 
dignity of participants in their research. 
2. General 
2.1 In all circumstances, investigators must 
consider the ethical implications and 
psychological consequences for the participants 
in their research. The essential principle 
is that 
the investigation should be considered from the 
standpoint of all participants; foreseeable 
threats 
3.4 Where real consent cannot be obtained from 
adults with impairments in understanding or 
communication, wherever possible the 
investigator should consult a person well-placed 
to appreciate the participant's reaction, such as a 
member of the person's family, and must obtain 
the disinterested approval of the research from 
independent advisors. 
3.5 When research is being conducted with 
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detained persons, particular care should be 
taken over informed consent, paying attention to 
the special circumstances which may affect the 
person's ability to give free informed consent. 
3.6 Investigators should realise that they are 
often in a position of authority or influence over 
participants who may be their students, 
employees or clients. This relationship must not 
be allowed to pressurise the participants to take 
part in, or remain in, an investigation. 
3.7 The payment of participants must not be 
used to induce them to risk harm beyond that 
which they risk without payment in their normal 
lifestyle. 
3.8 If harm, unusual discomfort, or other 
negative consequences for the individual's 
future life might occur, the investigator must 
obtain the disinterested approval of independent 
advisors, inform the participants, and obtain 
informed, real consent from each of them. 
3.9 In longitudinal research, consent may need 
to be obtained on more than one occasion. 
4. Deception 
4.1 The withholding of information or the 
misleading of participants is unacceptable if the 
participants are typically likely to object or show 
unease once debriefed. Where this is in any 
doubt, appropriate consultation must precede 
the investigation. Consultation is best carried out 
with individuals who share the social and cultural 
background of the participants in the research, 
but the advice of ethics committees or 
experienced and disinterested colleagues may 
be sufficient. 
4.2 Intentional deception of the participants 
over the purpose and general nature of the 
investigation should be avoided whenever 
possible. Participants should never be 
deliberately misled without extremely strong 
scientific or medical justification. Even then 
there should be strict controls and the 
disinterested approval of independent advisors. 
4.3 It may be impossible to study some 
psychological processes without withholding 
information about the true object of the study or 
deliberately misleading the participants. Before 
conducting such a study, the investigator has a 
special responsibility to (a) determine that 
alternative procedures avoiding concealment or 
deception are not available; 
sufficient information at the earliest stage; and 
(c) consult appropriately upon the way 
that the 
withholding of information or deliberate deception 
will be received. 
5. Debriefing 
5.1 In studies where the participants are aware 
that they have taken part in an investigation, 
when the data have been collected, the 
investigator should provide the participants with 
any necessary information to complete their 
understanding of the nature of the research. The 
investigator should discuss with the participants 
their experience of the research in order to 
monitor any unforeseen negative effects or 
misconceptions. 
5.2 Debriefing does not provide a justification for 
unethical aspects of any investigation. 
5.3 Some effects which may be produced by an 
experiment will not be negated by a verbal 
description following the research. Investigators 
have a responsibility to ensure that participants 
receive any necessary debriefing in the form of 
active intervention before they leave the research 
setting. 
6. Withdrawal from the investigation 
6.1 At the onset of the investigation investigators 
should make plain to participants their right to 
withdraw from the research at any time, 
irrespective of whether or not payment or other 
inducement has been offered. It is recognised 
that this may be difficult in certain observational 
or organisational settings, but nevertheless the 
investigator must attempt to ensure that 
participants (including children) know of their right 
to withdraw. When testing children, avoidance of 
the testing situation may be taken as evidence of 
failure to consent to the procedure and should be 
acknowledged. 
6.2 In the light of experience of the investigation, 
or as a result of debriefing, the participant has the 
right to withdraw retrospectively any consent 
given, and to require that their own data, including 
recordings, be destroyed. 
7. Confidentiality 
7.1 Subject to the requirements of legislation, 
including the Data Protection Act, information 
obtained about a participant during an 
investigation is confidential unless otherwise 
agreed in advance. Investigators who are put 
under pressure to disclose confidential 
information should draw this point to the attention 
of those exerting such pressure. Participants in 
psychological research have a right to expect that 
information they provide will be treated 
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confidentially and, If published, will not be 
identifiable as theirs. In the event that 
confidentiality and/or anonymity cannot be 
guaranteed, the participant must be warned of 
this in advance of agreeing to participate. 
8. Protection of participants 
8.1 Investigators have a primary responsibility 
to protect participants from physical and mental 
harm during the investigation. Normally, the risk 
of harm must be no greater than in ordinary life, 
i. e. participants should not be exposed to risks 
greater than or additional to those encountered 
in their normal lifestyles. Where the risk of harm 
is greater than in ordinary life the provisions of 
3.8 should apply. Participants must be asked 
about any factors in the procedure that might 
create a risk, such as pre-existing medical 
conditions, and must be advised of any special 
action they should take to avoid risk. 
8.2 Participants should be informed of 
procedures for contacting the investigator within 
a reasonable time period following participation 
should stress, potential harm, or related 
questions or concern arise despite the 
precautions required by the Principles. Where 
research procedures might result in undesirable 
consequences for participants, the investigator 
has the responsibility to detect and remove or 
correct these consequences. 
8.3 Where research may involve behaviour or 
experiences that participants may regard as 
personal and private the participants must be 
protected from stress by all appropriate 
measures, including the assurance that answers 
to personal questions need not be given. There 
should be no concealment or deception when 
seeking information that might encroach on 
privacy. 
8.4 In research involving children, great caution 
should be exercised when discussing the results 
with parents, teachers or others acting in loco 
parentis, since evaluative statements may carry 
unintended weight. 
9. Observational research 
9.1 Studies based upon observation must 
respect the privacy and psychological well-being 
of the individuals studied. Unless 
those 
observed give their consent to being observed, 
observational research is only acceptable 
in 
situations where those observed would expect 
to be observed by strangers. Additionally, 
particular account should be taken of 
local 
cultural values and of the possibility of 
intruding 
upon the privacy of individuals who, even 
while 
in a normally public space, may believe they are 
unobserved. 
10. Giving advice 
10.1 During research, an investigator may obtain 
evidence of psychological or physical problems of 
which a participant is, apparently, unaware. In 
such a case, the investigator has a responsibility 
to inform the participant if the investigator 
believes that by not doing so the participant's 
future well being may be endangered. 
10.2 If, in the normal course of psychological 
research, or as a result of problems detected as 
in 10.1, a participant solicits advice concerning 
educational, personality, behavioural or health 
issues, caution should be exercised. If the issue 
is serious and the investigator is not qualified to 
offer assistance, the appropriate source of 
professional advice should be recommended. 
Further details on the giving of advice will be 
found in the Society's Code of Conduct. 
10.3 In some kinds of investigation the giving of 
advice is appropriate if this forms an intrinsic part 
of the research and has been agreed in advance. 
11. Colleagues 
11.1 Investigators share responsibility for the 
ethical treatment of research participants with 
their collaborators, assistants, students and 
employees. A psychologist who believes that 
another psychologist or investigator may be 
conducting research that is not in accordance 
with the principles above should encourage that 
investigator to re-evaluate the research. 
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